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ABSTRACT 
 
BRANDING AGAINST CLOSURE: NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS AND THE  
MANAGEMENT OF RISKY FUTURES 
Julia A. McWilliams 
Kathleen D. Hall 
Philadelphia is one of many distressed American urban school districts, from 
Chicago to New Orleans, that has embraced market-based responses like school closures 
to tackle entrenched problems of funding and academic performance. While urban 
districts have increasingly appropriated closures-as-policy, little scholarship interrogates 
the sweeping social and organizational changes in governance and praxis that schools 
make when faced its explicit ultimatum: compete or close. Applying a framework 
developed in the anthropologies of branding and value, this dissertation explores school 
leaders’ fraught responses to imminent closure as they attempted to make their “value” 
legible in an expanding marketplace of school choice. Through a three-year ethnographic 
case study of an ethnically diverse neighborhood school slated for closure, I examine how 
the school’s strategies to remain open hinged on the selective enrollment and retention of 
students deemed “valuable” to their imagined brand. As these practices indexed raced 
notions of “value”, I analyze how school branding processes deepen racialized disparities 
in educational provision.  
Methods include over 200 semi-structured interviews with students, teachers, and 
administrators, participant observation in classrooms, district offices and meetings, and 
document analysis. As closures continue to threaten urban public schools across the 
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United States, this study uniquely captures the dilemmas that surface in educational 
practice and philosophy when schools prioritize the business of survival over the business 
of educating. Further, I contribute to emergent literatures in educational commodification 
and marketization by explaining how school branding, prompted by closure threats and 
competition for school survival, extend inequities in opportunity structures for vulnerable 
youth.  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION: SCHOOL CLOSURES AND THE PUBLIC 
EDUCATION CRISIS IN PHILADELPHIA 
Photo: Water damage in a neighborhood school classroom. 
Johnson High is a century-old, non-selective neighborhood high school serving 
approximately 650 students in Philadelphia. On rainy days in 2011, the academic year 
that I first began tutoring at Johnson High, water streamed from the ceiling onto students’ 
shoulders as the leaky roof went unrepaired. In the winter, the furnace fired on all 
cylinders, spiking classroom temperatures as students laid their heads on desks, trying to 
pay attention to their teachers amidst the sleep-inducing heat. As I walked through an 
empty top floor of the building, I peeked through door windows of locked classrooms to 
see old chairs piled high as mice gathered in corners to nibble on dust balls (Fieldnote, 
4/13/11). The administration had sealed off this floor several years ago due to alleged 
asbestos contamination. The principal and several teachers complained of the bed bugs 
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infesting the furniture, but there was no room in the budget to hire an exterminator. 
Students pointed fingers at the mold growing on classroom walls that aggravated their 
asthma and sent them to hospitals. The school was suffering from a steady, decade-long 
decline in enrollment, holding only half of the students in 2011 that it did in 2000 as 
shiny charter schools cropped up in both the surrounding neighborhood and throughout 
the city, poaching students and leaving empty seats in their wake.  
When the School District of Philadelphia leaked a consultants’ report in June 
2011, slating Johnson High for potential closure, the school community went into a state 
of panic, searching for a comprehensive strategy to keep the school alive (Herold and 
Mezzacappa 2011). In spite of the century-old building’s shortcomings and school’s 
growing vacancy, those that remained couldn’t imagine an academic home anywhere 
else. Referring to the Johnson High community as a “family” with long-embedded 
histories in the neighborhood and school, parents, teachers, and even administrators 
having attended Johnson preceding their children, understood the school’s closure to 
signify the erasure of those roots, the death of an historic institution that had served 
generations of their families.  
Johnson High managed to evade the closures that rocked neighborhood schools 
across the city for two years after the district’s initial school closure announcement. From 
2012 to 2013, the School District of Philadelphia closed 30 district-run neighborhood 
schools, in part to address a $1.35 billion budget gap (School District of Philadelphia 
2013). Twenty-four closures coincided with passing of the “doomsday budget” in June 
2013 as cuts in state-funding precipitated a $300 million fiscal shortfall for the AY 2013-
2014 school year (Strauss 2013). Philadelphia joins 70 other large and mid-sized urban 
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school systems in the last decade that have closed neighborhood schools as they have 
increasingly embraced the charter sector as a route to expand “school choice”, mitigate 
“poor academic performance”, and cope with severe fiscal shortfalls, particularly in the 
wake of the Great Recession (Engberg et al. 2012). New York City and Washington D.C. 
have carried out school closures en masse over the course of the last ten years. Chicago 
however is the nation’s leader, pioneering mass school closures beginning in 2001 as it 
turned district schools over to charter school operators, pressured by philanthropists, 
billionaires, and policymakers to increase competition and choice in its district’s 
educational portfolio.  
While Philadelphia has garnered international attention as a laboratory for 
experiments in market-driven education reform (Denvir 2014) through its exponential 
charter school expansion (Leitner 2014), contracts with educational management 
organizations (EMOs) (Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon 2011), and partnerships with non-
profit and philanthropic organizations (Limm 2014; Hardy 2014), the years of 2012 and 
2013 marked the district’s first foray into mass school closures. For a district attempting 
to maintain essentially “two education systems”, the charter school network and district-
run neighborhood schools, district leadership framed closures as an inevitable policy 
option in the context of increasingly scarce resources and national and state-level 
incentives to fortify “school choice” options for families (School District of Philadelphia 
2013; Hite 2013). Displacing over 15,000 students from chronically “low-performing” 
and or “dangerous” schools, the closures raised controversial questions, not only about 
the short-term and long-term effects on the children and communities affected, but also 
concerning the precarious arc of education reform in the city (Gym 2015a).  
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In Philadelphia, as in other large, poor, post-industrial American cities, school 
closures, at their core, index myriad tensions arising from the intensified and long-term 
mapping of federal accountability measures and top-down policies encouraging 
privatization onto public education in the country’s poorest urban districts. Standardized 
metrics of “school quality” like school infrastructure costs, enrollment numbers, and test 
scores naturalize school closure as a policy that privileges the laws of the market. 
Promoted as a reform model through the No Child Left Behind Act and Obama’s Race to 
the Top program, school closings have been framed at the national level as a way to 
improve “efficiency”, “choice”, and “quality” as schools compete in the “marketplace” of 
educational options to attract students and raise efficacy or ultimately shutter for 
persistent “failure” (Linkow, Streich, and Jacob 2011). Driven by problematic 
assumptions that the closure threat first motivates schools to improve their performance 
and that second, schools have the resources at their disposal to support improvements in 
performance, the policy unmoors schools from the range of environments and actors that 
produce “school failure”.  
At the heart of this dissertation is an exploration of how the problematic 
assumptions that undergird school closings articulate with the complex social realities 
that stem from their enactment. As Jack and Sludden (2013) point out, school closings are 
rarely a policy option pursued by school systems serving affluent constituencies. 
Operationalized largely by “failing” urban districts in the midst of severe fiscal distress, 
school closings, like other punitive market-based reforms (i.e. high stakes standardized 
testing, teacher merit-pay), inject high degrees of risk and uncertainty into education 
systems already reeling from decades of disinvestment and overwhelming student needs. 
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The policy, as a marketized bureaucratic apparatus, distills schools into an amalgam of 
seemingly “objective” measures that rationalize an ultimatum for schools: demonstrate 
“quality” through competition or close. These measures are divorced from neighborhood 
geographies, school histories, the relations of the educators and students, student 
demographics, and nuanced ways in which other district-level and state-level 
accountability mandates, fiscal crises, and bipartisan politics converge to complicate the 
work of teachers and administrators trying to keep their schools afloat amidst rising tides 
of uncertainty and fiscal distress. In turn, the policy wrongly assumes that schools are 
independent entities capable of governing their own fates, dissociating schools from the 
layered neighborhood and district contexts that influence their resources and capacity for 
“success” (as defined by the policy).  
Whereas punitive yet not fatal measures such as annual defunding or labeling as 
“persistently failing” accompanied other market-oriented policies (i.e. high-stakes 
testing) historically, mass closures represent the next evolution in the marketization of 
public education by creating zero-sum predicaments where neighborhood school 
communities must find ways to demonstrate “quality” according to the laws of the market 
or lose their buildings and livelihoods. In other words, by treating schools like businesses 
and closing them for underperformance, the policy induces prophylactic action to respond 
to the terminal stakes of failure. Understanding how neighborhood school communities 
react to their positioning as endangered commodities in an urban education marketplace, 
made ever more ominous by closures, provides insight into how the introduction of a 
closure policy in a district transforms educational practice in threatened schools as 
schools must minimize risk to their performance. Such insight further offers a window 
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consider how those practices align with or contradict several of the broader, principled 
goals of urban education reform: equity and social justice for poor youth of color (Giroux 
and Saltman 2009).  
To examine closures’ implications for educational practice and reform, I trace 
how neighborhood school leadership, staff, and students perceive the threat of closure 
and how those perceptions shape their organizational structures, climates, and 
relationships within neighborhood schools qualifying via standardized criteria for the 
pool of potential closures. Moreover, I investigate how school communities narrate, 
process, and strategize around fiscal crisis, resource scarcity, privatization creep, and the 
construction of school failure at the state, district, and school levels – common conditions 
that discursively inform the legitimacy and inevitability of neighborhood school closures. 
In other words, unlike the bulk of research on this policy, I do not consider the impact of 
school closures on youth and communities where schools have already been closed, but 
rather how the risk and uncertainty around the policy threat influences the social and 
cultural politics of schools working to resist closure.  
Taking into account one of the central assumptions of this policy, that schools will 
strive to improve the “quality” of their services (Smarick 2010), I argue that a careful 
ethnographic examination of this policy as an interpretative process within schools is 
needed to illuminate the complex responses and potentially unintended consequences of 
the policy on the ground (Deeds and Pattillo 2014). I anchor my study at Johnson High, a 
nonselective neighborhood high school in Philadelphia that has been identified as a 
school “fit” for closure by the criteria established by the School District of Philadelphia 
(School District of Philadelphia 2012a). It’s aged building, declining enrollments, and 
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regressive academic performance over the course of the last decade marked the school as 
closure-worthy in 2011 when the district first issued school closure recommendations. 
Over the course of the three years I spent conducting research, the threat of closure set 
into motion a problematic assemblage of practices, discourses, and relationships that 
contradicted one of the central missions of public education: to “ensure access to equal 
educational opportunity for every individual” (U.S. Department of Education 2015). The 
school, one of the most ethnically diverse neighborhood schools in the city, served as key 
site to explore the ways in which the school closure hazard shaped Johnson High’s 
cultural and racial politics and ensuing strategies around keeping the school open.  
By also conducting ethnographic fieldwork in AY 2013-2014, the year of the 
“doomsday” budget, I captured how political and organizational tumult at the state and 
district levels came to powerfully influence student and staff narratives over their 
capacity to survive as a school with increasingly unavailable resources and capacity to 
perform. Conceiving of school closure policy as a process that involves the “negotiation, 
contestation, or struggle between different group who may lie outside the formal 
machinery of official policy making” (Ozga 2000:2), my ethnographic approach allowed 
me to observe the productive capacities of the policy’s widespread circulation by 
attending to not only one school community’s response, but also its vertically scaled 
logics. I explored district and state-level policymakers and officials rationales for the 
necessity of closures in the midst of a budget crisis, taking note of how their narratives 
and actions conflicted or resonated with the grievances of school-level administrators, 
educators, and students. In contrast to statistical approaches to studying education policy 
that bring the gaze to decontextualized, bottom-line performance metrics, oftentimes 
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providing fodder for market-principled justifications for closure, ethnographic attention 
to closures as process suggest several analytical advantages:   
First, scaled ethnographic engagement at the school, district, and state levels 
allowed me identify and problematize the driving assumption and therefore rationales for 
the policy, that schools improve their “quality” when faced with the risk of closure. I do 
this by showing how district and state policymakers constructed the methodology for 
failure and how teachers, administrators, and students at Johnson High came to interpret 
and act upon the criteria that the district used to define “quality” schools. These 
interpretations informed a set of strategies that the administration, staff, and students used 
to makeover the school into one “deserving” of being kept open yet brought into relief 
the ethically muddled, racialized, and exclusionary dimensions of their response.  
Second, the racial and moral tensions that these strategies surfaced had larger, 
negative implications for peer relationships, the in-school experiences of students deemed 
a “threat” to the “quality” of the school, and also educators’ sense of purpose and value 
as advocates, mentors, and caregivers for all students. The fraught consciences of 
leadership that I capture at the school, district, and state levels demonstrate that school 
closures are not merely an inevitable process that shutters building and sells off public 
infrastructure, but an impetus behind shifts in educational practice that have larger 
implications for age-old purposes, aims, and values of non-selective public education. It 
was only through immersion as a participant observer that I could watch this closure 
process unfold in real time, documenting the lived experience of closures as well as their 
unintended consequences in schools that did not ultimately did not close in this first 
round, but perceived themselves as perpetually vulnerable to an impending round.   
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 In the following sections, I will situate my ethnographic case study of Johnson 
High in relation to literature on market-driven education reform, race and education 
policy, and namely the scant research on school closures. I will further discuss what this 
work contributes to these bodies of work. From there I will introduce the theoretical 
framework that I use to problematize school closures as policy as well as identify the 
central mechanisms through which closure-as-threat sets the process of becoming a 
“worthy” school into motion. Finally, I will delineate the research questions and 
subsequent methodology I used to investigate this process.  
Literature Review 
Market-Driven Urban Education Reform and School Choice  
 In her canonical work The Life and Death of the Great American School System, 
Diane Ravitch (2011) attributes the turn to markets to solve educational problems to the 
release of the 1983 report, A Nation at Risk (ANAR) by the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education. The 36-pg. report delineated a “crisis” in public education by 
examining declining test scores, pervasive functional illiteracy, stagnant teacher salaries, 
and growing turnover rates among educators. Likening the crisis to a “war” on “failure” 
that America must wage in its schools in order to avoid economic ruin, ANAR tethered 
educational mediocrity to ominous market predictions. Embraced by the Reagan 
administration, ANAR paved the way for an era of technocratic, market-driven tactics to 
restore “excellence” to the educational system.  
While Ravitch describes this turn to markets as rooted in panic about the “failing” 
state of public education as defined by the United States’ decline as an economic 
powerhouse, Mehta (2013) links marketization to one of a series of paradigm shifts 
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throughout the 20th and 21st centuries that have shaped a politics of accountability in the 
education sector to “reduce variation and discretion across school in favor of increasingly 
formal systems of standardized top-down control” (1). Within the current iteration of 
these reformers, academics, and politicians identify unwieldy school bureaucracies, lack 
of standards, and direct democratic control of schools as the roots of “failure.” Framing 
“failure” as a problem rooted in institutions, reformers aggressively pursued policies 
promoting “school choice” and “school competition” to improve schools and student 
achievement (Chubb and Moe 1990; Hanushek 1986). Endemic to this movement was the 
assumption that market-driven policies that held failing institutions accountable and 
incentivized “success” (defined vis-à-vis standardized testing metrics) would galvanize 
schools to improve their “quality.”  
Social scientists and education scholars alike have broadly used the term 
“neoliberalism” (Harvey 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Lipman 2011; Brenner and 
Theodore 2002; Apple 2001; Hursh 2008; Giroux and Saltman 2009) or “market 
fundamentalism” (Somers 2008; Cucchiara 2013) to capture the rising moral authority of 
markets in the governance and provision of traditional public goods since ANAR’s release 
in the early 1980s. For the purposes of situating school closure policy in a scholarly 
discourse at the intersection of markets and the citizenship rights to equitable educational 
opportunities, I draw on Margaret Somers (2008) coining and defining of market 
fundamentalism as “an ideational regime” that “subjects all social life and the public 
sphere to market mechanisms” (2). Market fundamentalism has been powerful and 
widespread restructuring force in the governance and provision of public goods in the last 
30 years, particularly public education in major American cities. Intensified high-stakes 
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standardized testing, charter school and school of choice expansion, and privatization of 
public school operations all fall under what Bartlett and her colleagues (2002) describe as 
the “marketization of education,” or the embedding of business-oriented principles into 
policy, school operations, and discourses around public education’s purposes and aims.  
Education scholars have pointed to the roots of market fundamentalism in the 
theoretical assumptions generated by neoclassical economists like Frederic Von Hayek 
and Milton Friedman (K. Saltman 2007; Johnson 2013). These economists posited in the 
1950s that only through unfettered markets could individuals maximize their potential. 
Following this logic, they argued that market fundamentalism necessitated the 
privatization of public resources to improve their efficiency and quality and therefore 
empower individuals through expanding market opportunities. Social scientists have 
traced the historical uptake of these once peripheral theories into mainstream social 
policy in the 1980s under the political leadership of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, (Katz 2010; Harvey 2005; Hall 2005). Katz (2010) specifically argues that 
market-driven education reform mirrors the erosion of the Keynesian welfare state from 
the 1980s to the present. He writes,   
The war on dependence, the devolution of authority, and the application of market 
models also run through the history of public education in these decades. The 
attack on "social promotion," emphasis on high-stakes tests, implementation of 
tougher high school graduation requirements and transmutation of 
"accountability" into the engine of school reform: all these developments are a 
piece with the war on dependence. They call students to stand on their own with 
rewards distributed strictly according to personal (testable) merit…In both 
education and public assistance, the mechanism of reform became the 
centralization of acceptable outcomes and the decentralization of the means for 
achieving them (55-56). 
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Sharing Katz’s view, Lipman (2011) similarly links the turn to market driven-
reforms in education with decline of the welfare state, pointing to a shift in the social 
imaginary that transformed both (poor) urban youth and their families from citizens with 
naturally endowed rights to education to consumers of educational services. Making an 
explicit link between this strain of thinking and school choice movement, Lipman writes, 
“People are “empowered” by taking advantage of the opportunities of the market…One 
improves one’s life situation by becoming an “entrepreneur of oneself”, cultivating the 
image, persona, and resume that enhances one’s competitive position in the marketplace 
of “human capital”” (11). This framing of youth as “entrepreneurs of the selves”, 
similarly transforms schools from publicly funded democratic institutions to competitive 
enterprises responsible for producing human capital for the larger economy. Saltman 
(2007) argues that this tendency for market-driven reforms to fold politics into economics 
translates social issues like educational inequality into business-oriented concerns with 
possibilities for profiteering. School choice and voucher plans in education reinforce 
conceptions of schools as largely serving the needs of the economy rather than the 
inculcation of democratic and civic sensibilities (Apple 2006, 39).  
 These transformations induced by market-reforms in education have prompted 
researchers to examine their stratifying effects and subsequent implications for social 
inequality and citizenship (Cucchiara 2013; Lipman 2011; Brown 2012; Ball 1994). 
Philadelphia, among other major cities like Dallas, New York, New Orleans, Detroit, and 
Chicago, has become a vanguard for market-driven educational policies, particularly in 
the last ten years. As market fundamentalist logics have gained political and discursive 
credence through the passing of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002 and 
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Obama’s Race to the Top program (RTTT) in 2009 (Ravitch 2013), scholars have used 
cities including Philadelphia as a urban laboratory to study the application of these 
policies. Research on reforms in Philadelphia in particular draws attention to the markets’ 
heavy incursion into educational provision and management through contracts with for-
profit and non-profit management companies, the alignment of curriculum with high-
stakes testing, and the explosive growth of charter schools (Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon 
2011; Christman, Gold, and Herold 2005; Gill et al. 2007; Gold, Christman, and Herold 
2007).  
Cucchiara’s (2013) recent exploration of the Center City Schools Initiative 
(CCSI), a public-private partnerships between the Center City District, a powerful 
business improvement districts (BID), serves as a prime example of the tensions that arise 
from introducing market models of governance to public education. Predicated on a 
particular vision of urban prosperity, the policy targeted public schools in Philadelphia’s 
most affluent neighborhood for bolstering and branding in order to retain upper middle-
class families. However, the policy positioned these families as privileged consumers of 
educational amenities while further marginalizing lower-class families that fell beyond 
the catchments. My intent is to draw on this work to situate school closures in 
Philadelphia within the national arc of market-driven reforms over the course of the last 
30 years. In doing so I hope to examine school closures as a consequence of these 
reforms as well as an extension of market-driven logics as they come to restructure 
neighborhood geographies and the urban youths’ relationships to their schools.  
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Race, Education Policy, and the Construction of Failure  
Critical theorists studying market-driven education reform argue for the centrality 
of race as a lens to understand the functions of educational policy and their effects on 
marginalized communities of color. Fundamental to this literature is the notion that 
“colorblind”, technocratic representations of educational outcomes to assess student and 
school “quality”, mask the powerful links between academic achievement and the racial 
organization of society (Bonilla-Silva 2009; Yosso 2005; Zamudio et al. 2011; hooks 
1990; Ladson-Billings 1995). Several scholars argue that A Nation at Risk (1983) first 
ushered in the notion of the “at risk” youth through the tacit lamination of academic 
failure onto particular racial groups (Margonis, 1992; Winfield, 1991). Policymakers and 
researchers defined the label “at risk” in relation to groups’ inadequate educational 
achievement, providing a rationale for the positioning of African-American and Latino 
students as posing the greatest risk to the nation’s global competitiveness (Gadsden, 
Davis, and Artiles 2009). By using abysmal achievement data to construct educational 
crisis in ANAR, O’Connor, Hill, and Robinson (2009) contend that race significantly 
shaped the discourse around risk in education from the beginnings of the accountability 
movement.  
Despite these early efforts to elucidate the institutional and structural forces that 
placed children at risk, at-risk status was commonly reduced to an internalize trait 
or inherent characteristic and rapidly became synonymous with "minority" status 
(2).  
 
Within a similar frame, other scholars have traced the ways in which educational 
legislation pushing privatized, technocratic solutions to educational inequities have 
further perpetuated the conflation of risk and race and the rendering of “institutional and 
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structural” forces shaping the educational opportunities of “risky” students invisible 
(Giroux and Saltman 2009b; Gillborn 2005; McDermott 2007). School reforms 
characterized by high-stakes testing and punitive accountability mechanisms that 
followed the passing of No Child Left Behind in 2002, they understand, as concealing the 
systemic barriers that children and their families confront like health disparities, 
institutional racism, and generational poverty through a language of “tough love and 
harsh sanctions” (Leonardo 2009, 137; Lipman 2011). Terming market-driven reforms 
like those stemming from the passing of NCLB as an “acts of whiteness”, Leonardo 
(2009) maintains that they contribute to a “white common sense” that reduces academic 
disparities along racial lines to the natural outcomes of group competition or cultural 
explanations for the inferiority of people of color. In other words, “failure”, is assigned to 
racial categories and normalized through the taken-for-granted scientific logic of the 
policy. Market-driven reform correspondingly frames schools serving high numbers of 
“failing” students (of color) as “failing”, further collapsing failure and race through 
technocratic rationalities. Since urban schools serve large groups of high-need students 
(English Language Learners, poor children of color) and suffer from chronic resource 
shortages, many claim that technocratic, accountability-centered policy regimes like 
NCLB produce failure by establishing impossible targets without more funds to meet 
student needs (Darling-Hammond 2004; Epstein 2012; Saltman 2007).  
Joining high-stakes testing and accountability, others have pointed to the cultural 
politics of race as focal to the rise of market-oriented reforms like charter school 
expansion, privatization, and school competition. Borrowing from Haymes's (1995) 
racialized metaphors of concepts of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ as equated with ‘good’ and 
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‘white’ and ‘bad’ and ‘black’ respectively, Lipman (2011) maintains that the cultural 
politics of race have provided the fodder to privatize public goods like education. In a 
similar vein as Katz (2010), she attributes the privatization of public education as part 
and parcel of a larger racialized project that constructs people of color as pathological and 
lazy in order to diminish state responsibility and end “dependency” (13). Colorblind, 
market influenced discourses around these reforms relieve the state of responsibility for 
mitigating racial inequality and disinvestment in communities of color and ultimately 
shifts the burden onto those communities to overcome the structural and ideological 
obstacles to realize their fundamental rights as citizens.   
Individual effort, entrepreneurship and personal accountability are the path to 
success. This paves he way for cultural explanations of poverty and race-neutral 
policies and furthers market solutions and disinvestment in the public sphere 
(Lipman, 2011, 13).  
 
As Lipman highlights, embedded within the rhetoric of “school choice” especially, lies 
“racially coded” justifications for the handing over of public institutions to the private 
sector. Pointing to the rollback of affirmative action, “culture of poverty” discourse 
penetrating explanations for educational failure, and individual choice as a route to 
equitable educational opportunities, she understand deracialization as a “silent partner of 
markets.”  
 Given that school closures are a policy adopted by primarily urban districts 
serving disproportionate percentages of low-income youth of color, I borrow from critical 
scholarship that assumes race as central to the construction and production of academic 
“failure.” As districts close “failing” schools, they draw on the technocratic language 
inscribed in policies like NCLB that prescribe market-driven solutions to school failure. 
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Those solutions do not account for the ways in which race and poverty as powerfully 
intertwining structuring forces come to bear on schools, nor how the fiscal crises that 
plague school districts are often exacerbated by market reforms like charter schools that 
further drain resources and students from already disinvested neighborhood schools. By 
using race as a lens through which to understand the dynamics of school closure, I also 
am able to document how race and racism impact the experiences of students of color in 
schools under consideration for closure (Zamudio et al. 2011). The processing of race in 
schools through the praxis of teachers, administrators, and students is of particular import 
to my study as “decisions” made in classrooms and offices are informed by decisions at 
the district and state-levels that rely heavily on the discursive rationalities of cold 
markets. Understanding race’s role and impact in schools under the threat of closure 
requires an multi-level analysis of how race is produced across institutions (Dreeben and 
Barr 1987; Vavrus and Bartlett 2006).  
School Closure as Policy  
 The rationale for school closures is rooted in the same technocratic, market-
oriented discourses around institutional failure that have characterized more extreme 
educational reforms since the passing of No Child Left Behind. Smarick (2010), in his 
piece, “The Turnaround Fallacy”, argues that closing underperforming schools trumps 
other reforms because within the for-profit sector, businesses fail to make space for 
successful businesses in the market, therefore “raising all ships.” Without a market to 
hold schools accountable for their “quality”, low-performance will continue in schools 
unchecked. Sunderman and Payne (2009) tout further benefits to closing schools such as 
transferring students in underperforming schools to better schools, driving existing 
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schools to improve their performance through the closure threat, and creating 
opportunities for the development of new schools. Informing this logic, again, is a 
Friedmanite economic “shock therapy” that envisions school closures as a means to purge 
the market of inefficiencies and allows private providers like charter schools to develop 
more “innovative” educational models (Johnson 2013). Closure policy further articulates 
with accountability rhetoric embedded in national-level discourse around reform as 
educators are held responsible for failing to deliver on the promise of quality educational 
opportunities for children (Duncan 2006, 458). 
According to Deeds and Pattillo (2014), although school closings have received 
considerable attention in the media as a controversial reform, scholars have been slow to 
look at closure empirically. The small pool of school closure-focused studies has tended 
to examine their impact on student achievement and districts’ savings. Some studies have 
suggested that students displaced by school closures experience adverse effects on 
achievement and attendance in the short-run but diminish within the first year of transfer 
(Pew Charitable Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative 2011; Engberg et al. 2012; 
Ozek, Hansen, and Gonzalez 2012). Other studies portend that the negative effects on 
student achievement endure over several years, but that can be mitigated by students 
transferring to higher-performing schools (de la Torre and Gwynne 2009). A report 
released by the Pew Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative (2011) that conducted a 
study of six major cities’ experiences closing schools en masse suggested that the cost 
savings of closing schools is limited, particularly with the growth of charter schools that 
continue to empty seats in district schools. Costs such as maintenance of shuttered 
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buildings, transportation for dislocated students, and moving furniture and schools’ other 
assets diminished both short-term and long-term savings (Jack and Sludden 2013).  
 A even smaller but growing literature on school closures has begun to look at its 
political and social dimensions, exploring not merely closures’ “measurable” outcomes 
but how those relate to questions around equity and notions of social justice. The New 
York Working Group on Social Transformation (2012) conducted a study of New York 
City’s mass closings and found that closed schools had greater numbers on average of 
low income, special needs, African-American, and English Language Leaners than other 
district schools. These same schools also experienced influxes of these high-need 
populations five years before their phase-out, suggesting that exponential charter school 
growth in NYC contributed to a sorting of high needs students into district schools 
(Gabor 2014). The same pattern characterized the schools in the considered pool in 
Philadelphia’s initial foray into closures in AY 2011-2012 (Research for Action 2012). 
This sorting further indicates that the stratifying effects of school choice and 
accountability policies contributed to the conditions of “failure” that qualified 
neighborhood schools for closure.   
 Other scholars point to the flawed logics of school closures as they assume that 
students will sort into higher performing schools once the “failing” school are identified 
and shuttered. Pointing out the unlikelihood that the majority of displaced students will 
have access to the mixed-incomes schools that are located primarily in gentrifying 
neighborhoods of cities (Lipman 2011; Aggarwal, Mayorga, and Nevel 2012; Bierbaum 
2014), and that existing higher-performing neighborhood schools are overenrolled and 
oftentimes still labeled “underperforming” by the standards of No Child Left Behind 
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(Shaw and Schott 2013), research raises doubts about whether closing schools actually 
accomplishes the intended objectives of the policy. The geographical concentration of 
“low-performing” schools considered for closure in the most economically disadvantaged 
and segregated areas of cities helps to explain these flaws as school “failure” becomes an 
index for racially textured poverty (Research for Action 2013). Consistent with Lipman 
(2011), closures often eliminate schools that serve as anchors in the poorest 
neighborhoods. In Chicago, where she does her work, school closures occurred in 
neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of low income African-Americans (55). 
Here one can see the intertwining of race, class, failure, and closure, bringing into relief 
the ways in which the methodology of closures elides important social considerations 
such as the presence of supportive neighborhood-centric institutions tied to community 
histories.   
 Closures have also instigated controversy over what becomes of the buildings that 
are forfeited. While many districts have looked to compensate for budget shortfalls 
through the selling of empty buildings, large proportions of closed schools have been 
turned over to charters, further propagating conspiracy theories of the mass privatization 
of public education (Kristen Graham 2014). According to Jack and Sludden (2013), 
growth in the charter school sector has driven districts to embrace closures because of 
intra-district enrollment shifts as students leave district schools in exodus to enroll in 
charters. In Philadelphia, a consultant report estimated that the district loses $7,000 for 
every student that leaves for a charter school as the transfer creates new costs for the 
district in payouts to the charter school and fixed costs for the student’s former school 
remain constant (Herold 2012). The “financial strain” of the “inefficiencies” imposed by 
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maintaining essentially two separate educational systems, has served as a guiding 
rationale in studies conducted by independent consultants that have recommended 
closures in Philadelphia and other cities (Boston Consulting Group 2012; Socolar 2012; 
Pew Charitable Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative 2011). These studies 
recommend “consolidation” through closures in order to mitigate the fiscal insolvency of 
almost bankrupt districts.  
Other work suggests that many cities have seen a decline in their number of 
school-age children with the rise of the “knowledge class”, young professionals between 
the ages of 25 and 35 that have delayed marriage and children as they focus on careers, 
therefore increasing the overall population of the city, yet decreasing the number of 
children attending schools (Cucchiara 2013; Sanchez 2013). Such studies argue that with 
buildings “half empty”, it does not make sense to keep the schools open. The rise of 
charters however complicates this reasoning as well as raises questions around the 
pressures of gentrification to close schools and privatize. Bierbaum's (2014) investigation 
in the role of gentrification in pressuring the closing and sale of school buildings looks to 
illuminate population and neighborhood change as an impetus behind the location and 
concentration of closures.  
The explosion of charter schools has raised further questions for scholars about 
the dangers privately managed public schools pose to democratic governance of these 
institutions. As Grant and his colleagues (2014) argue, schools have historically been 
considered democratic spaces of collective responsibility. However, school closings that 
precipitate charter takeover have turned schools into commodities that can be bought and 
sold without community participation or deliberation (Saltman 2007; Harwitt 2015). 
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Appointed boards also usually govern charter schools, truncating accountability to 
parents and communities. Many show that charter schools deprive community members 
and parents’ of their right to an active role in their children’s education (Buras 2014; 
Lipman 2011). As previously mentioned, this robbing of rights to participation 
compounds political and economic disenfranchisement historically experienced by the 
communities that school closures disproportionately impact.   
 As I have demonstrated, the limited work on school closures has examined the 
implications of closures for student achievement, district finances, and costs to students. 
A small group of scholars have considered more philosophically the problems school 
closures pose for equity and democratic governance. Therefore, the literature generally 
straddles the technical characteristics of closure policy and the larger political context, 
but very few that examine the political forces at work ‘on the ground’ that shape district 
reforms like closures. More integrated work is needed on this issue to understand what 
Trujillo et al. (2014) writes as central to holistic educational policy studies,   
We need to attend to the political factors that shape district policymaking and 
reform…[and] the ways in which a district’s political history is encapsulated by 
specific stakeholders, and how individuals’ positionalities shape their 
interpretations of district reform. (896)  
 
 Jeffrey Henig (2009; 2013;1995)’s and Dorothy Shipps (2012; 2003)’s argue that 
attention to local politics and paradigm shifts at different levels of scale is needed to 
capture school choice movements’ impact on neighborhood school governance, yet this 
work remains seminal within studies of school closures. Two researchers very recently 
framed school closure policy as a scaled political process by borrowing from work in 
organizational dynamics. Deeds and Pattillo (2014) argue that studies have often wrongly 
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conceptualized school failure as an outcome instead of an “interpretative process” in 
“pluralistic institutional environments” among diverse stakeholders. Studying school 
closure as a process instead of an outcome, they show how competing conceptions of 
legitimacy played out politically between technocrats and the assemblage of students, 
teachers, and community members in a closing school, divergently defining, enacting, 
and contesting failure.  
 Johnson (2013) provides a compliment to their work by not just looking at the 
organizational dynamics of closing schools but the cultural and ethical changes that the 
threat of closure induced. By ethnographically tracing how the school interpreted what 
kind of an institution it would have to become to  “merit” staying open, she demonstrates 
how the policy placed the onus on the school to remake itself anew without additional 
resources. She contends that this shift in responsibility to the school itself “reflects a 
cultural and moral shift in the conception of public schools” as social institutional 
networks protected from the effects of markets and competition to entrepreneurial actors 
responsible for their own fates. Such a conception resonates with Somers’s (2008) notion 
that market fundamentalist logics shift social risk onto the backs of vulnerable 
populations.  
 In this dissertation, I seek to build on the work around school closures that 
conceives of failure as a socio-political process that envelops multiple stakeholders, 
geographies, and institutions. Little work on closures has used this frame or examined 
what Johnson terms the “cultural and ethical” changes that schools feel forced to make 
when confronted with the “threat” of closure. I am interested in the productive work that 
the closure threat does in the institutions that feel its weight, and how the strategies that 
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teachers, administrators and students use to contest the threat, come to bear peer and 
educator relationships and school climates and identities.  
I am also interested to the degree that race and risk become conflated as schools 
chart their futures based on assessments of which students pose the greatest danger to 
their fate as a school.  As long as the “school choice” movement continues to garner 
strength in cities across the country, driving fierce competition for students and resources, 
school closures will remain a policy priority in districts suffering from severe fiscal crises 
and hemorrhaging student bodies to charter schools (Hangley Jr. 2012). As a result, the 
threat of closure will endure for neighborhood schools trying to keep their doors open. In 
contrast to studies that have merely examined the impacts of closures in the same 
technocratic ways in which they are defined by the policy, I contribute to understandings 
of perceptions of threat and the nuanced interpretations and responses of school 
communities to closure.  
Theoretical Framework  
School closure, at its core, is a policy that injects high degrees of risk and 
uncertainty into educational systems as schools are frequently audited by districts vis-à-
vis consultants to determine their cost-effectiveness, quality, and overall worth. 
Neighborhood schools resisting closure therefore must strategize around how to 
demonstrate worthiness to meta-level auditors within an educational marketplace that 
positions them as inferior in the realm of school choice. I therefore draw on three 
theoretical concepts to guide make sense of this process of becoming a school deemed 
worthy of remaining open according the measurable criteria of the school closure 
methodology. This is a process of both intertwined resistance and complicity to the 
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criteria through which the district determined school “worthiness.” First, I bring in 
critical policy literature to ground my project in an approach that foregrounds social 
justice and equity as its values and explores policy in its development as a contested 
process at multiple levels of scale, as well as a process with the capacity to set other 
socio-political processes into motion. I move to social theories of risk and uncertainty 
that focus on the social construction of these concepts as they relate to racialized readings 
of value and danger. These theories help me to understand how risk and uncertainty are 
produced and processed across state, districts, and schools. Finally, I draw on 
anthropologies of branding and value to illuminate how schools fashion worthiness via 
their racialized readings of risk in a market-driven policy environment.   
Critical Policy Studies.   
School closures are not only a pervasive policy priority in urban districts but also 
a product of an assemblage of policies in the last 30 years that have pushed districts 
toward markets as a dominant form of educational governance. Contrary to 
understandings of policies as having linear, circular trajectories (Colebatch 1998; Clay 
and Schaffer 1984), I situate my work in a tradition of research that considers policy as a 
practice of power that implicates diverse agents both inside and outside of formal policy-
making bodies. I conceive of policy as  “authorized text” that “circulates by various 
means across the various institutional contexts to which it applies” and interacts with 
other agents in dynamic processes (Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead 2009, 779; Koyama 
2010). Using the concept of “appropriation”, Levinson and colleagues (2009) see the 
interpretation and incorporation of elements of policy into agents’ “schemes of interest, 
motion, and action” as central to understanding how policy is both officially and 
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unofficially contested and enacted in peoples’ lives (p.779). This lens is couches policies 
within social and cultural worlds that both create as well as reflect those worlds (Ball 
1994). As Shore and Wright (2003) explain,  
Policies are not simply external, generalized or constraining forces, nor are they 
confined to texts. Rather, they are productive, performative, and continually 
contested. A policy finds expression through sequences of events; it creates new 
social and semantic spaces, new sets of relations, new political subjects and new 
webs of meaning (5).  
 
This view illuminates the ways in which networks of individuals at different 
levels of scale imbue school closure policy with meaning and legitimacy. Further, it helps 
us to see the productive capacity of the policy’s circulation as teachers, administrators, 
students, and district officials interpret it, craft responses, and forge relationships in their 
support or resistance for its implementation. Drawing on the ontological and 
epistemological traditions of anthropology, this analysis asks what policy means in local 
contexts, how does it work, who does it serve, and what are its effects on the social? 
Critical policy studies assume the problematic nature of policies as they attempt to 
depoliticize inherently political terrains like schools by making themselves seem 
incontrovertible. Defining “failure” of a school vis-à-vis a series of “standardized” 
metrics therefore becomes self-evident within a policy regime that privileges the 
employment of purely quantitative measures of evaluation.  
The critical policy tradition also allows one to attend to power relations as they 
articulate with social forces like race, class, and gender (Cucchiara 2013; Ozga and Jones 
2006). With regards to the evolution of educational policy in the United States, racial 
politics especially have been central to the structuring of educational opportunities from 
the nation’s beginning, naturalized by the dominant rationalities around race over time.  
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Thrupp and Willmott (2003) argue that uncritical ‘policy science’ oftentimes minimizes 
or neglects to attend to the structural and historic relations that shape school-based 
problems. Critical policy analysis calls for an interrogation of structuring forces like race, 
as struggle, conflict, and politics over issues of equity and social justice that “lie at the 
heart of processes through which policy is shaped” (Gillborn 2005:4). I use this lens to 
examine the role that conceptions of race blur with the technical rationalities of education 
policy in school closures and to situate closure within the social, economic, political and 
cultural urban contexts where they overwhelmingly operate (Lipman 2011; Grace 1984).  
Following this tradition, I do not see school closure policy as a bounded, linear 
entity that trickles down, but as a process that engages actors across sites to create “new 
rationalities of governance and regimes of knowledge and power”(Shore and Wright 
2003:2). Understanding policy as “text” processed across diverse institutional sites allows 
me attend to not only how school-level actors manage the threat of closure, but also how 
closure as policy is created, interpreted, and executed in other realms of educational 
governance. In other words, I am able to not only capture the process that ensues when 
the district produces its methodology for closures but how its circulation further spurs 
interpretative processes of that methodology between and within school communities 
among a range of actors including non-profit partners, neighborhood coalitions, and 
national and city-level philanthropists. I focus particularly on the moral dilemmas that 
school-level actors face as they attempt to respond to not only the threat of closure, but 
also how the threat interpellates other difficult everyday realities of work in a high-need, 
resource-poor conditions.  
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At its core, this dissertation focuses on what school closure means to the 
communities made most vulnerable through its logics. Through the application of this 
particular theoretical conception of policy, I contribute to understandings of not only the 
mechanisms and assumptions that influence the construction of school closure policy at 
macro-levels of scale, but also how school-level actors make sense of their positioning, 
urgency of action, and the logistics and possibilities for resistance. Capturing this sense-
making process brings into relief how the introduction of a closure policy to a district 
initiates controversial changes in the organizational and social dynamics of threatened 
schools that come to bear directly students’ outcomes, educational experiences, as well as 
school climates that cultivate exclusion, fear, and risk management, rather than 
belonging, creativity, collaboration, and risk taking in pursuit of academic and social 
exploration.  
Risk Management  
 Since school closure signifies what Johnson (2013) refers to as a kind of “social 
and civic death”, it serves as a form of injected “risk” into already unstable educational 
systems. Gene Rosa (1998) defines risk as a “situation or event where something of 
human value (including human themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome 
is uncertain” (28). This conception departs from more technical, scientific understandings 
of risk that examine “objective” probabilities of a particular set of circumstances arising, 
usually grounded in the ontological assumptions of actuarial science. Rosa and other 
social scientists understand risk not as grounded in a “real world” but constructed and 
mediated through the defining of social problems and their management in relation to 
actor-oriented values and power relations (Zinn 2008). In other words, they understand 
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“risk” as socially situated and entailing a state of uncertainty where something of value is 
at stake but not inevitably designated for destruction. From here, they question how 
people identify, understand, and manage uncertainty in context. These questions resonate 
with cultural approaches to risk that see not only knowledge but also individuals’ 
sociocultural values as central to their perceptions of risk (Douglas 2013; Wildavsky and 
Dake 1990). These theorists claim that individuals’ values are culturally and historically 
embedded and cannot be separated from conceptions of morality and danger across 
communities (Tulloch and Lupton 2003; Kearney and Donovan 2013; Boholm 2003).  
According to Bialostok and Whitman (2012), while cultural approaches to risk 
have gained prominence across the social sciences and “risk-talk saturates the field of 
education” (1), few scholars have theorized risk in relation to the field of education. They 
point to A Nation at Risk (1983) as starting point for the explosion of risk terminology in 
education research, and the naturalization of the analytic category, “at-risk”, to describe 
and predict student failure, specifically among children of color. Policy discourses 
ushered in by the Reagan administration that marketed fear about the direction of 
education prompted what Bialostok and Whitman argue as an era of “large-scale risk 
management in American public schools” (22). These scholars argue however that “at-
risk children,” “achievement gaps,” and “illiteracy,” pervasive in this discourse, are not 
part of nature’s reality but naturalized through the defining of problems and subsequent 
creation of these phenomena through human systems. In the current moment, “risk” in 
education is produced through market fundamentalist logics. They write,  
In education, we see the emergence of a rationality of the market over other 
rationalities, intensification of standards, intensified control of teacher and student 
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work, and students educated to state their own uncertain futures and pro-actively 
manage potential risks (9).  
 
As Zinn explains, the most general assumption of all conceptual approaches to risk is 
“that the future can be altered – or at least perceived as such – by human activities” (5).  
This turn to markets as a mechanism to manage risk in education is intrinsically 
connected with what Ulrich Beck (1992) described as the “rise of the risk society” to 
suggest that in modernity, people must plan their own life trajectories in response to the 
hazards brought about by modernization. Within “risk societies” capitalist markets 
become not only a consequence of modernization but also a mechanism for controlling 
the risks associated with free market economies – underperformance, ineffiency, 
bankruptcy, and fiscal insecurity. Power (2004) argues that by the mid-1990s, both the 
private and public-sectors were “invaded by varying degrees by ideas about risk and 
management…This phenomenal expansion of the risk industry reflects a number of 
different but convergent pressures for change in organizational practices for dealing with 
uncertainty” (9). The growing strength of market fundamentalism as an “ideational 
regime” in the governance of public goods therefore historically coincides with the 
expansion of risk management, subjecting public realms like education to market laws 
and “enabling citizen-consumers to take responsibility for their own well-being” through 
markets (Rose 1999:141–142). Somers (2008) reminds us that under market 
fundamentalism, governments have shifted the risks of capitalism onto “individual 
workers and vulnerable families” (2), echoing Rose’s (1999) claim that the market has 
not usurped the government but rather that the primary role of government has become to 
enable the market to function effectively.  
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Within public education sector, this current paradigm has manifested most 
prominently in urban districts in two major ways. First, districts like Philadelphia have 
operationalized “school choice” through charterization, creating and facilitating an 
education market which charges poor students and families of color to orient themselves 
toward uncertain futures and select and consume “quality” education as an antidote to the 
risks of cyclical poverty. Second, and more pertinent to this dissertation’s focus, 
education markets, created through policies like privatization and closure, transfer the 
risks and consequences for failure onto school communities. Schools must succeed within 
these state-enabled markets by managing in-school social and organizational dynamics as 
they relate and implicate measures that risk their survival as institutions.  
Because I examine in this dissertation the response of a school labeled closure 
worthy, I draw on this literature to understand not only the how the policy constructs and 
introduces risk and uncertainty, but how schools respond to the deepening marketization 
of public education that this particular policy instantiates. At the district-level, officials 
formulate closure as a response to the construction of school “failure” vis-à-vis high-
stakes testing, declining enrollments in neighborhood schools due to the expansion of 
charter schools, and chronic budget crises that make the renovation of older buildings 
difficult to finance. The policy assesses school value in relation to a narrow series of 
measures that embed risk in the form of fiscal and numeric “inefficiencies” yet does not 
account for the nuanced nature of school environments, community-derived 
understandings of school value, and variables that remain entirely outside of educators 
and students’ control (i.e. building quality) that introduce “risk” to their performance. In 
turn, it induces preemptive action where school communities must systematically deal 
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with the insecurity and uncertainty that accompanies the threat of closure without the 
control and oftentimes capacity to perform to the standards set by the policy.  
I am suggesting here that the concepts emergent within the anthropology and 
sociology of risk are helpful to understand schools within the current system as small 
societies that must chart their own courses in response to perceptions of risk within an 
increasingly aggressive and austere education market – a market reified and deepened by 
urban school districts (with support from their state and federal governments) that adopt 
closures. Further, social constructions of risk not only illuminate the macro-level effects 
of school closure on a larger system of schools, but also how that risk gets translated into 
practice and official and unofficial school policies that seek to manage subjects perceived 
as posing a “risk” to a school’s performance and reputation.  
Drawing on the work of critical race scholarship in education, the social 
construction of risk, specifically as it relates to students, is deeply influenced by 
institutional racism. Research has pointed to the disproportionate disciplining and 
policing of Black students, particularly males, driven by an anti-black imaginary 
naturalized within neoliberal education reform (Leonardo 2009; Ladson-Billings 2005). 
The Black male stereotype crystallizes the behavior and characteristics antithetical to a 
reform movement that seeks to “save” pathologized subjects from themselves through 
educational uplift (Leonardo 2004). Many ethnographers have linked the prison industrial 
complex to the criminalization and perverse treatment of Black children in schools, 
reinforcing notions of “natural difference” between Black students and White and other 
students of color (Rios 2011; Ferguson 2001; Alexander and West 2012). I use this frame 
in conjunction with the social processes accompanying the construction of risk to 
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understand the anti-Black racialization of risk in urban schools competing to remain 
open.  
Anthropologies of Branding and Value  
The commodity exists in a liminal space, caught between itself and what it is not 
but what it reaches for, what it can become (Nakassis 2013:112). 
 
In the previous section, I argued that the marketization of urban education through 
the closure of  ‘failing schools’ parallels the intensification and proliferation of “risk 
management” within the public sector in the last 30 years, making theories of risk useful 
to understand how districts and school communities interpret school-closure threats. Here 
I argue that understanding school communities’ responses to the possibility of closure, 
requires theories of branding as schools compete within an “urban education 
marketplace” of school choice (Cucchiara 2008). Closures, as an extension of market 
fundamentalist logics, have further commoditized the nature of urban public education by 
subjecting schools to market laws like competition and deregulation (Jabbar 2015a; Buras 
2014; Kasman and Loeb 2012). The demands of market competition transform schools 
into commodities striving to not only stimulate consumption, but also to create an 
impression of “quality” that will sustain consumption and drive value over time. Bastos 
and Levy (2012) write that  
At the root of all branding activity is the human desire to be someone of 
consequence, to create a personal and social identity, to present oneself as both 
like other people (e.g. to belong) and unlike other people (e.g. to stand out), and to 
have a good reputation (Bastos and Levy 2012:349). 
 
I draw on theories of branding to understand the process of value-creation that 
neighborhood schools must engage to succeed in an ever-privatizing education market.  
They must become institutions of “consequence” through identity makeovers and brand 
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differentiation. As Nakassis (2013) explains, brands authenticate relationships between 
consumers and producers by transcending their use and exchange values to invoke an 
immaterial imaginary based on “goodwill, reputation, loyalty, and even love” (113). As 
cultural, ideological, and sociological objects, brands have mimetic power to create 
affective attachments between themselves and their consumers (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2009; Chanock 2000; Schroeder, Salzer-Mörling, and Askegaard 2006). According to 
Meenaghan (1995), “brand choice is based on emotional and intuitive feelings about 
brands…how these brands satisfy consumer’s needs and fit into the consumer’s 
relationship with his/her world” (15). More simply, the “image” of a commodity matters 
as much or more than its function, benefits, facts, or features – it is the way that the brand 
exploits human affect that gives it the capacity to extract further profit within the market.  
I apply this notion of affective attachments to understand relationships between 
families and urban schools in the current moment, as the marketplace necessitates strong 
consumer-producer attachments to enable school survival in the face of competition. While 
an emergent scholarship in educational commodification has appropriated this frame to 
explain how organizations like business districts and ethnic associations have “branded” 
schools to selectively attract students (Cucchiara, 2008; Gulson & Webb, 2013), they explore 
these processes in relation to broader institutional efforts to revitalize urban space and 
commodify ethnic identities. I build on this work by distinctively linking branding to the 
cultural politics and exclusionary practices propelled by market-driven policies like school 
closure as schools manipulate raced and classed symbols of “quality” to broaden their 
consumer bases, instantiate their worth, and with any luck, succeed in the educational 
marketplace. Viewing the traditional neighborhood school as engaged in a process of 
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“becoming” valuable to the market through branding exposes how the selective pursuit of 
youth-familial-consumers that both enhance as well as minimize risk to a school’s brand, 
index racialized, classed, and potentially discriminatory educational practices.   
 Understanding how and the nature of the cultural politics and educational 
practices surface around a school’s branding process has several analytical advantages for 
educational governance and theory. First, branding requires school leadership to shift 
their focus to managing perceptions around their school rather than directing their 
energies toward meaningful and time-intensive improvements. Canonical scholarship 
focused on “school improvement”, namely stemming from the Consortium on Chicago 
School Research, identifies the centrality of curricular coherence (Newmann et al. 2001), 
investments in school leadership, and sustained alignment of community and school 
governing structures, to positive student outcomes (Bryk 2010; Bryk et al. 1998). While 
branding does not necessarily preclude these efforts, as a process it obliges school 
leadership to spend vast amounts of time advertising and marketing their schools in order 
to reinforce symbolic associations between their brand imaginaries and their student-
family consumer bases. The gaze therefore falls on improving perceptions of educational 
“quality” rather than improving praxis itself – a process that Gewirtz, Ball, and Bowe 
(1995) call “glossification”. This theory allows me to trace the tensions and conflicts that 
emerge when leadership must straddle the fine line between marketing and improving 
their schools.  
Since the laws that govern the education market also differentially position 
neighborhood schools by giving charter schools they discretion to fundraise corporate 
dollars to supplement their budgets and remove students that violate their disciplinary and 
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academic policies, neighborhood schools operate at a relative disadvantage within the 
market. Overcoming this disadvantage entails finding new ways to effuse impressions of 
“quality” in order to attract enrollments that match the brand imaginary. In spite of their 
mission to serve all students, branding a neighborhood school successfully requires the 
creation and maintenance of exclusivity within the brand. Therefore neighborhood school 
branding processes rest on a central contradiction: non-selective schools must build 
selective brands in order to compete with charter schools.  
Using branding theory to explore this contradiction will shed light on the muddled 
moral and ethical responses to school closure, as schools must purge themselves of 
undesirable symbolic associations in order to establish marketable school brands. Such a 
process problematically transmutes the mission of the neighborhood school to 
indiscriminately operate in the service of every child. Further, understanding how other 
structural forces like budget crises, demographic shifts, and other detrimental policy 
changes outside of neighborhood schools’ come to interfere with this process, will help to 
explain the limits of this strategy to resist closure as forces beyond the control of schools 
stifle or enable schools to “merit” remaining open.   
Research Questions 
Thus, unlike the bulk of research on this policy that looks at the impact of 
closures on districts and communities, this framework uniquely positions me to explain 
how risk, uncertainty, and value-creation, induced by closure-as-policy, shift the practices 
and purposes of public educators’ work from pedagogical and democratic, to 
entrepreneurial and managerial. Moreover, understanding how those practices embed 
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racialized notions of risk and value illuminates how school branding processes, prompted 
by closure threats, exacerbate and extend inequities in educational opportunities. 
Pursuant to this theoretical framework, my research questions explore school closure 
policy as a practice of power that implicates an assemblage of different stakeholders 
including state, district and local administrators and officials, educators and students in 
all neighborhood schools, as well as affiliated partners and community members of 
neighborhood schools, interrogating how risk management and branding work as 
overlapping and tandem processes at different levels of scale.  
1) In what ways does the School District of Philadelphia define and construct risk within 
its rationale and subsequent methodology for school closures?  
a. How has the history of marketization in the School District of Philadelphia’s 
internal policies shaped their rationale and methodology for closing schools?  
b. How are current fiscal crises and partisan politics within the state and district 
influencing their sense of urgency to close schools?  
o How have the district’s decade-long expansion of charter networks 
fueled this urgency?  
2) What strategies do school leaders use to signify/create educational value through 
school branding?  
a. How do educators and youth working in and attending neighborhood schools 
facing the threat of closure, perceive the risk and uncertainty around their fate 
as a school?  
b. To whom and how do educators and youth assign blame for their 
predicament as a potentially closed school?  
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c. What risk management strategies do they understand as necessary to “save 
the school”?  
3) How do strategies to brand schools around selective consumer identities produce 
ethical tensions in educational practice and service provision in non-selective 
neighborhood schools?  
a. What cultural politics surface as schools forge brands around particular kinds 
of student identities? 
b. How do these strategies perpetuate and possibly deepen racialized disparities 
in educational provision and performance for students with the greatest needs?   
Methodology 
The aims of this study are two-fold: 1) To understand how urban districts like 
Philadelphia use technocratic discourses of risk to inform their rationales and 
methodologies for rolling out mass school closures. 2) To explain how neighborhood 
schools’ responses to the deepening marketization of public education (vis-à-vis closures) 
are affecting their social and organizational dynamics as well as educational practice.  
To explore both the historical process that led to Philadelphia’s mass school closures but 
also the subsequent responses that closure policy set into motion in neighborhood schools 
across the city, I conducted a vertical ethnographic case study in a Philadelphia 
neighborhood school slated for closure, Johnson High. Vavrus and Bartlett (2006) 
describe vertical case studies as different from traditional ethnographic case studies in 
their “concomitant commitment to micro-level understanding and to macro-level 
analysis” (96). Vertical case studies are grounded in primary sites like schools, but attend 
to the ways in which scaled social structures, historical trends, and international, national, 
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and local processes shape the site. They write,  
Local understandings and social interactions should not be considered 
demographically or geographically bounded. Instead, in a vertical case study, 
understanding of the micro- level is viewed as part and parcel of larger structures, 
forces, and policies about which the researcher must also develop a full and 
thorough knowledge. 
 
The approach allowed me to understand how the school closure policy came to affect the 
social and political dynamics of a particular school vis-à-vis an assemblage of other 
“structures and forces” like national and district-level politics, policies, and budget crises 
that contributed to a meta-level discourse of inevitability and “common sense” around 
employing privatization and closures as a means to cope with School District of 
Philadelphia’s profound fiscal instability and “failure” to provide “quality” educational 
opportunities to its students in district schools. The vertical nature of this case study 
provided a window into the iterative exchange between state and district level 
policymakers encouraging competition, charter expansion, and austerity, and a 
neighborhood school’s internal policymaking and practices as it sought to calibrate top-
down demands and pressures with its unique demographics, needs, and constraints.   
Data Collection  
Data collection for this study took place over two main periods of part-time and 
full-time fieldwork. My interest in tracking the experiences of recently resettled refugee 
youth in urban schools first motivated my initial entry into Johnson High in early 2011. 
During this phase I served as a part-time volunteer in several classrooms, working with 
teachers and non-profits organizations serving refugee youth both in the school and in the 
larger neighborhood for an average of 15-20 hours per week. I sought through interviews 
and participant observation at this stage to learn about the history of the school, its social 
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context, and the ways it fit into the larger political and social fields of the city and school 
district.  
However, as I volunteered and tutored refugee youth from October 2011 to 
August 2013, a number of charter schools opened in the neighborhood surrounding 
Johnson High, damaging the school’s enrollment. The School District of Philadelphia 
also issued a list of potential schools for closure, on which Johnson High ranked as high 
priority. It became clear at this point that charterization, school closures, and fiscal 
austerity were the central forces shaping Johnson High’s concerns and practices as an 
endangered institution, and, in turn, the refugee youth that I was tracking. This original 
work in the first phase therefore provided a window into the problem that I ultimately 
tackled in this dissertation.  
When I entered the second phase of my research in September 2013, I shifted my 
focus to these drastic reforms, attending to the effects of 31 school closures and a 
“doomsday” budget crisis that wreaked havoc on the district and school during AY 2013-
2014 (Gabriel 2013). I paid more attention to the “verticality” of the school closures 
policy, visiting district offices and conducting 40 structured, semi-structured, and 
informal interviews with state and district-level officials, and observing education reform 
hearings and meetings at city-hall, the district’s headquarters to understand how the 
budget crisis and necessity of closures unfolded in state and district policies. I also 
covered local and national news sources and attended district and state-level policy 
meetings to understand the ways in which crisis informed the discourse around school 
closures. This archival data that I drew upon came from the Philadelphia Inquirer, The 
Notebook, The New York Times, Al Jazeera, Washington Posts, blogs of politicians and 
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education activists, Philadelphia Magazine, Penn Gazette, policy documentation at 
district level such as reports, statistical analyses of school performance, and press 
statements.   
I spent my days in classrooms as Johnson High to observe the concomitant effects 
of the schools closures and budget crisis in the lives of students and staff. I developed 
close relationships with the school’s administration, its teacher leadership, and a range of 
philanthropic and non-profit players that the school drew upon to both fill critical 
resource gaps, gain political capital and clout with connected individuals at the city-level, 
and contribute to the school’s overall branding process. This immersion at Johnson High 
proved the most illuminating as over 800 hours of participant observation, 160 
interviews, 5 focus groups, and document analysis illuminated how school-level 
interpretations of the school closure threat dramatically altered the ethos, climate, and 
educational practices of Johnson High’s educators.  
 Table 1.1: Data Collection Phases  
Phase Data Collected 
 
 
I  
(October 2011-August 2013)  
Part-time 
• 45 semi-structured interviews with 
students, non-profit staff 
• ~800 hours of participant 
observation in school, partnering 
non-profits, and neighborhood  
• Document/media collection of 
district budget crisis and school 
closure  
 
 
 
 
 
II  
(September 2013-June 2014) 
Full-time 
• ~160 structured, semi-structured, 
and informal interviews with 
teachers, administrators, students  
• 5 focus groups with heterogeneous 
samplings of students at Johnson 
High  
• ~800 hours of participant 
observation in school, district 
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headquarters, community meetings, 
weekend and after-school non-
profit programming, and city-level 
political institutions  
• Continued document/media 
collection of district budget crisis, 
school closure  
• Document collection of school-
level and district-level data, reports 
on performance 
 
 Why Johnson High?   
Johnson High provided an extraordinary site to capture the ways in which the 
school closure policy spurred subsequent processes of risk management and branding 
within threatened schools, transforming educational practice, climate, and the identity of 
the school writ large. As previously mentioned, Johnson High received notice early in 
my fieldwork that the district had identified it as closure-worthy using criteria 
recommended by the URS Corporation and the Boston Consulting Group. Based on 
enrollment, building quality, academic performance, and safety, these two firms, charged 
with conducting district-wide audits, scored Johnson High poorly. For the two calendar 
years between initial recommendations for the closures and the closure of 31 
neighborhood schools district wide in June 2012 and June 2013, the school had an 
ultimatum: improve by metrics set forth by the auditors, or accept the chopping block.  
Johnson High’s slating for closure in 2011 therefore offered a starting point to consider 
how the threat of closure influenced staff and student responses.  
The school is also one of the most ethnically variegated in the city, serving 
increasing numbers of immigrant and refugee students not only from the neighborhood, 
but also from across catchment lines. Several factors contribute(d) to its diverse 
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composition. Johnson is nested in a neighborhood that has served as a traditional 
immigrant gateway since the late 19th century, accommodating vast numbers of white 
ethnic Europeans through the first half of the 20th century, and later waves of Southeast 
Asian refugee families beginning in the 1970s (Dubin 1996). Each block around the 
school also served as a home to a particular enclave. In recent years, the neighborhood 
gained increasing numbers of refugees from Bhutan and Burma, a trend that significantly 
altered Johnson High’s demographic (Shaw 2014). These newer waves joined second and 
1.5 generation Cambodian, Vietnamese and Lao families, as well as longer-standing 
Irish-American, Italian-American, and African-American communities with claims to 
particular streets and business districts.  
From 2011 to 2013, Johnson High saw a 10 percent increase in its Asian 
population and a 10 percent decrease in its African-American population. One can also 
see a moderate increase in the Latino population. The latter can mostly be attributed to 
high volumes of unaccompanied Central American minors, mostly from Honduras.  
Table 1.2:  Johnson High’s Racial Breakdown1 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Asian 25.1% 31.6% 43.0% 51.2% 
Black 54.7% 48.3% 35.4% 25.0% 
Hispanic 9.6% 10.9% 9.3% 13.6% 
White 10.0% 8.2% 10.9% 8.8% 
Two or More 
Races 
.6% 1.0% 
0.7% 1.3% 
Total 
Enrollment 
668 581 588 725 
 
                                                           
1
 Civil Rights Data Collection (Ed.gov)  
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However, this 10 percent increase in the Asian and Latino populations does reflect the 
significant ethnic and generational diversity of the Johnson High. As the principal 
explained, district-level data collapses 17 ethnic groups into the Asian category alone.  
Layers of immigration history transposed onto the school by earlier waves of 
Southeast Asian refugees as well as recently arrived populations of Southeast and South 
Asian refugee youth, Chinese immigrants from both the neighborhood and other parts of 
the city, and a small population of Pakistani and Bengali students, complicated notions of 
“Asianness” among the student and staff. “Latino-ness” also became a point of 
contention as Central American students, mostly from Honduras, grew in number 
throughout the year, joining more long-standing 1.5 and second generation Mexican 
youth in their classrooms. At the end of my fieldwork, Tigrinya and French-speaking 
refugee youth from Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of Congo were beginning to 
arrive.  
Table 1.3: Johnson High’s Ethnic Breakdown (2013-2014)2  
Ethnicity Status Generation 
Paw Karen refugee 1st 
Sgaw Karen refugee 1st 
Indian  Green card/citizen 1st 
Tadem Chin refugee 1st 
Hakkah Chin refugee 1st 
Rohinga  refugee 1st 
Khmer Refugee/citizen 1st and 2nd  
Vietnamese Refugee/citizen 1st and 2nd  
Thai Green card/citizen 1st and 2nd 
Chinese Green card/citizen 1st and 2nd  
Taiwanese  Green card/citizen 1st  
Bhutanese-Nepali refugee 1st  
Tunisian  Green card/citizen 1st  
Lao  Citizen  2nd 
Malay  Green card/citizen 1st  
Indonesian Refugee/citizen 1st 
Pakistani Green card/citizen 1st  
Eritrean refugee 1st  
Puerto Rican Citizen  1st and 2nd  
                                                           
2 Observed through 3 years of classroom observation – intensive, full-time in AY 2013-2014.  
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Honduran Undocumented 1st  
Nicaraguan  Undocumented/green card 1st 
Mexican Undocumented/green 
card/citizen 
1st   and 2nd 
Bangladesh  Green card/citizen 1st  
Congolese  Green card 1st  
 
Table 1.4: Languages Spoken at Johnson High (2013-2014)3 
 
Johnson High’s extraordinary diversity provided a rich context to witness to 
which students that the school community assigned risk to their school’s performance 
data and reputation. What is more, this diversity offered a window into the racial and 
cultural dimensions of the branding process as administrators, teachers, and students 
made decisions around which students the school could build a valuable brand. 
Perceptions around which student populations were disposed to violence, poor academic 
performance, and truancy, criteria through which the district measured “quality” in their 
                                                           
3 Source: Johnson High Central Office   
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Tigrinya (Etheopia)
Vietnamese
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closure methodology, influenced strategies to contain and/or expel “risky” students and 
attract students that would boost their school’s brand. The school’s vulnerable status as 
well as its diversity therefore brought into relief how cultural politics and successive 
process of racialization powerfully intertwined with the school’s risk management and 
branding processes.  
Community Partners Landscape  
Throughout my three years at Johnson High, the number of “community 
partnerships” ballooned. By AY 2013-2014, sixteen partnering organizations provided 
most of the after-school programming, case management, and counseling at Johnson 
High (Fieldnote, 5/17/14). The absence of a counselor, nurse, adequate staff, and large 
class sizes throughout the school year shifted the role of the partners working at the 
school from supplemental service providers to becoming the core programs that Johnson 
offered. Witnessing the growth of partners and what kinds of organizations were attracted 
to the school and why, offered insight into non-profit partnerships as one of the school’s 
primary branding strategies. Who they served in the school, their stability, and their role 
in a milieu of resource desperation, provided a window into the consequences of making 
non-profit partnerships one of the cornerstones of a school’s survival strategy.  
Table 1.5: Johnson High’s Community Partners  
Organization Focus Resources Stabili
ty 
Type and Funding Source 
*Career Ready  College-going 
and career 
preparation  
Part-time staff, limited 
internship opportunities, 
curriculum support  
Low  Non-profit – 
corporate/philanthropic funding 
*Service for 
Salvation 
Service-learning  2 full-time staff, supply 
and field trip budgets  
High  Non-profit – 
corporate/philanthropic funding  
*College Dreams  College 
preparation at 
career prep  
1 full-time college 
counselor, supply and 
field trip budgets, 
college workshops and 
site visits 
Low  Federal-City initiative with non-
profit and for-profit partners  
*Guitars and Music and After school music, art, High  Non-profit – 
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Hoops  athletic 
programming 
athletic, and science 
programming; weekend 
supplementary 
programming; supply 
budgets; 4 part-time 
staff 
corporate/philanthropic/state and 
federal funds blend  
*Refugee Aid  Tutoring and 
supplemental 
education 
services  
3 part-time staff, field-
trip budget for college 
trips  
Moder
ate  
Federal/non-profit initiative – 
blend of federal and 
philanthropic funds  
Case Managers 
United 
Preventative case 
management and 
truancy support 
2 part-time case aides  Low  Non-profit – blend of federal-
state and private grants  
Latino Advocacy Advocacy for 
Latino issues  
Infrequent in-school 
and out-of-school 
programming 
Low  Non-profit  
Refugee Case 
Management  
Mental health 
services for 
refugee youth and 
adults  
Infrequent in-school 
and out-of-school 
programming 
Low  Non-profit  
Neighborhood 
Central 
After-school 
programming, 
summer 
internships, credit 
recovery 
programming, 
college 
counseling 
Infrequent in-school 
and out-of-school 
programming 
Low  Non-profit  
Special Needs 
Support 
Programming for 
students with 
special needs 
Infrequent in-school 
and out-of-school 
programming 
Low  Non-profit  
Vietnamese 
Community 
Coalition 
Advocacy and 
case management 
services for 
Vietnamese youth  
Infrequent in-school 
and out-of-school 
programming 
Low Non-profit  
Partner 
Coordination 
Provided a 
coordinator to 
oversee 
collaboration 
meetings and 
facilitate 
communication 
between partners 
1 Full-time staff Low Non-profit  
Refugee 
Communities 
United 
Summer 
internships, 
truancy case 
management, 
resources for 
Southeast Asian 
youth, academic 
enrichment 
programs 
Infrequent in-school 
and out-of-school 
programming 
High  Non-profit  
Anti-Bullying 
Advocates 
Anti-bullying and 
racism training 
programs for 
youth 
Infrequent in-school 
and out-of-school 
programming 
Low  Non-profit  
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Analysis  
I followed Glaser (2006) in treating the analysis of data not as not a distinct stage 
of research but something that begins in the pre-fieldwork phase. Analytic notes and 
memoranda emerging from two years of extant data collection, coupled with themes 
related to my theoretical framework and data from full-time fieldwork throughout AY 
2013-2014, informed the refined coding schema I used to analyze my corpus in Dedoose, 
qualitative coding software (Maxwell, 2005). The development of the coding schema 
occurred in two phases. In the first phase I conducted a read of all of my data in on place, 
creating a spreadsheet of emic codes, or short words or phrases that condensed data into 
smaller themes.  
From there I grouped codes into more etic categories, or broader themes that 
corresponded with my theoretical framework as well as the “verticality” of my 
methodological approach. For example, etic categories like “district level” and “school-
level” and or “brand strategy”, “risk management”, “market-speak”, categories that I 
assigned as an outside observer based, allowed me to index more emic categories that 
emerged from participants’ data like “budget crisis”, “charter school critique”, and 
“blaming.” This process was far from linear as emic and etic categories and codes 
overlapped, corroborating the theoretical underpinnings of the study but also pushing 
back. Teasing apart the confluence of forces shaping the schools’ social and 
organizational dynamics proved difficult within the coding as some groups within the 
school focused heavily on the effects of the budget crisis while others remained fixated 
on an impending round of closures.  
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I recorded all interviews and transcribed all but 10 of the interviews myself. As a 
member of the Institute for Education Sciences, Grant #R305B090015 funded the 10 one-
hour transcriptions of interviews. I also typed fieldnotes directly after I returned from the 
field to assure that I re-recorded and refined observations within a few hours in order to 
guard against memory loss. I returned many of the interview transcripts to my 
participants to “member-check” my transcription as well as give them the opportunity to 
strike anything they felt uncomfortable including (Creswell 2007). I have written several 
articles and conference papers, circulating that work to participants to make sure that the 
conclusions I’m drawing are in accord with the data they provided. To refine the 
theoretical framing, I participated in several colloquiums with discussants that are 
familiar with Philadelphia’s educational landscape and the reform history. Their feedback 
bolstered my analysis of secondary data from documents and reports. They also forced 
me to consider other angles from which to approach the data, enriching my theoretical 
framing of the study.  
Researcher Reflection   
 I entered Johnson High in my first year of graduate school after having taught Lao 
youth in the Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic for several years after finishing my 
undergraduate studies. My initial intent at Johnson High was to track recently resettled 
Southeast Asian refugees, namely Burmese ethnic groups from refugee camps in 
Thailand, in their school-to-work and college transitions. I sought to understand how the 
education crisis in Philadelphia was impacting their aspirations and trajectories as 
resources, staff, and support services diminished over time. Since many of these youth 
and their parents in initial interviews cited educational aspirations as their primary reason 
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for applying for third-country resettlement, I questioned how educational opportunities 
for these youth translated into disappointment or fulfillment of the “humanitarian 
promise” made to refugees arriving to the streets of Philadelphia (Fassin 2011). I 
hypothesized that these students would be invisible, that their needs would go 
unrecognized, and entered Johnson High as not only a researcher but an advocate and 
member of the non-profit cottage industry developing there.  
 In beginning part-time fieldwork, I represented what many of the non-profit 
coordinators mirrored: a white, idealistic, mid-20s, female graduate student from an elite 
university with an interest in the experiences of refugee youth. As a result, throughout the 
first two years, I primarily focused on these youth while spending time in their 
neighborhood, classrooms, after-school programs, and at ethnic events. I became a 
therapist, college counselor, job-finder, bills translator, and tutor. In a formal capacity, I 
taught English classes on Saturdays and I became a familiar face in the community. 
Parents and their kids referred to me as a “teacher” and a source of English translation.   
However, as I volunteered with the non-profits and began to immerse myself in 
classrooms, I realized that I would not fully understand their experiences unless I 
broadened my lens and studied these students in relation to the social dynamics and 
resource economy of school more holistically. Though I focused mostly on refugee youth 
in my part-time fieldwork, fieldnotes and informal interviews and conversations with 
teachers and administrators were rife with concerns about Johnson High’s potential 
closure. Concurrently, more non-profit organizations were forging partnerships with the 
school and suddenly I was one of many white, idealistic young adults working at Johnson 
High with refugee kids.  
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This feeling of being “one of many” folks in the school interested in the 
experiences of refugees did not sit well with me. I noticed that compared to other 
students, remarkably the native-born kids, that refugee kids received disproportionate 
support through this non-profit network. They qualified for special programming through 
not only the partners, but also within the larger schema of immigrant entitlements like 
public assistance, social security, and some medical care. I struggled with this idea that I 
had been privileging the hardship of these students for two years, focused so narrowly on 
their experiences that I neglected to understand them in relation to other immigrant and 
native-born youth of color at Johnson High. Therefore, during my full-time fieldwork, I 
expanded my questions to address those of market fundamentalist education reform and 
their impact on the school and therefore the refugee youth that I was following. This turn 
to the school as a case occurred at a tragically advantageous time: the “doomsday” budget 
crisis and mass school closures.  
Ethnographic Work in Crisis 
  I had served as a part-time tutor in several of Johnson High’s ELL classes as well 
as a tutor and teacher for two non-profit organizations serving refugees, but conducting 
fieldwork in the midst of a district-wide fiscal crisis proved much more challenging 
psychologically and methodologically. Ruth Behar (1996) in The Vulnerable Observer: 
Anthropology that Breaks Your Heart, writes of the emotional toll exacted by conducting 
ethnographic work with vulnerable populations and of the ways that we come to 
“witness” and “know” precarity.  
Anthropology…is the most fascinating, bizarre, disturbing, and necessary form of 
witnessing left to us at the end of the twentieth century. As a mode of knowing 
that depends on the particular relationship formed by a particular anthropologist 
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with a particular set of people in a particular time and place, anthropology has 
always been vexed about the question of vulnerability (5).    
 
I turned often to Behar and George Devereux’s work to cope with the blurring of 
boundaries between “anthropologist” and the host of other ill-defined roles I played at 
Johnson High, particularly during fieldwork in AY 2013-2014 at the height of the 
district’s budget crisis and political tumult following the closing of 31 schools. Not only 
did I question my prior work as an advocate for refugee youth, but I also became a source 
of extra labor in a school. Teachers and administrators daily used me as a sounding board 
for the innumerable stresses of working in an increasingly under-resourced school as well 
as their more existential qualms about the direction of the district and their profession. 
More of an “observant participant” than a participant observer, I became not only a tutor 
and chaperone but also a pseudo-therapist for a traumatized staff and student body.  
 Initially I embraced the role of therapist, believing that collecting “good data” 
meant that I needed to position myself to capture the crisis of the school from every 
angle. However, with no resources and overwhelmed by need, obliging teachers’ and 
administrators’ requests for help in their classrooms, tutoring students after-school and on 
weekends, as well as absorbing the palpable anxieties of everyone weathering the crisis, 
began to wear on me. Depressed that so little could be done about the state of the school 
and district, I found myself reluctant to go to the field toward the end of the year as I 
knew that I would be comforting a crying teaching or committing to a weekend of 
helping students look for part-time jobs to help their families. With no clearly defined 
role, I played every role.  
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 The lack of discussion around the profound loneliness of conducting ethnography 
in a crisis-ridden context came to eventually strike me toward the end of the year. 
Holding the stories of teachers, staff, and students throughout my fieldwork without the 
ability to mitigate their suffering rendered me powerless, a steward of their trauma and 
documentarian of the unprecedented existential and practical professional distress. Every 
“education policy researcher” that I knew at my graduate school pulled their data from 
large data sets, wrote their code, and ran their significance tests. I do not make the 
comparison between my approach to studying policy to diminish the rigor or difficulty of 
quantitative research, the dominant form of methodological training in education, but 
rather to point out that anthropologists of education policy are a minority presence in the 
broad field of education policy research. Studying “crisis” and its “effects” required me 
not only to position myself within a school but to forge relationships in difficult 
conditions, collapsing boundaries between my personal life and theirs, and experiencing 
the full weight of Philadelphia’s public education crisis with them as they felt their 
livelihoods and school community quickly slipping away.  
As anthropologists of policy, we must further interrogate the effects of “vicarious 
trauma” on our work, or how “bearing witness” to vulnerability and precarity textures our 
observant participation in context. Quantitative researchers implicitly maintain a distance 
from the everyday realities of the contexts they study, therefore protecting them from the 
psychological toll that witnessing tragedy exacts. Ethnographers aim for immersion, 
becoming part of the process they wish to study through participation in their context and 
deep relationship building. If we admit that such work is needed to further understand 
how these difficult realities influence the kinds of questions we are asking about schools 
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as scholars and policymakers, then in what ways can we support not only this work 
within the academy but also the people conducting this work? My isolation as the sole 
qualitative researcher/ethnographer in a policy program raises important questions about 
the contributions this work can make to field where qualitative work is less valued, but 
also the cost to the ethnographer without having an academic community to engage these 
conversations and seek company in this endeavor.  
Overview of Chapters   
 Given that I have chosen a vertical ethnographic case study as my approach, the 
following chapters move from a macro-level analysis of the policy regimes that have 
shaped the “road to closures” in Chapter 2, to five ethnographic chapters that illuminate 
the predicament and response of a school threatened by closure, Johnson High. Chapter 2 
discusses the school choice movement in Philadelphia in relation to broader trends in 
national public education legislation that have pushed for privatization and punitive 
accountability for “underperforming” schools. This chapter argues that school closures 
are merely an evolution in policies that have divested historically disenfranchised schools 
of resources as well as reconstructed and displaced the risk of “failure” onto vulnerable 
student populations and their educators. In turn, this section of the dissertation 
historicizes closures within the longer trajectories of marketization in urban districts.  
 Chapter 3 provides an overview of the strategies that Johnson High’s 
administrators set into motion to resist closure, detailing their rationales for the institution 
of problematic branding and risk management mechanisms. Chapter 4 tethers the fraught 
consciences of educators around the strategies introduced in Chapter 3, to ethical 
questions around the shifting mission of traditional neighborhood schools in the 
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expanding educational marketplace, and implications for equity and access to quality 
public education for vulnerable student populations. Educators in this chapter narrate the 
moral dilemmas they face as school competition induced by the marketplace coerces 
them into performing racialized readings of risk and value in their students, building 
school brands around specific categories of student that will not taint their reputation or 
endanger the school’s performance data. 
 Chapter 5 turns to the role of community partnerships’ in Johnson High’s 
branding process and the ways in which the threat of closure has further spurred the 
forging of relationships with private organizations to both brand the school and fill 
critical resource gaps. This critical, private resource economy within the school of 
selectively serving organizations providing core services as conditions worsened in the 
district, raised questions over the degree to which a closure threat necessitated the 
school’s privatization. Moreover the paradox of providing selective yet core services 
through partners generated further ethical tensions over the disproportionate targeting of 
particular student categories (i.e. race/ethnicity, immigrant status) for resources, 
compromising the school’s commitment to the inclusive service of all students.  
The final chapters are more descriptive. Chapter 6 draws on students’ voices and 
their responses to both the district’s consideration of Johnson High for closure and the 
school’s survival process. Chapter 7 serves as both an epilogue and conclusion, 
demonstrating how the unethical underpinnings of the school’s survival strategies created 
an unstable, vulnerable brand that began to unravel shortly after the conclusion of my 
fieldwork. This final chapter collates lessons learned from the ethnographic chapters with 
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the moving target that is education policy in Philadelphia, concluding with policy 
recommendations and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE ROAD TO SCHOOL CLOSURES IN THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA 
“Standing on the Edge of a Cliff” 
Mr. Riley (school district official): I was watching Chris Hayes I think, like last week, 
and he had on this drug policy specialist that was discussing the effects of a product when 
the resource is limited. So he was talking about tobacco and the way that people think 
about tobacco use in the world where you can get it anywhere versus the way it’s thought 
about in a prison where people have to engage in contraband. Once tobacco is treated as 
a commodity, it changes peoples’ perceptions and the tensions around it. I think about 
that when I think about the limitations on the number of quality seats in this district and 
the response. The School District of Philadelphia has been failing for a long time. I don’t 
think five-year plans are really being developed and executed because how can you with 
so much uncertainty? I think the vision is to prevent the district from going bankrupt and 
that’s a big challenge in itself. We’re not talking about like oh, we might need to move 
money from here to there. It’s more of an existential challenge. It requires resources that 
we don’t have for a whole bunch of reasons that people like to broad-brush as the District 
mismanaging money when that’s not really true. When I think about the superintendent 
and the assistant superintendents that supervise the schools, they’re dealing with this 
existential crisis, like “Oh snap! We need $300 million dollars to pay for counselors!” 
People need to realize that it’s hard to strategically plan when you’re standing on the 
edge of a cliff. 
Julia: Then are charter schools the answer to that because they can fundraise and inject 
private money into a large system that’s going bankrupt?   
Mr. Riley: Maybe. (Interview with Mr. Riley Thompson, District Official)4  
 
   ********************************** 
In a press release following the May 2013 “doomsday” budget cuts, a spokesman 
from the Republican majority in the Pennsylvania State Senate, Erik Arneson, claimed, 
“At this moment there’s no obvious path to reach the outcome being sought by the 
School District of Philadelphia” (Gabriel 2013). In my conversations and interviews with 
district-officials, they echoed Mr. Arneson’s sentiments. Endemic to these discourses was 
a paralyzing sense of uncertainty over the future of the district and questions over how 
they could work to improve educational outcomes when the battle to balance the budget 
                                                           
4 Given the extremely precarious and politicized context that officials worked under in AY 2013-2014, 
consent forms were written to exclude not only their names but also mention of their home departments and 
positions.  
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required increasingly Herculean efforts. Mr. Riley, a school district official who I spent 
time with in planning sessions for policy-pitches to the School Reform Commission 
(SRC)5, described the immediate pressures faced by the district as they simultaneously 
coped with the decline in existing school enrollments, slashed funds from the state to 
supplement their budget, and exploding costs of charter schools. Likening charter school 
expansion to the commodification of tobacco, Mr. Riley alludes to the “existential 
challenge” of stabilizing a district while reconciling two zero-sum political agendas. The 
first required district officials to recover a public education system in free fall while the 
second pressured them to expand semi-private charter school networks that further 
imperiled their finances. 
Caught in the crosshairs of disparate demands on their time, energy, and ethics, I 
examine in this chapter the political and economic forces shaping this dilemma for 
officials in the School District of Philadelphia. I pay close attention to the contradictions 
between state and district policy rhetoric and officials’ practical actions as they stood “on 
the edge of a cliff”, unable to develop a “vision” beyond preventing “bankrupt(cy).” 
Their narratives offer a window into the bureaucratic crunch induced by the deepening 
marketization of public education in Philadelphia and the social forces policy 
mechanisms that contributed to what officials perceived as the “inevitable” mass closure 
of neighborhood schools across the city.  
A Decade of Privatization Experiments in Philadelphia: The Road to Closures  
While Mr. Riley emphasized the extraordinary uncertainty texturing the work of 
district officials and administrators in the year of nationally headlined crisis, he also 
                                                           
5 The SRC is a five-member governing body that has worked as the driving policy and decision-making 
apparatus since the State of Pennsylvania took over the School District of Philadelphia in 2002.  
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alluded to its construction through the large-scale commodification of public education in 
Philadelphia in the last decade (e.g. “Once [tobacco] is treated like a commodity, it 
changes peoples’ perceptions and the tensions around it). It is not my goal in this section 
to perform an exhaustive excavation of the School District of Philadelphia’s historical 
instability, but to outline what makes this crisis and the heightened uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the district unprecedented.  
Shortly after the passing of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania took over the school district, imposing a five member 
governing body, the School Reform Commission (SRC). With three appointments from 
the governor and two from the mayor, the SRC since its inception has championed the 
principles of “accountability” and “choice” at the heart of NCLB through massive 
experiments in privatization and public education. As Gill, Zimmer, Christman, and 
Blanc (2007) highlight, NCLB prescribed state takeover and private management to low-
performing districts as reforms to develop more effective, efficient public education 
systems. Beginning with the diverse provider model (DPM) in 2002, the SDP contracted 
seven private for-profit and non-profit companies to manage 46 low-performing schools 
and restructured 21 more under the auspices of district-executed “turnaround” schools 
(Jack and Sludden 2013). Aggressively forging these partnerships, federal policymakers 
lauded Philadelphia for becoming the forerunners of these reforms (Christman, Gold, and 
Herold 2005).  
However, at the time of the DPM, the district had 237 district-managed schools 
and only 40 charters (Bulkley, Henig, and Levin 2010). Today there are 86 charters with 
an open application process fielding 40 more applications for 2015 (The Notebook 2015). 
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Pushing charters as a solution to fiscal instability, “failing” schools, and the demand for 
“quality” seats, Republican Governor Tom Corbett addressed a crowd of students at First 
Philadelphia Preparatory Charter School on November 17th, 2011, distilling the state’s 
stance toward the support of charter school expansion.   
I want to talk to the men and women in Harrisburg that pass the laws about 
schools. You are a very good example of how we can reform the schools. You are 
a special kind of school here. You are a charter school and that’s new. We didn’t 
have charter schools 20 years ago. It’s new to Pennsylvania and it to the country. 
We want to look at kids that live in areas where the worst schools in the state are 
– the 145 worst buildings in the state. When I say worst, I don’t mean the people 
are bad, but that they’re not performing. They’re not getting the grades. And 
they’re at the very bottom in Pennsylvania. So we want a student that goes there 
to be able to take the money that the state gives to that school district and go to a 
charter school. There are a lot of people that are opposed to that, but I don’t know 
how you can be opposed to allowing a young boy or girl to leave the worst 
performing schools in the state to have a chance to have the education that you 
have here…We need to give options. We need to give choices to your parents and 
to the parents of kids like you all across Pennsylvania to have an opportunity to 
grow – an opportunity to compete. (Corbett 2011) 
 
Corbett’s statement embeds notions of “competition” and “choice” that ran through state-
level discourse and policy around school reform statewide. Within this rhetoric, charter 
schools, or schools of choice that operated largely outside of the authority of the school 
district, became the answer to mitigating “failure” within the district system. Of the 145 
“failing” schools identified by Corbett, not ironically, almost all of them were in poor zip 
codes across the state; the lowest performing were in Philadelphia. Creating a 
marketplace of school choice, Corbett and his successive conservative administrations 
bolstered charter expansion through legislation that prevented enrollment caps and the 
issuing of new charters in cities identified as loci of school “failure” (Jack and Sludden 
2013). Enrollment in schools in Philadelphia therefore did not so much decline in the last 
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decade, but shifted toward charters, propelled by state-level policies to increase “school 
choice” within, to use Corbett’s words, Pennsylvania’s “worst” districts.  
The Unexpected Costs of Charters 
 While the charter presence in Philadelphia certainly preceded the state-takeover, 
NCLB, and the subsequent implementation of the DPM, enrollment in the city’s charters 
increased by 40,000 students as the district-run school enrollment has decreased by 
50,000 students from 2002 to 2012. This amounts to a loss of approximately 5,000 
students per year and an increase from 12 percent of the districts’ students to 33 percent 
attending charter schools in 2013 (Gabriel 2013; Hurdle 2013). This unfettered expansion 
of private options through charters and their unexpected soaring costs in the midst of 
shrinking block grants from the state, contributed to a hemorrhaging budget by 2008 – a 
budget that worsened through 2013. As public-private partnerships with the district, the 
state mandated that the district pay charter schools $8,417 per student and $22,307 for 
students who use special education services to charter schools (Graham 2014). Even 
though the district had internally instituted agreements for enrollment caps at many 
charters, other schools refused to agree to enrollment parameters based state legislation 
that prohibited caps. In the midst of legal battles between the School Reform Commission 
and state auditors, many schools greatly exceeded their caps, generating unexpected 
costs, upwards of $25 million in AY 2013-2014 alone (Woodall 2014a).  
To complicate the SDP’s financial picture, the district assumed other fiscal risks 
associated with both charter schools’ contributions to state pension plans as well as the 
financing of new charter buildings as charter expanded throughout the decade. Dozens of 
charters remained delinquent in recent years in pension payments for their teachers. 
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During AY 2012-2013, the district shouldered $1.3 million in pension payments for 22 
charter schools (Woodall 2014b). Further, while charter schools used to inhabit 
repurposed supermarkets or storefronts, a recent analysis of bond documents shows that 1 
in 3 charters have constructed newer and larger school buildings using tax-exempt bonds 
with extremely high interest rates (Wigglesworth and Briggs 2015). Carrying risky 
ratings, charter schools have paid for renovations through these “junk” bonds at costs of 
double to triple what the district would pay for a new school building using government 
bonds channeled toward infrastructure improvements. Financing processes and real estate 
transactions have also required charter school networks to pay millions in consulting and 
legal fees. Increasing percentages of charter schools’ budgets service their debts, creating 
pressure to reduce labor, instruction, and other service costs or overenroll students to 
stabilize their budgets. When charter schools overenroll students, the district shoulders 
the burden as they pay schools per capita while also maintaining the fixed costs of the 
district schools that students leave.  
Red-Blue State Dynamics and the Catch-22 for District Officials  
The unexpected costs of a reform meant to both increase quality and “efficiency” 
in the system plagued the consciences and work of district officials. Many described 
ironies of state-level demands to increase expand “school choice” while also stabilizing 
the district’s finances. Underscoring charter school expansion as the crux of this Catch-
22, they cited a dissonance between the state’s agenda to legislate in favor of charters and 
their evisceration of the school district’s budgeting troubles. Many lamented the short 
sightedness of charter laws and their implications for poor urban contexts like 
Philadelphia. Contrary to critiques of “440 Broad Street,” a colloquial expression used at 
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the school-level to pejoratively address upper-level administration, I found distraught 
district officials in a similar place as teachers and students: trying to reconcile what they 
perceived to be an increasing stream of conflicting mandates with decreasingly available 
human and monetary resources to execute them. Mr. Riley explained his predicament.  
The District doesn’t have the authority to give money to charters or not. It’s a 
state mandated conversation about how charters get funded. I mean, in 
Philadelphia we deal with red state-blue city dynamics all of the time. One of 
those dynamics is that people at the state-level that tend to support the charter 
movement also tend to be conservative and pump money into the charter-sector in 
Philadelphia to show that it will work. Why do you think that Mastery Charter is 
able to fundraise at the level that it does? Because there are people in the state that 
want to see charters work philosophically, separate and apart from what happens 
with these kids in charters and in the rest of the district. So in terms of where the 
district goes in five years, it all starts with the state. Is there going to be a decision 
made at the state level to set up a funding situation that doesn’t pit charters versus 
the district for use of the same resources? I don’t know.  (Interview, 3/14/14) 
 
Pointing out “red-state, blue city” dynamics, Mr. Riley highlights the “philosophical” 
battle he saw as being waged at the state-level “separate and apart” from its implications 
at the local-level through the pushing of charter legislation and the backing of 
conservative politicians and foundations. At its core, he understands the School District 
of Philadelphia, with so few resources, to remain at the mercy of state support for 
charters schools. He bemoaned in his interview however, not only the assumptions 
involved in the unfettered expansion of such a sector, but also ignorance of how 
continuing to carve up the system will impact the overall financial health of the district. 
In other words, should the “funding situation” continue to “pit charters against the 
district” and deplete the already scarce resources of the district, the privatization 
experiment might ultimately collapse on itself.  
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The Beginning of the End for 30 Schools: AY 2012-2013 
The explosive growth of the charter sector, a product of the lamination of state-
level mandates onto SDP policy and the larger privatization movement in urban public 
education, generated a fiscal crisis for the district’s leadership by AY 2009. Recognizing 
the inflexible costs of running underutilized district schools and the expenses of 
supporting the ever-expanding charter system, Arlene Ackerman, the then superintendent, 
addressed the tenability of continuing to stretch the district’s declining resources in the 
2009 Facilities Master Plan. Recommending the closing of “half-empty” district schools 
to cut costs (School District of Philadelphia 2012a), this document served as a template 
for the 2012 and 2013 school closures. Hiring the URS Corporation, in December 2010 
the district set in motion a process to identify underutilized, “failing” schools for closure 
(Socolar 2010). By June of 2011, the Philadelphia School Notebook, an independent 
publication that reports on public education issues in Philadelphia, had released a 
confidential document prepared by URS entitled the “Preliminary Options Report” that 
listed schools recommended for closure (Herold and Mezzacappa 2011). From this list, 
Ackerman’s predecessor, Leroy Nunery, identified 10 schools for closure based on 
enrollment trends by October 2011, and had shuttered 6 of them by June 2012.  
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Graphic 2.1: Utilized Seats by Planning Area 
 
To compound matters, from 2010 to 2013 Tom Corbett, a Republican governor 
notorious for his “no-tax” mantra, slashed education budgets across the state (Hurdle 
2013). In press interviews, Corbett used the loss of federal stimulus money flowing into 
the Pennsylvania Department of Education’s coffers as the reasoning for the cuts. In an 
interview with a Philadelphia reporter over the his stance on education budgets, he 
explained,  
These are difficult economic times. I am consistent in that we will not spend any 
more than we have. When I took office, and I will repeat this until the day that I 
leave office, when I took office, there was a 4.2 billion dollar deficit because of 
outrageous spending from years past. The general education budget for K-12 and 
higher ed was replaced after 2008 by federal, one-time stimulus money of over a 
billion dollars and it went away in a year. [Snap] Like that. The tax increase that 
would be required to replace that would be $930 on every taxpayer in PA to 
replace that…I wasn’t going to place that on the people of Pennsylvania. So we 
didn’t cut. We just didn’t replace the money from the federal government because 
we didn’t have it (Governor Tom Corbett on Education Cuts 2013).  
 
Corbett’s refusal to raise taxes in spite of its consequences for Philadelphia, created a 
$287 million dollar deficit for the district by AY 2011-2012, resulting in a loss of $1,327 
per student (Lin and Couloumbis 2014). His attitude reflected a general callousness at the 
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state-level toward the Philadelphia’s plight and a shedding of responsibility for its 
funding predicament. Pointing the figure at the federal government for the “cuts” and 
pledging to not raise taxes for the “people” of Pennsylvania, Corbett placed the onus on 
the city to seek a “long-term” solution to its funding problem internally. His explanation 
further highlights the ideological distance between a conservative state legislature and a 
poor, blue city in desperate need of resources and support.  
Without short-term help from the state, the budget cuts exacerbated feelings of 
urgency to dramatically reduce the district’s spending. Philadelphia, like many poor 
districts, relies heavily on state funds to supplement upwards of half of their budget 
(School District of Philadelphia 2012b). As these cuts increased in frequency and scale, 
district officials hired yet another firm, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) to conduct 
an audit of the district’s projected costs and to establish a protocol to mitigate the 
looming fiscal deficit. The BCG report, issued in August 2012, operated similarly to the 
URS report by focusing on the “underutilization” of district schools and recommending 
mass school closures. Calculating an average of $7,000 incurred for the loss of each 
student to a charter (Boston Consulting Group 2012), BCG recommended that the only 
way to stabilize the budget and minimize inefficiencies would be to execute a mass 
closure of 88 underutilized schools and transfer students to other district schools, 
displacing between 22,000 and 31,000 students district-wide (Gym 2015b).  
The district expected the closures, along with grade reconfigurations and co-
locations, to eventually achieve $24.5 million in annual savings and improve utilization 
rates from 67 to 78 percent (Jack and Sluddens 2013). The federal government closures 
also incentivized closures as part of an accountability framework for schools that did not 
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meet national performance standards (Hurdle 2013). The district’s Chief Recovery 
Officer, Thomas Knudsen, incorporated these recommendations in a 5-year financial plan 
for the district released in September 2012. The plan recommended the closure of 40 
schools, well below the number of schools recommended to the SRC by BCG, and 
intended to erase a budget deficit of $1.35 billion over the course of the five years 
(Socolar 2012; The Notebook 2012).  
While the Notebook was able to leak the URS report to the public prior to the 
September 2012 closings, BCG consultants presented their report in a “secret meeting” 
with the SRC that the district withheld from circulation. Claiming that they would be 
taking the multi-million dollar recommendations into consideration, Nunery’s successor, 
William Hite, and the Office of Strategic Analytics, announced in December 2012 the 
district’s plan to close 37 schools and restructure the grade figurations of 18 more at the 
end of AY 2012-2013 (Limm 2012). In his statement to the public, Hite explained, “We 
are undertaking this process now because we have few options, but we also believe that at 
the end, we will have a school system that is better run, safer and higher performing” 
(Statement by Dr. William Hite, December 13th, 2012). Arguing that the district could 
barely afford to renovate its utilized schools, Hite pointed out that continuing to pour 
precious resources into schools with high percentages of empty seats would be 
irresponsible (Hite 2013).  
Criteria for Closure – Inducing District-Wide Paranoia    
A “Summary of Recommendations” as well as a “Process and Methodology” 
document came attached to a modified “Facilities Master Plan” that listed the 37 schools 
slated for closure and described the criteria the district used to identify the pool. Selection 
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for closure occurred in two stages. First, the district relied on a highly informed 
technocratic analysis using the recommendations by the BCG report to identify schools 
based on a combination of building quality, academic performance, utilization, and cost. 
These measures pulled district-wide quantitative data on all 180 schools, scored them 
based on these criteria, and prioritized the lowest scoring schools for further analyses. As 
the slide below demonstrates, slightly less than 1/3 of the district’s schools were selected 
for further auditing.  
Graphic 2.2: School District of Philadelphia Closure Methodology (’12-’13)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In an interview with a district official that participated heavily in this process, she 
describes the magnitude of the closures and the process of prioritizing schools using this 
methodology.    
Ms. Crow: From an academic perspective, we look at AYP as a flag, so if you 
think about it, a filter mechanism. From that point, we look at the test scores by 
grade level. Over time, we look at their growth score. We look at their feedback 
score, their attendance, their violent incidents, and suspension rates. So basically 
it’s a mixture of climate and academic data in our decision-making process. We 
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look at the facility condition index which basically determines what cost it would 
take to bring the school back to good repair. From a student impact perspective, 
we look at how far the average student would be going to transfer. From a 
financial perspective, we look at how much savings closing the school would 
yield. So those were kind of the chunks. We went from academic to climate to 
facilities to finances. So it was fairly comprehensive across the board.  
Julie: Are there certain criteria that are weighted over others?  
Ms. Crow: It’s a case-by-case basis. I have to be honest with you (pause)… it’s a 
little bit hard to disaggregate because we we’re trying to close so many schools at 
once. A lot of it was messy.  (Interview, 5/4/14) 
 
Ms. Crow’s testimony demonstrates the highly technocratic nature of the school closure 
methodology as they collated a range of criteria through their two-stage audit process. 
However, she also admits that the process, in spite of its well-ordered methodology, was 
still “messy” and complicated by the “case-by-case” selection of schools. When I pushed 
Ms. Crow in her interview to explain if and how decision-makers weighted the criteria, 
she apologized, “I have to be honest with you (pause), it’s a bit hard to disaggregate 
because we’re trying to close so many schools at once.”  
Though the district released this methodology and communicated its intention to 
incorporate “community feedback”, which schools closed ironically hinged on officials’ 
subjective, last minute decisions. The “messiness” of this process was rooted in the 
growing tension between the decontextualized, market-driven conceptions of managing 
“school failure” and district officials’ calibrations of those conceptions with other 
pressures in context. The district attempted to create a guise of objectivity around closing 
schools by using a techno scientific rationale to define and pool schools of “low quality” 
based on seemingly “objective” measures. The measures were intended to divorce 
politics from decisions and craft inevitability and legitimacy around closures. However, 
the measures remained unmoored from the effects of more than a half of a century of 
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perpetual disinvestment and the more recent creep of charterization and ensuing 
stratification on district schools’ performance. Officials like Mr. Riley recognized 
blindness in the methodology’s defining of the problem,  
[Preventing bankruptcy] requires resources that we don’t have for a whole bunch 
of reasons that people like to broad-brush as the District mismanaging money 
when that’s not really true. (Interview, 3/14/14)  
 
Yet in the face of the district’s potential collapse, they felt that they had no choice but to 
rely on they prescription of BCG’s “experts” to close school en masse.  
This urgency to balance the budget ultimately stifled the democratic process 
around closure decisions, minimizing “community meetings” as a significant source of 
input. Barred from participation in deciding on the closure of schools, vehement 
opposition crystallized outside of the 440 Broad Street from December 2012 to February 
2013 as two “closures lists” circulated and officials removed and added schools without 
public deliberation. On March 7th, 2013 at an SRC meeting, 24 schools of the 37 were 
unilaterally voted upon for shuttering on June 30th, 2013 (Socolar 2014). Of the 32 people 
that spoke at the meeting in front of the SRC, only one supported the closures, therefore 
bringing into question which “community” mattered: the consultants or the public? 
Representative W. Curtis Thomas declared on the headquarters’ steps during large 
protests, “The process by which the Philadelphia School District decided on school 
closures was flawed and must be rejected” (Hurdle 2013). 
AY 2013-2014: The Perfect Storm  
 This unilateral vote and inconsistency between policy rhetoric and the actions of 
the district incited district-wide paranoia over whom the district would target next for 
closure. Conspiracy theories emerged among leadership and educators in neighborhood 
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schools over whether the district was operating in collusion with private consultants, 
conservative state legislators, and most importantly, charter school networks and their 
powerful connections in philanthropy and “corporate America” to destroy public 
education in Philadelphia (Fieldnote, 9/10/13). The passing of a “doomsday budget” in 
the Republican-dominated Pennsylvania state legislature in June 2013 that coincided with 
the closures only reinforced these sentiments. Diverging dramatically from steady cuts to 
education spending since 2011, the state spending cuts had particularly dramatic 
consequences for Philadelphia. 
 As previously mentioned, almost half of Philadelphia’s budget stems from state 
supplements. With a $419 million dollar cut in June 2013, the district ran a $304 million 
deficit for the AY 2013-2014 school year. In addition to the closures, the district’s “long-
term” cost savings strategy, 440 Broad Street issued pink slips to 19 percent of the 
school-based work force, including all 127 assistant principals, 646 teachers and more 
than 1,200 aides (Gabriel 2013). Many of these staff were also critical support staff like 
nurses and school counselors, earning Philadelphia the title of a “city on the brink” of 
educational collapse and the epicenter for the “slow extinction of public education” 
(Kerkstra 2014; Ravitch 2014; Strauss 2013; Popp 2014). 
Questions and anxieties circulated over how the summer around how the district 
would transition the 15,000 students displaced by the closures as well as balance the 
administrative tasks of closing 24 schools with dramatically less resources than initially 
anticipated. Further, how would the district continue to pay for the rising costs of charter 
school expansion in light of the budget cuts?  These scaled fears of educators and district 
officials came to fruition on September 9th, 2013 as schools managed to open their doors 
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on what the Philadelphia Student Union documented in their blog as the “Worst of 
#Philly1stday” (Philadelphia Student Union 2013). Classes in some schools swelled to 
40+ students and principals operated main offices without support staff to answer phones 
and enroll streams of students coming from closed schools. Without nurses, aids, and 
counselors, students went without transcripts as they tried to finish college applications 
and sick students did not receive medical care. Emotions spilled over on September 25th 
when Laporshia Massey, a 6th grader, died of an asthma attack at a school without a 
nurse, Bryant Elementary (Denvir 2013). Protests and pleas for emergency funds 
pressured Governor Corbett to release $45 million to rehire 400 teachers, assistant 
principals, secretaries, and counselors to select schools in mid-October, almost six weeks 
into the school year (Snyder, Worden, and Graham 2013). 
However, the rehiring of these staff complicated the process of “leveling” schools 
by October 31st, the state deadline for aligning staffing with enrollments at district 
schools (McCorry 2013). The district operated under the assumption that the overall 
utilization would increase but could not predict the skewed distribution of transfers across 
remaining district schools. While some schools received large numbers of students, 
others gained few. Overall enrollment fell below 4,000 students as some students showed 
up at the doors of charter schools and other went missing entirely. Expecting 135,000 
students, only 131,000 arrived in district-schools. Enrollment at charter schools grew to 
67,000, 2,000 more than slotted for in the district’s precarious budget, as many charters 
exceeded their enrollment caps to accommodate the overflow. Six-hundred students 
continued to go unaccounted (Langland 2014). In some schools, administrators had to 
combine grades into one class to cope with the teaching shortage. With the turbulence 
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brought by the school closures and budget cuts, the leveling deadline came and went. 
McCorry (2013) described the leveling process as “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” as some 
of the schools that received a larger proportion of the transfers also received a counselor 
or several extra teachers. In the majority of cases, these transfers were predicated on the 
loss of one school’s staff member for another school’s gain. As one teacher at a South 
Philadelphia elementary school decried, “It should not matter whether my child is in a 
school of 300 or a school of 1,200. Every child deserves a full-time guidance counselor, a 
full-time nurse, and a teacher for every grade. It's not rocket science. It's responsibility."  
As schools struggled to accommodate the complex accounting of their students 
and redistribute scarce resources accordingly, sobering analyses of the school closures 
began to surface in reports. Not only could the district not account for 600 students, but 
the majority of the closures also took place in the city’s north-central region where one-
third of the city’s “Corrective Action” schools are located. These areas were not 
unexpectedly, in parts of Philadelphia with the deepest poverty. In other words, the 
closures concentrated their social, fiscal, and spatial fallout of the closures in areas of 
greatest disadvantage. A Research for Action study found that while 22 of the receiving 
schools for these students boasted stronger achievement, 20 performed at similar levels 
and 16 performed worse. The majority of the better-performing schools are also still 
considered “low-performing” as measured by the standards of NCLB, and were at or over 
capacity at the time of the closures (Research for Action 2013).  
The Ironies of “Accountability”  
 In conversations and meetings with district and state officials, discourses around 
charter school expansion and neighborhood school closure inextricably intertwined. At a 
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hearing at City Hall, organizations and individuals gathered to address state legislators 
visiting to understand the impact of state-supported charter school expansion on the 
district and the recent impact of closures. The Auditor General, Eugene Depasquale, 
among several state representatives and administrators sat in front of a long line of 
testimonies that spoke to issues of access, equity, and the ironies of “accountability” in 
the current climate. Believing that unfettered charterization of the district without 
evaluating its consequences for the financial health of neighborhood schools represented 
an glaring contradiction in district policy, Helen Gym, Philadelphia’s nationally 
renowned firebrand education activist, and leader of several parent and advocacy 
associations in the city, admonished the state.  
For a district paying out $700 million to 86 charter schools per year, their 
performance is underwhelming. It’s amazing to talk about standards when the 
state won’t ensure that our students in neighborhood schools get the most basic of 
resources. It’s a tragedy and a national disgrace. The cost to charters and 
neighborhood schools alike are enormous and you’re literally driving people out 
of the system. People won’t be able to stay in Philadelphia if this continues. It’s a 
mistake to keep closing public schools. It’s not accountability but instead 
shedding accountability by putting families out on the street. So please don’t use 
that term when discussing the rationale for closures. These kids have no 
affiliation with their schools because their schools offer nothing…Two-hundred 
counselors for 131,000 children isn’t going to cut it. Charter schools should not 
exist at the expense or in lieu of public schools. (Fieldnote, 3/14/14)  
 
Testimonies like Gym’s continued, decrying the pitfalls of unfettered charter expansion 
without proper legislation and detailing investigations into the enrollment barriers that 
specific populations faced when applying to charters. Closing schools, Gym argued, was 
not a form of holding failing schools accountable but instead “shedding accountability” 
by failing to fund neighborhood schools so that they could adequately serve their 
students. She also criticized the state-level push for charter school expansion when no 
 75
overwhelming evidence existed that charters performed better than neighborhood schools 
when serving the same kinds of students, namely ELLs and special education students. 
 In spite of the demand for them with so many students on waiting lists to get into 
charter schools, Gym maintains that chronic underfunding is “driving people out of the 
system,” forcing parents to consider charters that perhaps would send their children to 
neighborhood schools. “Charter schools should not exist at the expense or in lieu of 
public schools,” Gym cautioned, pointing to the zero-sum predicament facing district 
officials, as they must close neighborhood schools to open new charter schools. By 
pushing charterization and simultaneously defunding of the district system, Gym draws 
attention to the perverse logic of market-driven policies like closure as they misdiagnose 
the roots of district “failure.” Locating school “failure” at the state-level where policies 
that purport to boost performance, in reality, deprive neighborhood schools of already 
scarce resources, Gym points out a central problem of mapping market models onto 
public good like education. By placing the onus on individual schools to “perform” 
without acknowledging the interconnectedness of policy decisions at different levels of 
scale that define and produce “failure”, her critique illuminates the paradox facing 
neighborhood schools, as they are held accountable for “failure” yet not given the 
resources to adequately serve their students.  
Market Stratification  
Donna Cooper of Public Citizens for Children and Youth (PCCY), in an 
impassioned delivery at the same meeting, described the inequities that her organization 
identified in their research on Philadelphia’s charter schools, pointed to other flaws in this 
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policy, as legislators assumed that within the “marketplace” of school choice, students 
would have equal access to charter school lotteries.  
People aren’t just going to operate on an honor system in the marketplace. That’s 
naïve to think. Charters have fewer ELL and special education students than 
traditional neighborhood schools. They should be aggressively recruiting from the 
bottom in they believe that their models work to initiate change. We identified in 
our study that there were 111 barriers to enrollment at these schools, many which 
lied in the recruitment process itself. Some of the recruitment for these schools 
was done at country clubs. Because we currently have 4 people overseeing 86 
charters and nobody at the state level, this grand experiment is one that’s about to 
collapse of its own weight.  (Fieldnote, 3/14/14) 
 
Ms. Cooper describes the underbelly of charter school autonomy as they exclude 
“undesirable” populations from enrollment through recruitment barriers. Instantiating the 
tension that so many scholars have written about that arise from the tacit lamination of 
market-reform onto public sector goods like education (Bartlett et al. 2002; Cucchiara, 
Gold, and Simon 2011), she echoes critiques that charters benefit small numbers of 
students at the expense of the masses. Leaving the education “market” to do its work and 
using performance indicators alone to monitor “performance”, Ms. Cooper underscores 
the stratification that occurs when information and access barriers that preclude particular 
populations’ access to the market go unchecked. She further elaborates on the irony 
embedded in Gym’s testimony that as school closure as a policy functions to heighten 
accountability for “failing” district-run schools, there are virtually no accountability 
mechanisms in place to monitor charter schools. This irony is particularly stark at the 
state-level where there are no officials appointed to oversee charter schools.  
Mass budget cuts and the fiscal hemorrhaging at the district-level partially explain 
this lack of accountability for charter schools. Several officials pointed to the problem 
arising from the simultaneous layoffs of district officials and the expansion of charter 
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schools, in turn diminishing the district’s capacity evaluate the effects of the expansion 
and oversee enrollment practices of charter schools with so few staff. In AY 2013-2014, 
the year of my full-time fieldwork, the Charter School Office had a total of 3 staff to 
supervise the operations and compliance of 86 charter schools district-wide and had an 
executive director vacancy for over a year (Fieldnote, 3/14/14). Each of the staff was 
responsible for monitoring 25+ schools each, writing policy and procedures for 
acceptance and renewal of new charters, representing the office at local and district 
meetings, and fielding the concerns and calls of the public over particular schools 
(Interview, 3/14/14). One of the coordinators admitted at an SRC meeting, “Yeah, I don’t 
sleep very much these days” (Fieldnote, 3/17/14).  
Again, budget cuts account for only part of the lack of accountability mechanisms 
for charters. Several officials pointed to larger existential questions at the state and 
district levels concerning the ideological and legal principles that should guide their 
growth and governance. The original intent behind the establishment of charters was to 
devolve authority to schools and allow them to develop their own governing frameworks. 
Within the state’s charter law, charter schools “operate independently from the existing 
school district structure as a method to…encourage the use of innovative teaching 
methods.” Within that same article, charter schools must agree to not discriminate on the 
basis of admission and be held accountable for their performance through “measurable 
academic standards” (Pennsylvania Department of Education 2009). Many district 
officials highlighted the contradictions that arose in the evaluation of “school quality” 
when the charters were subject to less scrutiny outside of their test scores compared to 
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district schools. Ms. Turner, an official, discussed the tradeoffs of difficulty of 
monitoring charter schools when the law allowed them to operate autonomously.  
Five years ago, the parochial system was a primary vehicle for educating middle-
class kids. People are concerned about charters because as the parochial system 
fades away, charters will just become the replacement, which feels bad. Many 
middle class kids are getting into charters but so are kids who need help. I mean, 
if you look at the number of FRL6 kids that go to charters is less than the District 
but it’s not zero. It’s still 65 percent. The District is 87 percent Free and Reduced 
Lunch, so it’s just a different world, but it doesn’t mean that the charters are 
serving kids caviar. I think if you’re thinking about charters and vulnerable 
populations, you have to look at the four big buckets. There’s FRL or just poor 
kids. Can poor kids get into charter schools and that’s mostly a question of choice 
and access? Then there’s the ELL bucket. If a parent doesn’t have a command of 
the English language, or the systems of Philadelphia, how can they help their kid 
apply? Then there’s the special education bucket, the kids that are costly to 
educate. The fourth bucket is kids with discipline issues. The question is, if we’re 
going to say that charters get to operate and have different and innovative 
models, is it ok for them to say that you need to behave in a certain way to stay? 
That they are only designed to serve certain kinds of kids? (Interview, 5/3/14)  
 
Breaking the students that disproportionately attend district schools instead of charters 
schools into “four buckets”, Ms. Turner highlights that though charter schools are serving 
vulnerable populations (i.e. “it doesn’t mean the charters are serving kids eating caviar), 
the most vulnerable still attend underfunded district schools because of questions of 
access. Even though charters are not legally allowed to practice selective admission, 
navigating a unanimous lottery system requires a type of institutional knowledge that puts 
vulnerable student and parent populations at a disadvantage. These skewed enrollment 
types therefore reflect a number of barriers to enrollment. The most important question 
Ms. Turner raises comes at the end of her analysis however when she asks whether it is 
justified for charters to be selective about the “kinds of kids” that they serve. The 
question calls attention to issues of ethics and equity and whether, in the spirit of 
                                                           
6 Free and Reduced Lunch.  
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“innovation” and autonomy, charter schools have obligations to serve students that do not 
fit their model? 
Here enters the question of charters’ obligation to equitably serve all students. If 
the law empowers them to act largely outside of the bureaucratic governing structure of 
the district, developing their own accountability systems, tailored curriculums for 
particular “kinds” of students, and rules that make admission contingent, then how can 
one not expect stratification across charters and district schools? This tension between 
market stratification and equity plagued officials’ consciences. Several complained that 
the current research on the effects of charters on vulnerable student populations like 
special education and English-Language Learners was not “sophisticated” enough, 
particularly in Philadelphia, to warrant continued expansion (Interview, 4/28/14). In other 
words, the state was not taking into consideration how the education market worked to 
stratify students along lines of race and class in their acceptance to charter schools. 
Returning to Mr. Riley’s tobacco metaphor from the chapter’s opening vignette, he 
admits:  
Mr. Riley: You’re dealing with the same tobacco issue from before. These 
charter decisions help some kids at the expense of other kids. That’s just the fact 
of it, right? I think there’s an open question whether the dialogue can get 
sophisticated enough to have that conversation, and there are real and legitimate 
reasons why people don’t want that to be a conversation. How could you 
legitimize a charter school not supporting special education kids? But by the same 
token, how could you not legitimize a charter school that has a discipline policy 
that enables them to have a safe space? Do you see how thorny this gets?   
(Interview, 3/14/14)  
 
While these officials felt conflicted about the ethics around charter schools practices, they 
felt powerless to resolve these “thorny questions.” As Mr. Riley put it, “These charter 
decisions help some kids at the expense of other kids.” If they system was deliberately set 
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up around selectively serving schools with incentives to reduce their costs, what might 
happen to the city’s most vulnerable kids that cost the most to educate? Secondarily, what 
costs would pursuing this reform have for the remaining district schools that 
disproportionately serve the city’s most vulnerable youth?  
Returning to red state-blue city dynamics, in a context of limited resources and 
political enthusiasm for continued expansion at the state-level, officials collaborated with 
a non-profit firms specializing in educational law to try to address some of the equity 
issues around school funding and charter expansion. An interview with Mr. Dell, a 
lawyer at one non-profit law firm, described the predicament in pursuing lawsuits on the 
basis of charters’ access barriers and equity in service.  
I mean, it’s always so hard to prove this stuff, that charter schools are deliberately 
excluding certain populations. We’ve done a lot legislative advocacy and 
sneaking around the Commonwealth to examine the disparities in the charter 
sector. English-Language Learners (ELLs) are the biggest disparity with about 80 
percent of ELLs in district schools and less than 3 percent in charter schools. The 
ELLs that they have, they’re upper-level ELLs. We know that non-English 
speaking families go into charters, get told by the secretary that “We’re sorry, but 
we don’t really have services.” But then if you go to the school, they say, “Of 
course we never said that.” So it’s difficult to prove that it ever happened. You 
basically have to file with the Department of Justice and they have to do an 
investigation. It’s tough to know where to file this. Do you file it against 
individual charters or do you file it at the state level where it may or may not have 
any chance of helping kids in Philly? There’s nothing being filed at the moment at 
the systemic level against charters because of the political climate at the state 
level that supports charterization. Enrollment caps are something that the district 
is trying to institute, but many charters are ignoring them, and the state court has 
so far ruled in their favor. (Interview, 5/27/14) 
 
Mr. Dell highlights two issues that make legal recourse for the district difficult. First, the 
devolution of governance and accountability systems for charters statewide complicates 
the filing complaints against charters. Further, the process of conducting an investigation 
into individual charters practicing exclusive admissions is expensive, time-intensive, and 
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may not have any impact systemically. Second, the tidal force of conservative support for 
charters at the state-level (as evidenced by court rulings in favor of abolishing enrollment 
caps) on the basis of not encroaching upon students and families’ rights to “school 
choice” (Woodall 2014a), evinces a fear of sinking time and resources into cases that go 
against the state’s political grain. Mr. Dell describes again, the issue of powerful interests 
at the state-level that protect the liberties of charter schools, legislatively coercing 
districts’ to diversify their “choice” portfolios. Philadelphia’s status as a poor city that 
barters with the state for supplemental funding therefore disadvantages its bargaining 
power in state courts that rule in favor of conservative political agendas that favor pro-
charter education policies.  
Salvaging Value in a Devalued System: The Impetus to Brand  
Interviews and conversations with district officials yielded insight into 
overwhelming feelings of powerlessness as they sought to recover value from what they 
perceived to be an increasingly “devalued system.” Pointing to a deepening stratification 
between populations attending district and charter schools – as enabled by policy 
decisions at the state level that greased the wheels for charter school expansion – many 
officials watched the neediest kids continue to pool in the schools with increasingly 
unavailable resources. Confused and scattered by the churn of staff and their status as 
mediators between the state, the district, and their schools, many felt that this churning 
thwarted their best efforts in changing the direction of what they deemed as questionable, 
if not morally reprehensible policy reform. Ms. Smith, an official interested in major 
policy-changes for accommodations for vulnerable student populations, explained.  
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I mean, since I’ve been in this position, everything has just felt very transitional. 
It’s hard to know how much to try if you feel like, tomorrow there’s going to be a 
whole other regime. A superintendent comes is in and they have their plan and 
everyone tries to get their policies in place within the structure, and then three 
years later there’s someone new and we start all over again. We’re burnt out and 
it’s hard to not get sucked into the mentality that any work you do will be for 
naught. (Interview, 4/29/14)  
 
Another official explained how the turnover, particularly with the budget cuts, impacted 
her feelings about the district’s future,  
So many different people have rolled the district out so many different times in so 
many different ways. Like I was thinking the other day I’ve been here a little over 
six years. There was one year where I didn’t have a boss for an entire year 
because she was let go. In six years I’ve had eight different bosses. So the state of 
change is so rapid there’s no memory, no way to even have a vision. I think that if 
the district—whatever direction they want to move in – they have to rally the 
support of the folks that are here. But with budget cuts and charter pressures, 
there’s no vision. The vision is, don’t go bankrupt. That’s about it. (Interview, 
3/28/14) 
 
Many officials voiced that in spite of their qualms with the direction of reform and their 
implications for equity, pointing to charters as the lightening rod in their work and the 
contradictions in internal policy that it produced. Yet, the “rapid change” and the lack of 
institutional “memory” stifled their ability to combat the hazardous, long-term 
vicissitudes of unencumbered market-inspired charter growth. Caught in the momentum 
to “cut costs” in spite their problematic and enduring effects for vulnerable youth 
populations in particular, officials capitulated to marketized notions of “quality and 
“success” and set plans in motion to close schools.  
With what they felt was the inability to lead and develop a lasting “vision” at the 
district level, many district officials placed the responsibility on schools to compete with 
charter schools. In Action Plan 2.0, an internal policy document released in 2014, the 
district promoted the internal marketization of public schools through the development of 
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public-private partnerships with non-profit, philanthropic, university, and community 
organizations. This strategy encouraged schools to attract private resources to both 
supplement their declining budgets and sport programming that would attract higher 
enrollments. In other words, the policy encouraged schools function like charter by 
finding private investments to capacitate services and therefore their marketability. While 
the district had created the Office of Strategic Partnerships several years prior to promote 
partnership development between itself and private city, state, and national organizations, 
the director’s position had laid vacant. In the 6-pronged strategy plan to meet four of its 
anchor goals, Action Plan 2.0 prescribed the cultivation and sustainment of 
“partnerships” at the system and school levels as the central tactic of “Strategy 5” to 
“Become an innovative and accountable organization” (23).  
The District will continue to develop and maintain partnerships with 
philanthropic, business, non-profit, higher education and community 
organizations and others, and collaboratively determine where and how partners 
can support our goals. The District will also maintain and expand collaboration 
opportunities with current City and institutional partners to provide and prioritize 
academic and behavioral supports, ensure student safety, and offer extracurricular 
opportunities for students in the early grades. During a period of significant 
financial challenges and transitions, City agencies, philanthropic and community 
organizations, and families have been extraordinarily supportive of the District 
and its schools. Over $10 million was secured in SY12-13 to supported transition 
of District students, to enable the expansion of high quality schools, and the help 
sustain the important student-focused programming (The School District of 
Philadelphia 2014:23).  
 
In this document, while describing partnerships as a “supplemental” measure to improve 
the progress “already achieved by district schools”, Action Plan 2.0 underscores the 
centrality of the resources that partnerships provide, particularly in the midst of a fiscal 
crisis. The “$10 million” secured in 2012-2013 refers to the funds provided by 
organizations like the Philadelphia School Partnership (PSP), a non-profit dedicated to 
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garnering philanthropic funds for investment in “turnaround” and private schools, for 
covering the costs of the schools closures. Though the district created the Office of 
Strategic Partnerships years prior to the budget cuts to develop partnerships, and 
partnerships between private organizations and the district have long history in 
Philadelphia (Harkavy and Puckett 1991), in this iteration of the district’s goals 
partnerships represented a core rather than supplemental tactic for resource garnering.  
 Many officials oversight but concluded that the only way for district schools to 
survive in the crisis was to attract partnerships. Partnerships, in their view, could 
accomplish two, interrelated goals – 1) to fill chronic resource gaps 2) brand schools to 
bolster their enrollments by offering programming and resources through “respectable” 
outside organizations. By bringing locally and nationally recognized organizations to 
offer services like college counseling, after-school programming, and enrichment, 
schools could disseminate symbols of “quality” that students and families might read as 
valuable to their children’s educational experience. These resources could also insulate 
against the effects of mass budget cuts, a concern for parents that saw public 
disinvestment in neighborhood schools as harmful to their long-term value and capacity 
to adequately serve their children. In effect, partnerships could bring cache to 
neighborhood schools through their unique services, create an aura of “value” for their 
school’s brand, and in turn, sharpen their competitive edge in the market.  
Within the district’s bureaucratic machinery, a district official described her plan 
to build a digital infrastructure around partnerships that administrators could draw on to 
lure partners to their school.  
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Ms. Lily: So we would have a site like an Amazon marketplace where partners 
will come in, register, say who they are, what they do, the money they would 
bring, kids they want to focus on, and outcomes desired. The principal goes into 
the marketplace and shops for partners. That’s the piece that doesn’t really happen 
now. There are some really entrepreneurial principals but this would allow 
everyone and their mothers to build their partnerships portfolio and track 
everyone in their buildings. So you would see partners as a core of school 
improvement plan. Say you don’t have good science professional development 
but some corporation is doing externships for science teachers? So then you 
would begin to see a growing reliance on partners.  (Interview, 4/12/14)  
 
In Ms. Lily’s description of her plan for an online registration forum for interested 
partners, she maps marketized notions of business and entrepreneurship onto educational 
service delivery, animating spaces of private resource exchange in public schools. From 
her perspective, partnerships empower principals to go to a “marketplace” to browse for 
resources that align with their vision for the school. With technological infrastructure to 
facilitate these exchanges between private organizations and schools, Ms. Lily envisages 
partnerships giving neighborhood schools the ability to indirectly fundraise and brand 
their institutions like charter schools, allowing them to compete in the “marketplace” of 
schools the district is attempting to create through charter expansion.  
 Within this discourse, district officials positioned principals as CEOs instead of 
educators, charged with the responsibility of enticing partnerships to compensate for the 
dearth of district-provided resources. In a conversation with a district-official responsible 
for coordinating a district-wide partnership, College Dreams, she explained the 
responsibility of the school’s leadership to manage partner resources and align them with 
their school’s designated “brand.”   
Ms. Tolentine: The only way you brand your school is to prioritize. If you have 
all of these partners, you need to be strategic and coordinate them to execute your 
vision and needs. If none of them do anything, the principal needs to lay down the 
law. Do you know what we like to call those people?  The pimps of poverty. The 
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people trying to make money off of poor kids. That’s what’s happening and it’s 
getting worse as the district gets worse. The principals are the ones that have to 
make sure that doesn’t happen in their schools. They need to take charge and use 
these people for what they bring. (Fieldnote, 2/17/14)  
 
Aggravated with principals that she felt were not prioritizing her program in their 
schools, Ms. Tolentine reinforces Ms. Lily’s notion that principals must manage their 
schools like businesses, coordinating this labor and “laying down the law” for recalcitrant 
or ineffective partners. She alludes to a danger in partners that are only there to profit off 
of crisis, labeling these partners types as “the pimps of poverty.” School leadership, from 
her perspective, must determine which partners “execute” the “vision” of the school and 
trim the fat accordingly.  
Problematic of Partnerships in a Crisis   
While Ms. Tolentine puts the onus on stressed school-level administrations to 
determine their partnership schemas, others noted that in the current climate, the pressure 
for district officials and school-level leadership to run schools with so few resources 
positioned them poorly to lead with their needs at the negotiating table.  
Ms. Roebuck: I think the partnerships idea is great because the bottom line is that 
we don’t have enough resources. But we also don’t have a framework or the 
power to structure partnerships equitably. So as a result we have a lot of people 
who come in, lots of non-profits and universities and with no common interest or 
agreed-upon strategy. Everyone has his or her own interests. I’ve never worked 
with an organization that came in and said, “What do you need?” They’ve come 
in and said, “This is what we do.” So it’s always kind of like trying to fit a round 
peg into a square hole. (Interview, 3/28/14)  
 
Ms. Roebuck pointed to the discrepancy in the missions of organizations with highly 
coveted resources and the needs of the district. She also brought issues of power and 
equity into to relief as she described the decreasing capacity district officials have to 
negotiate, direct and align private organizations’ resources with their goals. Missing key 
 87
staff in the partnerships’ office and desperate to attract private dollars to support 
programming in increasingly underfunded schools, Ms. Roebuck felt that the district 
employees did not have the ability to thoroughly oversee the distribution of partners 
across schools nor determine partnerships’ fit with the needs of the school. Even with the 
digital forum proposed by to connect schools, schools desperate for resources would still 
be at the mercy of organizations willing to provide services.    
 Other officials raised questions around sustainability and the distribution of 
partner resources district-wide if the district continued to push partnerships in their 
strategy to redress service gaps. The same official that saw an opportunity to vest 
principals with the power to control their schools’ fates through partners, admitted that 
building a service delivery infrastructure around partners brought its risks.  
Ms. Lily: Funding from foundations and local corporations for non-profit work 
are more limited and shaky, especially since the Recession. Look at the major 
funding sources in the city, like United Way and the William Penn Foundation. If 
William Penn is putting $30 million into educational programming, which they do 
every year, the majority of that comes to kids in our schools. So that’s funding a 
non-profit network. When William Penn decided to switch their strategy from 
youth development into academic performance, $30 million dollars of revenue 
left the eco-system. So what happened in the schools with partners funded by 
those people? Services diminished from buildings. We went from having a 
college readiness budget of let’s say, 2 or 3 million dollars down to zero. That’s 
the risk you take with taking on a non-profit partner. (Interview, 4/12/14) 
 
Ms. Lily couches the instability of partner funding in the precarity of the economy, 
demonstrating that when the district allows partners funded by foundations to carry some 
of its weight, they are vulnerable to the whims of funders. In spite of the potential she 
saw for partners to invigorate school communities, making them more porous and able to 
capitalize on external resources, she also saw the cyclical funding of these organizations 
as reinforcing the instability that already plagued district schools.  
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 Another key concern around the partners’ strategy was distribution of partner 
resources across schools and within schools. Several officials believed that certain 
neighborhoods and schools were “better suited” to take on partners than others, 
emphasizing the desirability of certain neighborhoods for organizations given their 
demographics as well as geography.  
Ms. Smith: I feel like South Philly gets so many more partners than any other part 
of the city. It’s like where the hipsters that work in these community organizations 
want to be. You know, if you don’t have a car, it’s easier to get to than the 
Northeast. These programs aren’t in the schools there and it’s mainly because it’s 
hard to get to and it’s not this cool, new place to live.  (Interview, 3/28/14)  
 
Pointing to gentrification as a driver of increasingly established non-profits and 
community-based organizations, Ms. Smith compares South Philadelphia and Northeast 
Philadelphia, two areas that differ in their concentration of school-supportive non-profits. 
If responsibility for filling schools with community partners was displaced onto local 
schools, she feels that certain neighborhoods would face a geographic disadvantage.   
Another official also mentioned that not only geography, but also demographics within 
schools might drive skewed distributions of partner resources.  
Ms. Lily: I think there are definitely deserts, possibly because of the population or 
geography of the neighborhood. One year I did a mapping project at a high school 
that had 54 organizations serving the same 300 kids, and there were like 1300 
kids in the building at the time. So I think that some of it is about people’s 
perception of where they think the need is. Because the truth be told is, there’s 
only about 10 organizations that can do real scale. Beyond that, it gets real mom 
and poppy, 35 kids here, 35 there. I got into it with a college readiness provider 
that said, “Oh, well, we want to be the premiere organization.” I was like, “Ok, 
there are 47,554 high school students and you serve 500. You’re nobody’s 
premiere.” So yeah, I don’t know if there are enough resources to go around at the 
end of the day, but it’s something right?  (Interview, 3/26/14)  
 
Ms. Lily’s insight brings into focus the problem alluded to by Ms. Roebuck the refraction 
of the districts’ needs through myriad lenses. Partners’ lenses are first determined by their 
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construction of the problem, reflected in the mission of their organization, the ways they 
measure impact, and the demands of their funders. This refraction, Ms. Nicholas’ points 
out, can lead to a crowding of resources around students constructed as “targets” of 
partner programming, while unintentionally neglecting a large majority of the student 
body. This “mom and poppy” quality to partnerships has its benefits in that many 
organizations operate at an extremely grassroots level with deep connections to the 
communities they serve. However, with an inability to “scale” their organizations, she 
harbors uncertainty as to whether “there are enough resources to go around at the end of 
the day.”   
Branding Through Partnerships: ELLs as Partnership Currency   
The primacy of partnerships-as-strategy grew in scope and intensity throughout 
the year at both SRC meetings and in interviews with officials and other administrators. 
As a participant in a series of planning meetings for a presentation to the SRC on English 
Language Learner policy reform at the district level, I noticed that while many of the 
attendees were ELL teachers from neighborhood schools with high percentages of ELLs, 
many were also the ELL-serving partners, public interest lawyers, and district officials 
working on ELL policies and services in the district. The three planning meetings were 
tense and complicated by diverse stakeholders coming together to build a unified agenda. 
The tensions largely centered around the message that ELL-serving constituencies 
wanted to communicate to the district about the needs of ELLs and the state of services 
for them. With only two hours to monopolize the attention of the 5 members of the SRC, 
opinions diverged over whether to “showcase” the best practices of schools serving ELLs 
or to platform the dramatic loss of resources to these schools as a result of the budget cuts 
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and its adverse impacts on ELLs. The designated facilitator of the meeting, Ms. Smith, 
encouraged the group to use this meeting as a “showcase” for partnerships, leading with a 
“positive” rather than “pejorative” tone.  
We need to show that schools are drawing on all of these extra resources, parents, 
community groups, non-profit organizations, etcetera to show how while we have 
challenges with resources, we still developing best practices. We want good 
examples of best practices like partnerships but to not gloss over the challenges. 
    
An ELL teacher, Ms. Betty, objected to the strategy to avoid confrontation with the SRC 
by painting the “resort” to partnerships in a positive light.  
This might be clear to everyone but me, but what is the objective of this meeting? 
What’s our tack toward the SRC?  Is the point not to direct criticism or rage at the 
SRC? I’m not sure what the objective is. We also want to show what the 
weaknesses are with the lack of funding and that these partnerships aren’t enough 
to cover the state’s responsibility to provide for ALL of these children. We would 
like more funding right? Why can’t we say that? (Planning Meeting, 3/5/14)  
 
The principal of a prominent elementary for ELL students, Mr. Savitch, responded to Ms. 
Betty’s questions.  
I think that because we’re addressing the SRC about ELLs, it’s about representing 
people at this meeting and showing that there is this kind of support and advocacy 
for our students.  
 
Overriding Ms. Betty and several other teachers’ concerns that showcasing schools that 
develop partnership cottage industries would distort the dire need for state-provided 
resources and provide further ammunition to displace responsibility for resource-scarcity 
onto neighborhood schools, the district representatives heading the planning committee 
structured the presentation to the SRC around “Best Practices for ELLs”, center-staging 
Mr. Savitch’s elementary school’s numerous partnerships as a gold-standard for building 
ELL-supportive schools.  Seventy-five minutes of the two-hour presentation was 
dedicated to listening to the testimonies of this school’s partner leadership, plugging for 
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their programming and demonstrating how their financial and human resource 
commitments have mitigated the impact of the cuts on the school and its students. One 
partner, a non-profit dedicated to after-school programming, boasted, “We have 
assembled a parent advisory board and also found neighborhood volunteers to run the 
school’s library,” while another claimed, “We have provided the students we serve with 
application help to charters and special admission schools that they wouldn’t have 
otherwise without counselors.” Following the testimonies, Ms. Smith addressed the SRC, 
“We wanted this school be shown because they are successful in engaging their 
community’s resources, a practice that needs to be more widely adopted.”  
 As the presentations concluded and a panel of district-officials took the platform, 
a visibly distraught African-American father stood up and shouted at Ms. Smith.  
It’s been great hearing about these partners have worked in THIS school doing 
THIS thing for THESE kids. This is all well and great. [turning to the SRC] But, 
what is the school district going to do? We can’t rely on all of these folks to do 
what you’re supposed to do! Not all neighborhoods can do this. Not all 
neighborhoods have immigrant kids with organizations that want to help them 
(Fieldnote, 3/17/14).  
 
Flustered and not knowing exactly how to respond, Ms. Smith assured the father that they 
would be discussing the issue at the next meeting. He challenged her, “When are WE 
having THIS meeting? When’s the meeting? When’s the next meeting? Tell me!” Asking 
him to give her his contact information at the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Smith 
informed the father and the audience that time was running short.  
 After the meeting, I gathered with several teachers from Johnson High, the high 
school where I was conducting my fieldwork, to walk to our cars and the subway. Their 
faces were drawn, tired from the long day at school and now what they perceived to be an 
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unfruitful presentation to the SRC. Ms. Betty, a teacher usually abounding with energy, 
explicated her disappointment in a dejected tone. 
I just don’t know anymore. We went to three, two-hour meetings, brought 
students to testify, and not even the surface got scratched. Here we have a district 
falling apart and they decide to put one school on display because they’ve gotten a 
lot of outside help. They parade them around like that’s what every school should 
be doing. We should not be telling them that we can’t do this job with partners 
alone. Our partners are underpaid and unstable in their jobs themselves. I know 
that school, like all schools, wanted to give itself some visibility, to make them 
known so they won’t close them down. But because of that, we sacrificed an 
opportunity to tell them that we’re not ok. Things are not ok. (Fieldnote, 3/17/14)  
 
Ms. Betty distills the ethical dilemma of increasingly relying on partners as resource 
providers in public schools, as the distribution of those partnerships does not serve all 
school equitably. She further critiques the instability of partnerships themselves, as many 
of them remain at the mercy of the cyclical funding of the non-profit industry. Fearing 
that partner reliance provides a release valve for the state in terms of pressure to 
adequately and consistently fund Philadelphia’s neighborhood schools, Ms. Betty 
questions the political ends that such a strategy serves as private organizations come to 
increasingly perform the work and function of the state in public education. She finally 
forgives Mr. Savitch’s marketing of partnerships to the SRC as evidence of the school’s 
“quality”, understanding the necessity of positive press for schools as the school closure 
threat circulates.  
  ********************************************** 
 This chapter details the deepening marketization of the School District of 
Philadelphia beginning with the passing of No Child Left Behind and the rise of high-
stakes testing, “performance-based” evaluation systems, and the privatization of public 
school operations through school takeovers and the mass expansion of charter schools. 
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Given the state-takeover of the district in 2002 and the subsequent institution of the 
School Reform Commission, a body of unelected officials appointed by the state to 
govern the direction of reform in the city, I further demonstrate that conservative 
administrations at the state level from 2002 to 2014 influenced the adoption of school 
reforms pushing for devolution, competition, and choice within low-performing schools 
districts like Philadelphia. In spite of the intentions of intentions of the reforms to 
improve “accountability”, “quality”, and stability in educational provision and district 
finances, I argue that they operated in concert with state-level budget cuts from 2010 to 
2013 to produce the district’s most precarious fiscal crisis. Supporting essentially two 
separate educational systems, the district and the charter system, the School District of 
Philadelphia turned to closures to “consolidate” infrastructure and attempt to minimize 
their costs long-term in 2013 and 2014.  
 Central to my conversations with district officials were the momentum behind 
these reforms in spite of their unintended consequences at the local level. Citing “red 
state-blue city” dynamics, or the state’s conservative backing and imposition market-
driven reform models in a democratic, poor city like Philadelphia, officials lamented the 
state’s lack of concern for equitable outcomes. Pointing out the truncated access 
populations like first-generation immigrant families and special education students’ 
experience, they implied that unfettered education markets naturally stratify their 
consumers along lines of access and privilege. Further, they raised questions about the 
legal parameters of charter schools’ rights to selectively service students that abide by 
their disciplinary policies and or “fit” the criteria for which their charter establishes their 
services. If charter schools receive public funds but operate autonomously, to what 
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degree should the district monitor them beyond their performance? To what degree can a 
bankrupt district monitor the proliferation of charter school networks?  
 The fact that the “neediest” students were pooling in district schools afflicted the 
consciences of officials. They recognized that because of stratification across the sector, 
school closures would therefore have the most adverse impacts on the students that 
needed the most help. Unable to stymie the demand and support for charters at the city 
and state-levels, the “necessity” and “inevitability” around school closures emerged from 
what many felt as forced capitulation with powerful interests pushing market-reform. The 
fiscal precarity of the federal and state-induced budget crisis in AY 2013-2014 further 
shaped the urgency that many felt to cut costs and improve the overall “efficiency” of the 
district system. Their rationales and methodologies for the closures relied heavily on 
technocratic understandings of school quality and failure, intended to map order onto the 
messy, intensely political process of shuttering schools across the city. While many 
officials admitted that they tried to be “objective” as possible, eliciting “community 
input” to help make their decisions, the closures ultimately hinged on the unilateral 
voting of the School Reform Commission.  
 The “messiness” of the closures and the lack of democracy around these reforms 
index what Greenhouse (2010) writes as the “problems of interpretation” that accompany 
the marketization of publics. District officials responsible for closing schools and 
authorizing charters, in spite of their fraught feelings over these actions underlying 
paradoxes, did not feel a collective agency in altering the direction of reform. Charged 
with “improving” the overall quality of the district while reconciling the disparate 
demands of fiscal crisis, they allowed the School Reform Commission, or the state’s 
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governing arm, to dictate the rules of engagement, losing administrators along the way to 
budget cuts. While admitting that the state and district education policies promoting 
privatization and context-independent metrics of “quality” worked in tandem with a long 
history of disinvestment in Philadelphia’s district schools to produce schools’ “failure”, 
they saw no other option but to rely on the same metrics to close schools. Moreover, in 
the district’s internal policies, officials encouraged district schools to attract private 
resources to boost their schools’ quality through partnerships with non-profit, corporate, 
and philanthropic organizations.  
 Though I found officials troubled by the “paradoxes” of choice emergent in these 
reforms, in the coming chapters I argue that market-driven policies like school closure, 
charterization, privatization, and continued fiscal crisis created a blanket environment of 
precarity for all neighborhood schools. Deprived of resources and exhorted to “act” like 
charters by supplementing their budgets and services with the labor and resources of 
private organizations, neighborhood schools faced the conditions and demands of an 
increasingly entrenched education market. However, community members and educators 
at district meetings with the SRC voiced the problems of looking to private organizations 
to both attract private resources and demonstrate “quality” to parents selecting schools for 
their students in an expanding education market. Many questioned the viability of 
partnerships for all neighborhood schools when certain schools did not have the “ability” 
to attract enough partnerships to meet their demands. Others questioned the stability of 
partnerships with organizations that lay at the mercy of cyclical funding cycles. Many 
underscored the undeserved shift in responsibility to the school to find resources that 
should come from the state.  
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 Partnerships and school closure policies together index a dramatic seeping of 
market logics into the relations between public schools. By encouraging public schools to 
compete for private resources and then evaluating their closure-worthiness based on 
decontextualized performance metrics, these policies pit public schools against one 
another, limiting political mobilization and collective efficacy at the local level. 
Therefore, not only do district officials feel powerlessness in steering the direction of 
reform, but schools also understand their own survival as hinging on the failure of others.  
Treated like businesses, school closure and market-driven policies like private 
partnerships structure zero-sum relationships between schools competing for students, 
grades, and the resources to defray their rising costs. School closures-as-policy in 
particular, as both a consequences and extension of market logics, therefore raised the 
stakes of failure through an explicit ultimatum: compete or close. 
In this next chapter, I ethnographically explore one neighborhood high school’s 
response to this ultimatum, examining the dilemmas that surface in educational practice, 
philosophy, and governance when non-selective neighborhood schools must prioritize the 
business of survival over the mission of educating. School closure, more than any 
market-driven reform, fortifies the perils of failure, prompting neighborhood school to 
compete for survival. I explore processes of social and organizational change that top-
down, market-driven accountability mechanisms induce in public schools and they strive 
to compete in an expanding urban education marketplace. More simply, I trace school 
communities’ responses to the threat of closure and the market demands of demonstrating 
“value” and managing risk to their performance. By linking school closure threats to the 
in-school experiences of teachers, administrators, and students at a high school slated for 
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closure in early 2011, I hope to show how local interpretations of “failure” and markets 
come to restructure the educator-student relationships and experiences of equity and 
belonging for youth in non-selective neighborhood schools. Further I will show how 
market-driven logics alter the inclusive and democratic missions of traditional, non-
selective neighborhood schools. 
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CHAPTER 3 – “SAVING THE SCHOOL”: EFFORTS TO BRAND JOHNSON HIGH 
 
“Doomsday”: September 9th, 2013 
When I entered the building on September 9th, 2013, Johnson High was on the 
cusp on its 100th birthday. Walking into the main office, I saw the principal and one 
secretary enrolling dozens of students amidst a backdrop of empty desks and forlorn 
desktop computers of former staff. The May 2013 budget cut had leveled 3,500 
employees district-wide, and cut school supply budgets by 90 percent. The crisis also 
accompanied the closure of two-dozen neighborhood schools throughout the city (Gabriel 
2013). Johnson High had survived the “school closures list” for a third year in a row, 
managing to secure itself another school year in spite of its leaking roof, soaring utility 
costs, and low test scores. However, it did not escape the consequences of being a 
neighborhood school in the midst of dramatic district-wide austerity and reform. The 
school was sharing its counselor with 8 other schools, receiving his services 1 out of 
every 9 days. The nurse came more often at one day per week.  
After sitting for 30 minutes observing the chaos, I noticed that students enrolling 
in the school were overwhelmingly of Asian descent. Mr. Keo, the school principal, 
gestured to me to come into his office, a room covered in sprawling paper piles and 
Khmer artifacts: a paperweight of Angkor Wat, a parchment painting of the Cambodian 
countryside where he was born, a picture of his mother and her 11 children in her home a 
few blocks from Johnson High. He himself was a former Khmer refugee, arriving at 
Johnson High in the early 1980s after escaping the Pol Pot genocide and spending years 
in a refugee camp in southeastern Thailand.  “So how many days per week can you be 
here this year?” he asked.  I told him that I was planning on being in classrooms four 
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days per week, that I would help out in whatever ways that were needed. “As you can 
see, we are short-staffed, and some of our classrooms have over 45 students. I’ll take you 
and whoever else I can get.”   
From there he gave me a schedule of six classes, a mix of low-level English-
Language-Learner (ELL) classes, “shelter” classes, or content classes like American 
history and mathematics modified for ELL students, and finally a class designated for the 
implementation of a college-access program, College Dreams, for college-aspiring 
sophomores. As I walked the hallways, the imagery of Jonathan Kozol's (1991) work on 
the state of public educational infrastructure came alive. Water stains marred peeling 
walls and cockroach droppings gathered in dusty corners. Stepping over chunks of fallen 
plaster, I sat in a squeaky seat in Mr. Wolf’s room. As the bell chimed, 43 students 
rushed in to grab a seat in this “shelter” American civics class. With a limited number of 
desks, several students took their seats on the radiator, a relic from the early 20th century 
when the school was built. Students passed a set of 14 textbooks published circa 1989 
around to their peers. Three and four students crowded around one book, taking turns 
skimming the lines with their fingers and searching for information to answer Mr. Wolf’s 
opening set of questions on the chalkboard. One student touched her shoulder with a 
furrowed brow and raised her eyes to see water streaming from a hole in the ceiling. Mr. 
Wolf looked at her, then to me, and smiled, “Yeah, we thought that sealing off the 4th 
floor of the building would help, but at the end of the day we need a new roof and it’s 
going to cost 5 million. You can guarantee that the district will close us down before that 
happens. Just don’t sit too close to the door. That’s where most of the water is.”  
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The rest the day was a whirlwind of desperate teachers trying to salvage lesson 
plans with no paper, and students navigating overcrowded classrooms, hallways and 
cafeterias. Whereas I thought that my presence would confuse teachers, make them wary 
of a graduate student doing ethnographic “research” in their classrooms, many of them 
seemed relieved to see me. Upon entering Mr. Raymond’s fifth period “shelter” biology 
class, he asked, “What organization do you work for?”  I responded, “I don’t work for 
anyone. I’m a graduate student.”  Squinting his eyes, he asked again, “So you don’t work 
for a non-profit?” “No, I responded, “I’m not. Just a graduate student.” Mr. Raymond 
narrowed his eyes, confused, but aware of the room filling with students, “You’re a warm 
body and that’s all that matters” (Fieldnote, 9/9/13).  
   *************************** 
 The experiences described above illustrate the milieu in which administration and 
staff worked in September 2013, the direst month of my fieldwork, a moment when 
neighborhood schools across the city struggled to manage over-enrollment, busting 
classrooms, and no give in their budgets. In Chapter 2 I described the School District of 
Philadelphia’s current state of affairs, particularly how issues of school choice, 
privatization, charter expansion, and entrenched bi-partisan politics at the state-level 
shaped the district’s urgency to execute mass closures of 30 non-selective neighborhood 
schools over the course of two academic years (AY’11-12, ’12-13). In this chapter, I 
explore the ways in which a particular neighborhood school responded to the concomitant 
pressures of the threat of closure and unprecedented fiscal austerity in their strategies to 
signify their educational value and save their school through a process of school 
branding.  
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I entered Johnson High in early 2011 as a tutor, two years prior to the budget 
crisis. During that year a leaked report from the URS Corporation recommended the 
school for closure (Herold and Mezzacappa 2011). While unique in its ethnic diversity, 
Johnson experienced similar pressures to most neighborhood schools under closure 
consideration: high student body poverty rates, low standardized test scores7, a decaying 
building, and decreasingly available material and human resources. When the school 
received word that the district was considering it for potential closure, administrators and 
teachers read the policy as emblem of unprecedented precarity, raising the stakes of 
“failure” through its explicit ultimatum: compete or close. Positioned as educationally 
inferior to charter schools and magnet schools as a traditional neighborhood school, they 
felt that the only way to rise from the fray of considered schools was to minimize risks to 
their performance, improve the reputation of the school to attract higher enrollments, and 
build political capital with connected individuals and networks to help insulate the school 
from the threat. The practices that accompanied each of these strategies set into motion a 
larger branding process that administrators and educators believed would sustain the 
school as a viable institution within Philadelphia’s educational marketplace.  
I therefore take on my second research question in this chapter that pertains to 
how educators perceived the risk that school closures-as-policy posed to their fate and 
how they translated those perceptions into organizational and praxis-oriented changes to 
both mitigate risk to their performance and reputation as a school and circulate symbols 
of educational quality to bolster enrollment of students deemed valuable to their imagined 
                                                           
7 Prior to the 2009-2010 school year, Johnson High scored below the district average on the PSSA (School 
District of Philadelphia).  Both AY 2009-2010 and AY 2010-2011, the school performed significantly 
higher than the district average. It has subsequently dropped in the last several years to at or below the 
district average (School District of Philadelphia, 2014).   
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brand. As recent work demonstrates, underlying closure policy is the condition of 
extraordinary competition between both charter and neighborhood schools alike. Schools 
with declining enrollments are deemed “inefficient” and “failing” and therefore must 
ultimately be consolidated under management rubric. Closure is thus the outcome of what 
Jabbar (2015) identifies as “competition as process” where school leaders “must develop 
their responses to competition after they scan the market for the strategic actions of other 
schools” (3). She also argues that while many economists of education have assumed 
competition as a natural “lift-all-boats” mechanism for school improvement, as a theory, 
it remains speculative. While relatively unexamined in the literature, recent work has 
pointed to the marketing of schools that competition motivates, rather than material and 
curricular improvements as schools strive to attract enrollments (Davis 2013; Holme, 
Carkhum, and Rangel 2013; Kasman and Loeb 2012). Other scholars have also discussed 
issues of equity when “problem kids” are “counseled out” of schools during the 
marketing of a school, raising questions about the equity (Jennings 2010; Lubienski 
2007). I build on this work by considering how school branding, as a racialized process 
that responds to the risk introduced through competition and resource scarcity, 
encompasses more than merely marketing the school but transforming the institution into 
a niche commodity that will succeed in the education market.  
As I described in the previous chapter, branding requires the reinforcement of 
symbolic associations between brands and consumers through the engendering of 
affective attachments (Schroeder 2009; Bastos and Levy 2012). Brands, as cultural, 
ideological objects, transcend Marxist-oriented conceptions of use and exchange-value. 
For Marx, the process under capitalism produces a commodity or use value, that has an 
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exchange value that is greater than the sum of the values of the commodities in its 
production (Foster 2007). Luvaas (2013) argues that within advanced capitalist societies, 
notions of use and exchange value have not disappeared but that value creation has come 
to hinge more on the immaterial imaginaries that brands invoke through the play on 
human affect. As Foster (2007) explains,  
The product singles out the agents and binds them together and, reciprocally, it is 
the agents that, by adjustment, iteration and transformation, define its 
characteristics” (Callon et al. 2002:198). Hence, the product implies a dynamic 
“economy of qualities,” an economy in which tradable goods in the market are 
defined by the characteristics attributed to them in successive qualifications and 
requalification, including those enacted by consumers (713).  
 
Drawing on the “qualifications” that brands must consistently negotiate with consumers 
to be successful, I show in this chapter how two successive principals and their 
administrations sought to qualify the school by capitalizing on the educational desires and 
aspirations of first-generation Asian immigrant students that they perceived would 
enhance the school’s brand and thus attract and retain student-familial-consumers.  
The chapter moves from a thick description and history of Johnson High as 
context, and then to three major sections that detail the strategies that the school 
employed to brand itself as worthy of remaining open. The first section details two 
administrations’ efforts to alter the student body of Johnson High in order to attract larger 
enrollments of particular kinds of students. The second captures the institutionalization of 
policies that sought to manage “risk” in the student population in order to insulate the 
envisioned school’s “brand” from sullying. The third and final section delineates the 
ways in which successive principals went outside of the school to forge partnerships with 
a large number of private organizations, mostly non-profits, in order to build political 
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capital with powerful individuals citywide and attract services that would attract 
enrollments of particular populations. My analysis provides insight into how tandem 
processes of risk management and branding that these strategies set into motion, indexed 
racialized and classed educational practices that marked populations as “risky” to the 
“quality” of the school. I show how these practices promoted particular student 
populations as “desirable”, crowding scarce energies and resources in their service. 
Conversely, I show how educators, in a context of austerity and heightened urgency, 
attempted to annex and reduce the presence and visibility of populations that they 
perceived would stain the school’s reputation and ultimately, imperil its survival.  
Creating the Brand through ELL-ification  
As the school closure threat gained strength from 2010 to 2013, Johnson High 
came under the microscope by the Office of Strategic Analytics, the arm of the School 
District of Philadelphia responsible for evaluating school “quality” through a series of 
metrics including enrollment numbers, the condition of the building, academic 
performance, and school climate data (School District of Philadelphia 2012a). Johnson 
High, similar to many high schools considered for school closure, scored poorly across 
most of the metrics. Consistently performing around or below the district average in math 
and reading test scores, this 100 year-old school suffered from perpetual maintenance 
problems and a dramatic drop in enrollment in the last decade. Administrators attributed 
drops in enrollment and test scores to the “creaming” of better students by charter 
schools, a trend that had reconfigured the educational landscape of the larger 
neighborhood in recent years. With no hope for financial help to renovate the building 
and with the likelihood of continuing to serve high percentages of high-need students, the 
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two principals that governed Johnson High over the course of my three years there, Mr. 
Brown (’11-’12) and Mr. Keo (’12-14) highlighted the importance of rising from the fray 
of considered schools. Each saw improved performance in particular areas as more 
achievable than others, namely enrollment and school climate. The School District of 
Philadelphia uses a composite of indicators to measure school climate performance: 1) 
percentage of students attending 95 percent or more of instructional days 2) within-year 
retention rates or students that remained in the school for a full academic year year3) 
across-year retention or students that remained in the school for successive academic 
years 4) percent of students with zero in-school suspensions or suspension time served in 
the in-school disciplinary quarters 5) percent of students with zero out-of-school 
suspensions 6) teacher attendance rates 7) serious/violent incidents (School District of 
Philadelphia, 2014). In both principals’ minds, bolstering “school climate” would 
naturally increase enrollment. District auditors would also see changes in these indicators 
as reflective of the school’s progress and therefore reconsider its initial recommendation 
to close Johnson.   
After a deluge of violence at another neighborhood high school in 2009 with 
alleged attacks on Asian students by “African-American” students, contributed to an 
exodus of “Asian” students, Johnson High’s former principal, Mr. Brown, saw an 
opportunity become a “safe haven” for students fleeing what they perceived to be a 
persistently “dangerous” school. Teachers and administrators referred to these students, 
among other first-generation immigrant students, as English Language Learners, or 
ELLs. While a number of different ethnic groups composed the ELL population at 
Johnson, youth from East and Southeast Asian nations were the most populous. By 
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promoting an image of a safety and opportunity for hard-working immigrant students, 
Mr. Brown, Johnson High’s principal from 2008 to 2012, argued that he could “brand” 
the school as an institution that would attract larger enrollments.  
Mr. Brown: I use to work as a teacher in a bilingual school in North Philadelphia. 
We had some ELL kids here [at Johnson High], some wonderful ELL teachers. I 
was impressed with what was going on in those classrooms so of course I wanted 
to highlight that. In a lot of ways you have to market your school – you have to 
brand your school somehow. I think the school became more positive, safer when 
we strengthened the ELL program. I think that kids were happier and therefore 
kids came back. I mean I’m in charge of a five million dollar company [as a 
principal]. I’m the CEO. I needed to build pride in the school as the resource 
provider and the brander. I got the school painted, got the new weight room, put 
in new cameras to improve school climate, so I said to the kids, “Look what I’m 
doing for you.” To the staff and the press I said, “Look at what we’re doing for 
each other and what we’re building!” I brought in the Student Union and they 
went out and said, “Hey, look, ours is a good school and here’s why.” When you 
have the kids selling the school, it’s tougher to close it. (Interview, 4/7/14) 
 
Here, Mr. Brown tethers images of safety and school prosperity to the identity of a 
particular kind of student: the diligent, well-behaved English Language Learner. When 
Johnson High’s staff used this term, they referred to a particular type of student that 
embodied the educational aspirations of Asian youth. While the term was slippery, used 
to capture hard working, well-behaved Latino students, in this particular context, my 
participants deployed “ELL” to index model minority behaviors. Mr. Brown further 
describes the importance of reinforcing those images with material improvements and 
curriculum changes. Under Mr. Brown, the school bolstered its English language 
program, offering not only four levels of English language instruction (ELL) but parallel 
content curriculum modified to serve the language needs of immigrant students. He also 
points to the mechanisms through which he created an “aura” around Johnson as a “good 
school”: the students themselves. By bringing in members of the Philadelphia Student 
 107
Union, or a city-wide student-led leadership organization, he incorporated students and 
staff into the branding process by allowing them to circulate the message of the school’s 
quality beyond its bounds.  
 As a result of this shift to an ELL-centric school, many new students came from 
across catchment lines, particularly after the district closed other neighborhood schools 
en masse from 2012 to 2013 and allowed students to apply to schools across catchment 
lines in the spirit of “school choice.” Since the large majority of ELL students at Johnson 
were of Asian descent, the school began to acquire a reputation as “The Asian High 
School”, reinscribing the racialized logic that enrolling more ELL students would give 
the school the “right kind” of reputation. As one teacher, Ms. Crowley, explained, “Yeah, 
I mean you have students traveling from Northeast Philly just to come to this school. 
There’s definitely a perception that this school is safe and welcoming for Asian students; 
also that they represent the majority” (Interview, 1/10/14). Another teacher, Mr. Drew, 
recounts the legacy of his Mr. Brown’s tenure.   
When Brown was here the school was a lot different than it is now. He was 
actually reforming the school to keep it from closing. So he was focusing a lot on 
attendance and participation in class, detentions, that kind of thing. It was a very 
different feel than it is now and that’s because of our immigrant students. When 
he started, that population wasn’t as prominent as it is today. (Interview, 1/23/14)  
 
Mr. Drew draws attention to a central assumption in Mr. Brown’s strategy to ELL-ify the 
school: that enrollment numbers and climate statistics like “attendance” and “detentions” 
would naturally improve with higher numbers of English Language Learners. By 
improving those criteria, the school would not only bolster its “hard data” but also its 
“soft data”, or staff and student narratives that could be traded upon in neighborhood and 
city-wide discourse to strengthen the school’s reputation.  
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Heightened Urgency to Brand: AY 2013-2014  
 Mr. Keo, who in served as Mr. Brown’s assistant principal from 2009-2012 and 
succeeded him as principal, faced tremendous pressure in the AY 2013-2014 school year 
to continue to brand the school as an ELL haven. With no resources and few support staff 
as a result of the slashed budget and increasingly disproportionate enrollment of high-
need students, Mr. Keo saw ELL-ification as the only way forward to save the school 
from closure. 
The district is focused strictly on one thing – numbers. It’s about saving money, 
utilizing space, and not getting sued. They do not take into consideration the 
uniqueness of each school unless it has something to do with those three things. 
So you have to beat them at their own game. If they close the ELL high school 
and those kids go to other schools and get beat up, that would hurt their numbers 
AND get them sued and they know that. Even the principal of [sister neighborhood 
high school] keeps saying to me, “Whatever you’re doing, don’t think you’re 
offending me. You’re actually doing me a favor, because if you send those kids 
over, there’s going to be turf war in my building all over again.” It’s not my 
intention to make this into an Asian high school, but it would be great if it could 
be. It’s a neighborhood school so I have to take everybody. However, it doesn’t 
hurt to attract more Asian students because this district will never close down a 
majority Asian school.  (Interview, 5/1/14) 
 
As he alluded to above, the enrollment of ELLs, namely Asian students, that would allow 
the school to “beat [the district] at its own game” by exploiting the cultural politics of the 
neighborhood and city to accomplish two goals. First, the principal assumes that by 
enrolling first generation Asian students, he will raise the school’s “numbers” in terms of 
enrollment and attendance, making it more difficult for the district to justify the school’s 
closure. Second, Mr. Keo brandishes the political and fiscal risk the district would 
assume through lawsuits by closing an Asian-dominated high school. The principal’s 
secretary, Ms. Lai, a key adviser and information source to the principal and the only 
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office staffer in 2013-2014, confirms an underlying assumption at work within the 
administration. 
I’ve been playing around with a lot of the open data in the district and so I was 
looking at how attendance rates are correlated with the percentage of ELL 
students, and I found really high correlations between ELLs and attendance rates. 
(Interview, 2/11/14)  
 
This explicit relationship between the enrollment of ELL students, improvements across 
the board in behavior and attendance statistics, and enrollment numbers was a central 
theme of conversations across both the administration and staff at JH. The discourse of 
school survival ultimately hinged for staff on not only increases in enrollments, but 
specifically enrollments of students that would not taint their climate numbers: ELLs.  
Mr. Cassidy: The only reason we’re not closed is because we have our ELLs. 
They come here all the way from Chinatown...What’s weird is that the Asian 
scores are just as dismal across the board. The perception is that if you have Asian 
kids, your math scores are going to go through the roof.  It’s more of a reading 
test than anything else, ya know, so it’s not about achievement. Let’s be honest, 
when 15 ELL kids come in and are like “Oh, we want to go to your school,” Mr. 
Keo is like, “Ok, sign em’ up!”  It also helps because as we grow in numbers it’s 
harder for them to close us down. This school used to house 1200 kids so I mean, 
we need to be up to 700 or 800 to be safe. Two years ago we were pushing 500.  
We’ve gotten 200 ELL kids from all over the city. It’s not like 200 show up in 
August. They come all year. We got a student in June, ya know, it counts! He’ll 
be here next year so sign em’ up! I mean, come on, you have zero issues with 
those kids. You have issues but you wouldn’t have fights, weapons, or things like 
that. You wouldn’t have those issues, ya know? And for a guy who’s been here 11 
years, if that’s the way to keep it open, then I’m all for it. (Interview, 3/19/14)  
 
Mr. Cassidy below summarizes the institutionalization of the ELL strategy and its key 
technocratic advantages, alluded to in both the introductory vignette and the several staff 
members’ testimonies. Attendance and behavioral statistics trumped achievement data 
and therefore, instead of attempting to strengthen achievement in the midst of 
increasingly severe resource and labor cuts, maintaining discipline became the key focus 
 110
of Johnson’s administration. Teachers like Mr. Cassidy confirmed that the manageability 
of ELLs made them an appealing student type for recruitment and admission. Together, 
the value that Asian enrollment induced via quantification and the legal power they 
carried to reverse district decision-making around closure, influenced teachers and 
administrators ‘strategies to build their brand around this group. 
Recruitment and Exploiting Enrollment Caveats  
Understanding hard data and soft data as intrinsically connected, Mr. Keo, 
spearheaded further efforts to ELL-ify the school to improve its numbers. Mobilizing a 
number of staff, bilingual classroom aids, and students, he and this group visited 
elementary schools to advertise and promote Johnson High as an alternative to charter 
and special admission schools. Creating and relying on a “Student Advisory Council” of 
four students, Mr. Keo encouraged this group of “model students” to go with him to 
neighborhood elementary and middle schools to recruit students for the following school 
year.   
A lot of our students are wonderful, dedicated students.  We have knuckleheads, 
not that many, just like any other school. We know that this is a great school here, 
but from the perception outside, every time we send out representation and they 
introduce themselves as Johnson students, other children look at them like, 
“Really?  You’re from Johnson? You’re the ghetto one?” We need to break that 
stereotypical perception. So I’ve asked Rhonda and a few of other students who 
want to change that to come up with strategies to educate people outside of this 
building that we are not fighters, that we aren’t the lowest form of human being 
because we are from Johnson High. (Meeting Recording, 3/25/14)  
 
Mr. Keo points to a key issue: the power of perception and reputation in terms of 
attracting more students to enroll. By changing the perception of Johnson High’s as a 
violent, low-performing “neighborhood” high school full of “knuckleheads” through the 
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strategic employment of “model students” as recruiters, Mr. Keo attempted to counteract 
his school’s reputation as serving “the lowest form of human being.”  
However, Mr. Keo was not interested in all elementary schools equally. Targeting 
elementary schools, some beyond the boundaries of the catchment area, he, the Student 
Advisory Council, and a number of bilingual counselors, actively recruited ELL students. 
Mr. Abram, a security guard whose wife served as the principal at neighborhood 
elementary school where Mr. Keo sent students and counselors, recounts the selectivity 
of the recruitment.   
I know for a fact that all of the Bilingual Counselors went into the elementary 
schools and were recruiting the ELL students to come here. I know that first hand. 
Mainly Asians, which is understandable because the population down here is 
largely Asian, but we’re also getting Asians from Center City! I think Johnson 
High will be here for a while because of the climate and because of the type of 
students Mr. Keo is accepting here. Well, it’s first and foremost a neighborhood 
school, but there are students that can apply here outside the catchment that, in my 
opinion, may end up turning it into a 100 percent ELL school. If that were the 
case, I believe they would never close us. (Interview, 1/16/14). 
 
As Mr. Abram points out, not only did active recruitment become a strategy to change 
perceptions of the school, but also an indirect strategy to change the composition of the 
student body.  
The Risk Management of “Americans”  
However, branding the school as one “worthy” of remaining open required 
instituting policies that would also minimize the participation and visibility “risky” 
students. These policies became of especial import as the district’s fiscal crisis deepened 
throughout AY 2013-2014, intensifying the uncertainty of the direction of the district and 
its implications for Johnson High’s future. As Nakassis (2013) argues, central to the 
history of branding is the management of risk to the brand. Through differentiation from 
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generic classifications, brands distance themselves from undesirable symbolic 
associations. In the case of Johnson High, avoiding labels such as “dangerous” or 
“chaotic” became of utmost importance in terms of retaining first-generation Asian 
students, building their enrollment base, and avoiding poor climate data.  
 “Behavior” therefore reigned supreme as the defining expression of both student 
quality and risk. While the generational and ethnic diversity of the school confounded 
categorical race breakdowns, two homogenizing categories came to both classify and 
segregate students spatially, academically, and socially: “English Language Learner” and 
“American.”  Staff and students also deployed these categories “ELL” and “American” 
interchangeably with other synonymous terms that contributed to the crystallization of 
the “ELL” versus “American” dichotomy. While staff and students used “ELL” in most 
cases, they also substituted “immigrant”, “international student”, and “foreign” students 
to invoke the same set of set of behaviors that characterized this student type. Even 
though the ELL population also splintered in complicated ways across ethnic lines (see 
Chapter 1), being “ELL” invoked “model minority” behaviors, or behaviors typically 
associated with “Asian-ness” (Lee 2005; Fong 2008): hardworking, respectful, 
submissive, and quiet. In contrast, staff and students alike framed “American”, or native-
born students, as antithetical “ELL” – lazy, violent, disrespectful of authority, loud, and 
abrasive – characteristics closely associated with what my participants understood as the 
trope of urban Black masculinity. Ms. Betty, a teacher, describes the distinctions between 
these two groups.  
In the truest sense of the word, I mean it is sheltered ELL instruction, that’s the 
model, but in reality, we’re sheltering them in the broader sense of the word from 
the big, bad Americans. That’s the way I see it and I don’t discourage it. I know 
 113
that it’s wrong because I don’t believe that’s going to help them in their life to be 
afraid of Americans or not want to commune with them, but to be quite honest, I 
would not want to commune with them either. Why would I approach someone in 
the hallway who’s cursing up a storm and fighting in the hallway, whatever you 
want to call THAT? The volume of their voices is offensive to my ELL students. 
They cannot figure out why anyone would speak that loudly and that alone 
prevents them from approaching them, regardless of what color they are. 
(Interview, 12/18/13) 
 
Ms. Betty points to two issues: first, she assigns a set of behaviors typically exhibited by 
“big, bad Americans” that makes “ELL” students’ fraternization with them difficult to 
facilitate. Second, she assigns fault in the communication barrier to the native-born 
students. Claiming, “I would not want to commune with them either,” Ms. Betty 
identifies more with the perceive plight of the ELL students.   
 This dichotomy did not just apply to behavioral characterizations of students.  
According to both staff and students alike, ELLs “valued” their education and Americans 
did not, a performance that had little to do with academic achievement, but instead, an 
embodied hope that educational attainment would have some bearing on their futures. 
Ms. Allard makes a comparison between her “ELL” and “American” students:  
I do find that I see the American kids are not as appreciative of what they have. 
You may not have much, but they’re like, “Oh, whatever, this is just school and I 
don’t want to be here.” Where a lot of my ELL kids, they’re like, “I want to be in 
school because education is important.”  You even see that in class. When you 
look at when they turn in work, almost all of the ELL kids turn in all of their 
work, and the other kids turn it in whenever they want to turn it in. It’s the work 
ethic that I don’t see in the American kids. (Interview, 2/18/14) 
 
The dynamics described by Ms. Allard allude to spectrum of behaviors that inform 
assignment of students to particular social categories: “work ethic” or “attitude” toward 
their education. Scholars have thoroughly documented the enthusiasm and aspirations 
that first immigrant youth harbor for educational achievement (Bok 2010; Kao and 
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Tienda 2005; Louie 2012; McGinnis 2009; Ogbu and Simons 1998), highlighting that 
fervency for achievement often diminishes as students become incorporated into the 
American mainstream. Within this particular context, the subsuming categories of “ELL” 
and “American” reflected that understanding, but went further to embed racialized 
notions of value and risk. By building a brand around ELL students that demonstrated 
care toward their education as well as contributed to a climate of order, the school 
believed that it was elevate the value of the brand, selling the school’s environment as 
one conducive to enthusiasm and respect for learning.  
In fact, very few staff dwelled on disparate academic performance in their 
classrooms but focused more the “effort” that students demonstrated in their work. The 
obedient, hard-working minority, regardless of ethnicity or generation, was evaluated 
based on his or her “care” for education – a trait they strongly associated strongly with 
model Asian-ness. Teachers, administrators, and students designated students exhibiting 
violence, deviance and apathy toward their academic performance, as more “American”, 
or enacting “urban” behaviors typically identified with Black male students (Ferguson 
2001; Rios 2011). While the “American” population, or native-born population, certainly 
splintered in complicated ways across race and ethnicity, one’s labeling as “American” 
translated into the degree to which their racialized behavior and educational aspiration 
put the school’s imagined brand at risk.  
Barring Enrollment of “Problem Kids”  
In addition to a large number of ELL students of Asian descent enrolling at 
Johnson, many of whom the staff referred to as “problem kids”, or native-born students 
ejected from mostly charter schools and some parochial schools due to their poor 
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performance, behavioral issues, or a combination of both, were arriving at Johnson High 
simultaneously (Fieldnote, 2/19/14). These students were mostly African-American boys, 
but there were several African-American girls and Caucasian boys. With cuts to support 
staff and teachers, Mr. Keo and the teachers feared that “problem students” might have an 
adverse impact on the school’s climate and overarching reputation. The school struggled 
with its state mandate to “accept everyone”, specifically when branding itself required an 
associative distancing from “problem students.”  
Mr. Keo: I’ve even had people say to me, you know, I know you’re trying to 
convert this school into an all Asian or ELL school. And I was like stop, that’s not 
part of my agenda. If the ELL student comes to my school, I have to take him. If 
the African-American student comes to my school and they live within the 
catchment I have to take him. I run a neighborhood high school. I have no control 
over who comes here. But it makes it hard because my school will be held 
responsible for that African-American kid punching someone out in the stairwell. 
We’re one violent incident away from being closed. (Interview, 12/9/13) 
 
The dilemma of inclusion became particularly acute in AY 2013-2014 as Mr. Keo 
struggled to operate the school with few support staff. In the opening vignette I alluded to 
the lack of “bodies” in the school, a term that many teachers and Mr. Keo used often. 
Students with behavioral issues posed a serious risk to the school climate without 
“bodies” to regulate and govern areas where risk of an “incident” ran high – stairwells, 
the cafeteria, and outside of school. As he notes, the behaviors he deems as most risky 
reflect what he perceives as indicative of African-American boys, denoted by his use of 
the term “him.”  
As I began to spend more time in the main office observing enrollments, I spoke 
often to the school secretary and principal’s intern. While the intern’s purpose was to 
shadow the principal, she reported that with the budget cuts and the loss of five 
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administrators, including the former assistant principal, she mostly helped the sole 
secretary cope with the overwhelming workload of enrolling new students. The school 
kept a record of transfer students as they streamed in, noting from where and for why 
students were enrolling. Eating lunch one day with the principal intern, Ms. Nguyen, 
commented on how Mr. Keo oftentimes worked around the “catchment” caveat.  
I mean, every time a student comes in, Mr. Keo asks them a set of questions and 
why they’re here, and they also look at the address. If the student lies beyond the 
catchment and they have a lot of discipline issues at their old school – usually a 
charter – then he doesn’t have to take them, and he won’t. But if they’re in the 
catchment, he has to take them, so usually we’ll get like 2 or 3 kids in the two 
days per week that I’m here that are like that. If the kid is a good kid, doesn’t have 
issues, or doesn’t have a record because they’re just coming to the country, then 
he takes them even if they’re not in the catchment. They are usually Asian kids.  
(Fieldnote, 5/12/14)  
 
By turning “problem kids” away and funneling them back to their neighborhood schools, 
or students that exhibit the hazardous behaviors associated with African-American boys, 
and enrolling “good kids” from across catchment lines to bolster the school’s numbers, or 
students that reflect model minority behaviors, Ms. Nguyen underscores a central 
mechanism created to drive the disproportionate enrollment of Asian ELL students. 
Because the district gave principals autonomy to make decisions around admission of 
students from outside the catchment, no mechanism existed to correct for racialized 
readings of admissions candidates.  
 The Institution of the “Success Academy”  
However, as Ms. Nguyen and Mr. Keo pointed out, as a non-selective 
neighborhood school, the law mandated Mr. Keo to take “everyone” within the 
catchment. In response to the enrollment of “problem kids”, Mr. Keo and teacher 
leadership, or two teachers charged with administrative responsibilities in the absence of 
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an assistant principal, adopted a strategy to corral these students, offer them an alternative 
curriculum, and also truncate their time spent in the building. Through the founding of 
the “Success Academy” in 2012, months after the announcement of Johnson High’s 
inclusion on the potential school closures list, Mr. Brown and several teachers split 35 
“problem students” between two classrooms in the school’s basement. When I asked one 
of the two Success teachers what qualified students for this tracking, Mr. Marra informed 
me, “It depends on a bunch of things.  They’re here because of a combination of 
behavior, attendance, and grades, in that order. Mostly behavior.” (Fieldnote 11/5/13). 
Mr. Marra repeatedly discussed the prioritizing of weighting behavior and attendance 
performance over achievement, a priority of the school as climate data became 
increasingly critical to manage.  
The students came from across grades and oftentimes had the same number of 
credits regardless of their designated class year, largely due to failed classes and truancy. 
One teacher in each classroom would cover a range of basic subjects like algebra, history, 
and English, trying to forge a curricular middle ground among the range of levels. 
Success Academy students arrived at 9am everyday instead of 8am with the rest of the 
student body, and left by 1:30pm, not 3pm. These students did not enter through the 
central doors, but came through an entrance on the side of the building that led directly 
toward the assigned classrooms. Their classrooms were also directly adjacent to the 
“Dean’s Room”, another space where students serving in-school suspensions gathered 
under the supervision of a teacher-disciplinarian. Success students usually spent as much 
time or more in the Dean’s Room as they did in the Success classrooms. They did not eat 
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lunch with the rest of the student body and came and went from the school without much 
interaction with the general population.   
Teachers, administrators, and the student body, all constructed the Success 
Academy in our conversations as a “necessary evil”, not only in light of the ever-present 
school closure threat, but also due to the loss of staff in the May 2013 budget cut. 
Without an assistant principal and counselor, as well as a teacher shortage, a vacuum 
replaced former emotional supports for these students. When I asked the second Success 
teacher, Mr. Cassidy, about the effects of the Success Academy on the climate of the 
school, he explained, “Well, it certainly has improved things upstairs. You notice a 
difference in the hallways - not as many fights because all of the instigators are corralled” 
(Fieldnote, 11/5/13). The idea of “corralling” the problem was understood by the staff as 
part of the larger strategy of minimizing the risk that “problem kids” could wreak on the 
reputation and district-level data-driven decisions around keeping the school open. 
Teachers and the principal himself oftentimes felt conflicted about the program, believing 
that its absence would promise chaos in the classrooms of students that “wanted to learn.”  
I will discuss the ethical dilemmas circulating around the Success Academy later in 
Chapter 4.  
Racialization of the Brand  
As I spent more time observing in the Success classrooms, I came to realize that 
its institution acutely distilled the spatial, relational, and racial dimensions of Johnson 
High’s branding process. Over the course of the year, the number and composition 
changed due to the influx of students from charter schools or the relegating of students 
with behavioral and truancy issues in the regular population to the Success Academy. 
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However, of the 35 students, of which only 28 on a given day attended, the majority of 
the students were African-American males. Though the school was over 50 percent 
Asian, 83 percent of the Success Academy was African-American.  
Table 1.6 Breakdown of Success Academy8 
 
Race Male Female 
Black  19 9 
Caucasian  3 0 
Mixed9 2 1 
Asian  0 1 
 
Such a disparity in demographic representation in the Success Academy symbolized the 
effects of a “colorblind” set of criteria, or behaviors deemed “unacceptable” regardless of 
race, that the school and district used to contain threats to their climate data and 
consequently their perceptions of quality schools (Bonilla-Silva 2009). Administrators 
like Mr. Keo and teachers could justify the racial distribution in the Success Academy by 
tethering behavioral problems to the risk they posed to the fate of Johnson High.  
Justifying Colorblindness: Second Generation Cambodians  
As the ELL population grew over the course of my three years there, questions 
circulated among the students and staff as to whether Asian students were systemically 
and socially receiving preferential treatment. To deflect this criticism, teachers and 
administrators, namely the second principal, Mr. Keo, would cite the “other Asians”, or 
second-generation Cambodian students as a contrary example (Ong 2003; Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice 2013). This group legitimized the ELL-American 
                                                           
8 These numbers are subject to change.  The Success Academy’s numbers and attendance fluctuated 
dramatically over the course of its two years of existence. This was the racial breakdown during a visit on 
November 5th, 2013.  
9 Of the mixed students, one male was African-American and Caucasian, one male and one female were 
Latino and Caucasian. 
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categorical dichotomy, enabling the school community to deny accusations of racism 
against Black and White native-born students. While the school had both second and first 
generation Cambodian students, teachers and students pointed to the differences that 
divided the groups. Teachers, administrators, and students described second-generation 
Khmer youth as “more like the African-Americans” in their attitudes and behaviors, 
predisposed to violence, bullying, and academic apathy. When I asked about the “Asians” 
of the Success Academy, Mr. Marra commented,  
Yeah, there’s a couple. There is one now and last year there was another one but 
he doesn’t go to school with us anymore. It’s all Cambodians that are down there 
– like the dark-skinned Cambodian girl, oh, she’s bad. The Cambodians aren’t 
really Asian like the rest of our students are Asian. They’re all second generation 
and completely Americanized (Fieldnote, 11/5/13). 
 
Becoming “Americanized” in the school meant the display of behaviors traditionally 
associated with the subcultural styles of urban Black youth urban, a product of exposure 
to street life in Philadelphia and the shedding of more stereotypically “Asian” behaviors. 
Whereas first generation Cambodian students in the school were typified as more 
authentically “Asian” in their reverence for authority and educational aspirations, they 
portrayed second-generation Cambodian students as “deviant” and “uncaring toward their 
education”, therefore qualifying them for admission into the Success Academy and the 
larger category of “American.” Mr. Keo, a former Cambodian refugee, reflected on what 
he perceived as the second generation’s plight.  
The children of my generation are lost and confused. They have no clue what to 
do because most of the people my age dropped out of school and joined the gang, 
the only place they felt they belonged. There’s no parent connection. Back in the 
90s, we were trying to get the school district to understand that. They never look 
at the sub-groups for test scores. When they look, they always see the “Asian” 
population doing exceptionally well, and we told them to go a little deeper, to 
break that sub-group down to find that the most challenging sub-groups are the 
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Cambodians and Laotians. The Vietnamese and Chinese had more education and 
structure. I still do feel that way. Also the parents—the ones who are growing 
from my generation—they’ve gotten way too comfortable with the system in this 
country. So there’s no motivation for our children, the ones who were born here, 
to achieve higher. So the [first and second generation] are very separate and don’t 
interact with each other. The newcomers, they tend to stick together and they 
work harder. Whereas the ones—not all but most—who were born here, they tend 
to hang out with the problem kids. (Interview, 12/4/13)  
 
Mr. Keo in this analysis contrasts the second-generation Cambodian population to 
“newcomers”, or Cambodian families arriving in the U.S. through family reunification 
visas. Drawing on what are perceived to be more traditional “Asian” behaviors as a 
metric, particularly the desire to “achieve higher” through educational achievement as 
well as strong “connections” between parents and children, Mr. Keo explains this sub-
group’s regression to patterns of urban deviance like joining “gangs” and relying on 
“welfare.”  
While he, as a member of this sub-group, understood the underlying history and 
social forces shaping these youths’ educational outcomes, his position as the leader of a 
threatened high school forced him to lump these students in with “problem students” and 
quarantine their “deviance” for the “greater good” of the school. Using the treatment of 
second-generation Cambodian students as evidence of colorblindness, the principal and 
teachers repelled accusations that the branding of the school as ELL-friendly catalogued a 
series of racist strategies that disproportionately targeted African-American males for 
disciplinary action. Further, by shifting the blame to the “problem students” for 
endangering the Johnson High’s already precarious status as closure-worthy school, the 
administration and staff justified the highly racialized outcomes of their risk-management 
strategies.   
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The Political and Material Benefits of Partnerships  
 In addition to the enrollment of ELL students to protect against the threat of bad 
climate data, the administration turned to another strategy to guard against the threat of 
closure: building public-private partnerships with non-profit organizations at the city and 
state levels. Though the school lacked an assistant principal and guidance counselor10 in 
September 2013, the school had 14 “community partnerships” with organizations across 
the city. These organizations provided anything from after-school music, athletic, and 
academic programming to weekend service activities and resources for fieldtrips and 
supplies, filling key service and resource gaps in the middle of the crisis. Not all 
organizations were equal in terms of their resource commitments to the school, their 
funding streams, or missions. Most of the organizations operated entirely on private 
donations. The more stable organizations and those that had the strongest presence in the 
school drew on a blend of public and private funding streams in the form of grants from 
foundations, corporations, and the city, state, and federal governments.  
Administrative Entrepreneurialism  
Like the ELL enrollment strategy, building public-private partnerships with a 
constellation of non-profit organizations was marshaled well before the mass school 
closures and budget cuts. Teachers that worked under the reign of the former principal, 
Mr. Brown, pointed to the turn to partnerships in 2011 after the school received news that 
the district recommended its closure.   
Mr. Cassidy: When I first got here, there weren’t that many community partners. 
The only partner was Career Ready. And then when Brown came and the district 
started having financial trouble in 2011, that’s when we started getting Guitars 
                                                           
10 The counselor returned full-time in December, 2013 when emergency funds were released by the Corbett 
administration at the state-level.  
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and Hoops, Service for Salvation, and Refugee Youth Support, and all of those 
groups started coming. Mr. Keo was Mr. Brown’s assistant principal and then 
when he became he principal he just kept it going. The partners do all kinds of 
stuff. Guitars and Hoops has sports, music, I mean, it’s out of control and Service 
for Salvation with the treks to the different countries and stuff. (Interview 
3/14/14)  
 
As Mr. Cassidy points out, Mr. Brown left a legacy that his successor, Mr. Keo, relied on 
heavily to cope with the “financial troubles” of the district. Other teachers celebrated Mr. 
Brown’s “having juice”, or an entrepreneurial spirit that leveraged connections to both 
attract as well as actively recruit outside programs to come to the building and provide 
key resources. A 16-year veteran teacher at Johnson High reflected on his time under Mr. 
Brown: 
Mr. Darling: I would say that under his leadership these outside groups set up 
base here and he knew a lot of people and carried a big stick.  So he could make a 
phone call and bring people in. He had a lot of star power. He has that gift of 
communication, so he could swim in different social circles. He had juice. 
(Interview, 1/13/14)  
 
Interviews with teachers like Mr. Darling yielded the same opinions about Mr. Brown’s 
reign: that without his “juice” to attract partnerships with key service providers, the 
school may have closed at the end of the 2013 school year.  
While Mr. Brown initially looked to partnerships to mitigate the loss of funds for 
programming, the partnerships strategy also accomplished several other objectives. As 
the school faced the looming threat of closure, partners allowed the school to market 
itself as an attractive alternative for students to enroll in charter schools. With outside 
groups like Service for Salvation offering trips to developing countries to build schools 
and Refugee Youth Support providing full-time staff to tutor refugee youth after-school 
and on weekends, the school hoped that it would strengthen its reputation among key 
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groups of students. Partners oftentimes had political connections with district officials 
and city, state, and national-level private funding streams like corporations and 
foundations. By increasing the school’s connections with well-resourced as well as well-
connected organizations, Mr. Brown and Mr. Keo both saw partners as a way to assemble 
a critical mass of allies in a menacing district climate. Mr. Wood, a teacher that worked 
in conjunction with Career Ready to help implement their curriculum model, explained 
the political and financial benefits of attracting partners to Johnson High in this climate.  
[Partnerships] are part of this idea that you need to brand your school. You build 
these connections through these external partners and you hope that they bring 
you a network of money and people to draw on. Every year there’s this thing 
called “Comcast Cares Day” where they pick sites around the city and they fix a 
playground or do whatever. Career Ready, well, someone on its board knows 
someone at Comcast and we became a Comcast Cares Day site. So Comcast 
came in and we got resources, we were in the paper, and it was a cool thing for 
our school. One day out of the year you get some positive press, and maybe 
someone who knows someone will decide that you shouldn’t be shut down.  
(Interview 3/5/14)    
 
Mr. Wood’s description underscores the equal importance of two key benefits of 
partners: resource provision as well as the potential for fortifying the school’s political 
clout through mediums like media and association with persuasive individuals at the city-
level. In a conversation with the formal principal, Mr. Brown explained the “buzz” that 
partners had the capacity to generate.  
When good things start happening at a school with partners and it has a buzz, stuff 
starts opening up. That’s kind of what happened. We were already partnered with 
Career Ready and they were giving us support with their model but then we 
brought in some other partners too. I would have the Career Ready’s board 
meetings at Johnson High so people could see that our building’s a hundred years 
old and we have antiquated equipment. But it opened their eyes to see the great 
things and the great kids that were there. (Interview, 4/7/14) 
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Career Ready, the partner Brown discusses, had multiple corporate partners funding their 
model throughout Philadelphia, including hotels, electric and cable companies, and major 
restaurant chains. By locating partners’ “board meetings” in the school, Mr. Brown saw 
an opportunity to bring in leaders across the private sector to showcase the school and 
create a “buzz” around its portfolio of partner activities, programs, and “great kids.” Less 
visibly, having corporate connections as a threatened public institution was, similarly to 
Mr. Wood’s insight, a key strategy to distinguish the school from other high schools. 
Revisiting the idea of administrative “entrepreneurialism” or the ability to attract private 
resources to fund services and programs outside of the scope of the district’s budget, 
principals and teacher saw partners as an outlet to draw political and material resources 
from to supplement their ailing budgets and reputation.  
Supplemental to Core Service Provision  
While the former principal used partnerships as a medium to promote the school’s 
reputation in order to attract higher enrollments and build a network of politically 
connected partners, the role of partners began to shift as the financial crisis in the district 
spiraled throughout the AY 2012-2013 (Fieldnote 9/9/13). Mr. Keo formerly looked to 
partners for the same reasons as Mr. Brown, to market the school to the district and larger 
neighborhood by providing supplemental programming. However, the extent to which he 
relied on their services and labor changed dramatically in September 2013. Partners 
became core service providers as a staff hired to serve 500 students, accommodated over 
seven hundred. Returning to the chapter’s opening vignette and the main office scene of 
“chaos”, the school not only faced the enrollment of students coming from another closed 
high school in the neighborhood, but students from closed high schools throughout the 
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city. District policy, in the spirit of minimizing the “disruptive effects” of the closures, 
allowed students to attend their schools of “choice” (Interview, 5/15/14). Without an 
assistant principal, counselor, nurse, a sufficient number of staff, and nonexistent budget 
to serve the unpredictable growth of the students, principals and teachers alike embraced 
partners to fill key service gaps. The school coordinator for one partner, Service for 
Salvation, reflected on an interaction with the principal in which she asked him how the 
providers could be of service.  
Ms. Shore: Yeah, at the beginning of this school year just talking to Mr. Keo, I 
would say, “What do you want from the partners?”  And he would just say, “I 
need bodies.” I will stand in the hallway during transition time because there just 
aren’t enough people. Some of the partners have really taken the initiative with 
trying to support like, I mean, I’m supposed to be doing service programming but 
I’m working with Keo on figuring out how we can work with problem kids on 
discipline. (Interview, 2/18/14)   
 
Ms. Shore’s depiction of Mr. Keo’s desperation for “bodies” and her role as a hall 
monitor and disciplinarian points the ways in which resource and labor shortages forced 
partner staff into positions where they deviated from their original missions and became 
indispensable actors in school operations. Another teacher, Mr. Raymond, when asked 
about their role in the school in AY 2013-2014, explained,    
OH! WE NEED THEM!  Hands down. They’re not like add-ons to the school 
anymore. We’re building on top of them. They’re holding us up because they have 
resources, manpower that they can bring into the school, and outside connections 
they can bring in.  They are the ones running most of the events. They’re 
becoming the core of what we offer to our students. (Interview, 4/10/14) 
 
Describing partner “resources”, “manpower”, and “outside connections” as “holding up” 
the school, Mr. Ray confirms this shift in what he sees as once supplemental 
programming becoming the “core” of the school’s services and resources. The partners 
operated as a private labor force, heightening their presence after the budget cuts. The 
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hemorrhaging of staff and resources particularly in May 2013 created a void of staff and 
material functions to be filled by whomever the teachers and administration could draw 
upon.  
Mr. Keo: These relationships bring us bodies. Just knowing that every year I’m 
threatened to lose my assistant principal again, having other people just standing 
the hallway makes a difference in the school, even if they don’t have the authority 
to do anything. The fact that they just stand out there, raise their voices a little bit. 
The kids have a sense that not all is lost. (Interview, 12/9/13)  
 
Mr. Keo not only depends on the “bodies” of partners in hallways to maintain control but 
also to give the students the sense that they have not been completely abandoned. He 
describes that an image of “safety” is as important as safety itself. Partners not only 
attract students through their programming, but bring vitality to a building that otherwise 
would feel like a hollowed shell. Therefore, partners improve the “image” of the school 
internally and externally, sending signals to the students and community that “all is not 
lost.  
   ************************************* 
 I have delineated the multitude of strategies and sub-strategies that staff at 
Johnson High employed to brand the school in order to “save” it from closure. First I 
showed how administrators actively built curriculum around and recruited English 
Language Learners in order to improve “school climate” and boost enrollment numbers, 
two criteria considered strongly in the district’s closure evaluation methodology. Second 
I showed how the administration and teachers managed the participation and 
spatialization of risk in the school through the founding of the Success Academy and the 
exploitation of the “catchment” caveat. Students that posed the gravest “danger” to the 
school’s climate statistics were placed in isolated classrooms, given shortened school 
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days, and redirected to private entranceways to minimize their contact with the rest of the 
student body.  
The labor shortage during AY 2013-2014 further justified school leadership’s 
reasoning for these measures. I demonstrated how “colorblindness” discourse seeped 
discursively into rationales for quarantining and villainizing “problem kids” as well as for 
the creation of two dominant social categories: “ELLs” and “Americans.” The 
interpellation of these categories rested on racialized readings of risk and value in relation 
to the goal of building a competitive school brand. Finally, I explained the utility of 
partnerships to Johnson High, particularly in the midst of the fiscal crisis. Drawn on for 
material resources as well as political capital, both Mr. Brown and Mr. Keo saw 
partnerships as key to branding the school and in turn, guarding against closure.   
These strategies to resist closure stemmed from school actors’ readings of the threat 
of school closure and how they might become a valuable neighborhood school as 
measured by their meeting some of the district’s criteria for a “quality school”—though 
interestingly not the criteria of improved student achievement and learning as measured 
by test scores. Administrators and teachers believed that in order to compete with charter 
schools, they would have to build a brand that would send messages of “value” in the 
form of embodied educational aspirations, order, and safety. Relying on heavily 
racialized notions of risk and value to their brand, Johnson High’s staff facilitated similar 
processes of stratification and exclusion that many have argued characterize the 
admissions and operations of charter schools (Leitner 2014; Buras 2014). Interpreting 
behavioral issues as a “risk” to the school instead of a symptom of needs gone unfilled, 
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these educators felt forced to eschew their public oath to serve all students, treating 
students as mini-threats to be managed or expelled versus children to be educated.   
 My goal was not to indict these teachers for maliciously and intentionally 
perpetuating racial inequality but to couch their strategies within an educational 
marketplace that pressured them to compete or lose their livelihoods and school 
community. Mr. Keo, Mr. Brown, and all of the teachers and support staff worked in 
deplorable conditions, endured pay freezes for close to half of a decade, and dedicated 
their own resources to buy supplies and fund extracurricular activities and events. Mr. 
Keo himself attended the school as a former Cambodian refugee and held the school and 
its value to the neighborhood in profound esteem. He opened the school almost every 
Saturday during AY 2013-2014 to allow non-profits partners to provide additional 
programming, striving to bring opportunities to Johnson High’s students, albeit 
selectively. Many teachers had served at the school for 30+ years and saw Johnson High 
as a distillation of their life’s work. Their deep commitment and care for their students 
and the school was evident in their sacrifices, digging into their pockets to make events 
like the prom and other school traditions possible. Further, the participation in some of 
branding practices plagued their consciences as they saw these measures as necessary but 
immoral in light of the dire circumstances of the district and the direction of school 
reform toward charterization.  
In the following chapters I will further show how these actors reconciled their 
fraught consciences with their overarching goal to “save the school”, bringing into relief 
how branding processes, induced by closure threats, are stimulated by small moral 
economies of educator work that debate and contest what it means to be a “good school” 
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under the current paradigm of marketized educational governance. Teachers’ and 
administrators’ troubled narratives will illuminate the lived experience of marketization, 
the moral dilemmas that surface in their craft, and their implications for the racialized 
care of the vulnerable youth that attend neighborhood schools. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE MORAL ECONOMY OF EDUCATOR WORK IN CRISIS 
 
“Screw the Kids” 
In the middle of second period, Mr. Keo walked into a 10th grade math class, 
lethargically dropping into a seat next to me at the back of the room.  
People expect me to come in, be energetic and light-hearted, but I’m not. I’m 
completely burnt out like everyone else and I don’t know how I’m going to keep 
this up for another five years, if we even have a district by then. We have become 
holding ponds for the kids nobody wants. The idea that I need to get 700 kids in 
order to get an assistant principal, and be subjected to the same standards of the 
magnet and charter schools that get to select their kids is absolutely ridiculous. 
We’re not going to get the same scores - we’re just not. We get the kids with the 
behavior problems and because of that, we don’t deserve an assistant principal?  
They create the conditions for us to fail and then punish us when it happens. You 
devalue the work we do with the toughest kids, the ones that are hardest to get to, 
the ones that nobody is looking out for. I don’t see society getting behind us. I 
don’t see the public getting upset about what’s happening. Maybe it’s because I’m 
in my little bubble taking orders, but from my seat, it feels like we’re being 
abandoned. What’s happening is we’re dismantling public education piece by 
piece. We’ve made it into a commodity and the irony of it all is that the kids at the 
bottom don’t have any choice, even though we’re supposedly all about “choice.” 
Screw the people that are committed to running good schools for them. These 
people at the top have no plan for how this is going to go. They’re all about the 
money. The people making the decisions know nothing about this neighborhood, 
this community, and this city. They have no history here the way that I do, yet 
they makes decisions that wreck havoc on our lives. They threaten to close me 
instead of just giving me teachers and money for supplies. It doesn’t matter to 
them that there won’t be the resources next year. That’s how it works at the top - 
there’s no vision – just don’t get sued, don’t go broke, and screw the kids. 
(Fieldnote, 1/28/14)   
 
                             ******************************************** 
 Embedded within this conversation with Mr. Keo, Johnson High’s principal, in 
the throes of the winter of AY 2013-2014, is the central theme of this chapter: the moral 
and ethical dilemmas of teachers and administrators that arose from setting the school’s 
survival strategies into motion. Questions over the accrued benefits of these strategies 
and the marginalization of particular groups of students as a result of enrolling 
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disproportionate numbers of ELLs surfaced in teachers’ discourse around the crisis, 
praxis, and relationships with staff and students. While the previous chapter demonstrated 
how the crisis at the district level trickled down to permeate the school climate as well as 
inform the strategies teachers and administrators adopted to cope with the budget crisis 
and bolster perceptions of Johnson High as an institution, this chapter ethnographically 
engages the fraught nature of the collective response. As these educators attempted to 
“save the school” through these advocacy for students in their politics and praxis and 
donating unpaid labor as the budget cuts ebbed at their salaries and healthcare, the 
question of “for whom?” the school could be saved brought tension to their work to resist 
closure.   
I draw on work in moral anthropology to illuminate moral economy of staff labor 
to explain how the staff developed and justified problematic branding strategies to keep 
to elevate what they perceived reflected a worthy school. Fassin (2009) defines a moral 
economy as the “production, circulation, and appropriation of norms and values, 
sensibilities, and emotions in contemporary societies” (10). Central to a moral economy 
are the contradictions that emerge in the dialectic between politics and compassion, as 
different moral judgments and sentiments clash over social problems. Within this view, 
moral codes and ethical dilemmas cannot be isolated from political, religious, economic, 
or social issues, but apprehended through acts and discourses that people claim are 
“moral or good or right or generous” (Lambek 2010: 6). I argue in this chapter that the 
ways in which teachers and administrators narrated the troubled “rationality” behind 
these strategies illuminates the tension between their call to offer equitable educational 
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opportunities “all” children at Johnson High and the demands of competition within an 
expanding educational marketplace.  
Downey's (2007) notion of the “moral economy” of teacher-work, or the process 
of “sense-making” in which educators “develop, maintain, and justify their own logics 
through the telling of stories” (p.6), brings focus to teachers narratives around their action 
as a place to explore this tension over what constituted the moral course of action for the 
school. He posits that often the “job” of teaching is often conflated with the “work” of 
teaching, arguing that when public educators are not teaching or preparing to teach, their 
“work” disappears off the radar of researchers, limiting the kinds of questions that can be 
asked about their labor process. Instead of understanding teachers as merely executors of 
curriculum or disciplinarians, one must question the ways in which the moral dilemmas 
teachers face in their care work and activism spills beyond the bounds of the classroom 
and into their politics and personal lives. This “narrative work” through the telling of 
stories, offers a window into the coping mechanisms that teachers develop to cultivate 
hope and direction in a desperate educational milieu that they otherwise understand to be 
unjust and immoral. Their narratives around school closures and their consequent 
responses further offer insights into the moral and ethical dilemmas produced through 
their reading and enacting of resistance to closure.  
I detail these ethical dilemmas as they arose throughout the year in two major 
sections, the first which follows up on the strategy of manipulating the racial composition 
of the school’s student body and the “corralling of poison” in the Success Academy. The 
second provides a window in the crises of school representation and teacher advocacy as 
relational rifts in the student body worsened over the course of the school year. Together, 
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these sections craft an account of how the first strategy came to influence the construction 
of student and deservingness of the right to a public education, and subsequently, the 
school’s right to remain its provider.    
Hopelessness and Burnout: The Rising Premium on “Affective” Rewards   
 As the budget cuts deepened throughout the year, a discourse of hopelessness and 
burnout began to circulate more intensely in classrooms, hallways, and teacher 
professional development meetings. On the ground, overcrowded classrooms, particularly 
before the “leveling” in late November11 (McCorry 2013), broken copy-machines, burnt 
out Smartboard bulbs, and gaping holes in ceilings streaming rain water, contributed to a 
palpable stress which embedded itself in the tirades of teachers (Fieldnote 10/10/13). If a 
classroom did have textbooks, albeit dated, three and four students often crowded around 
one. Without a budget to repair a caving-in roof, Johnson High, a building celebrating its 
100th anniversary at the end of 2013, sealed off its asbestos ridden 4th floor.  Many 
students and teachers complained of tight-chests to me as I sat in corners observing their 
classes. While I was allegedly there to observe, I acted as a sounding board to teachers 
trying to salvage lesson plans without paper and facing impending cuts to their healthcare 
and salaries.  In the middle of the particularly harsh winter of AY 2013-2014, news 
surfaced that the district would be asking the teachers to take a 13 percent cut to their 
salaries and pensions as well as extending their school days and paying into their 
                                                           
11 Pennsylvania state law caps class sizes at 35 students and mandates “leveling” by October 1st where 
disproportionate enrollments are corrected for by the reshuffling of students and teachers across schools. 
Due to a confluence of factors including but not limited to the holding of state funds in the PA Department 
of Education and the closure of 24 neighborhood schools city-wide that caused unpredictable enrollments, 
Johnson High and many other neighborhood schools had classes with 35+ students.  After the release of 
“emergency funds” in late November, the district finally “leveled” classes, allocating 4 extra teachers to 
Johnson High to cope with the over-enrollment of students.  
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healthcare costs (Graham 2014).  These requests compounded a 5-year pay freeze for 
teachers in the district that, on average, make less on average than their suburban 
counterparts.  
The day following the release of the request from the district was also a 
particularly heavy day for Ms. Allard, a 30 year old, 5-year veteran teacher, whose 
student told her that she had been raped and was pregnant. Ms. Allard left the class 
suddenly and asked me to take over. Once the bell rang, I went to the bathroom where I 
found her leaning against the wall and crying.   
If I thought my time was going to make one bit of difference, I would gladly 
donate it, but I’m just feeding a bad system. I have to play mommy, daddy, social 
worker, doctor, and teacher and not only am I not compensated for it, but I’m 
punished for it. I burn myself out and for what? They’re just going to charterize 
this whole district anyway and pay a bunch of Teach for America types half of 
what I make to work 13-hour days and weekends. I love these kids but life will go 
on if I’m not their teacher. There will be another warm body in here when I’m 
gone. I’m barely making it and they want to cut our salaries 13% next year?  You 
can’t take 13% of nothing. If this job were just about teaching, instruction, and 
the kids’ learning, the salary would be ok. But to do everything else, plus the 
stress of taking on the problems of these students, I can’t wear all of these extra 
hats and see my salary get cut. Nobody expects anything from these kids or they 
would have backed it up with resources. They don’t care about them or me and 
they’ve shown me that over and over again.”  (Fieldnote, 2/25/14) 
 
Ms. Allard’s despair touches on the affective dimensions of working at Johnson High 
with the mounting pressures of the budget crisis for staff across the school. Called to 
sacrifice her limited income for a district in decline, many of the teachers articulated 
despondency as they experienced the devaluing of not only their paid labor as instructors, 
but also the growing emotional labor they performed as “ momm[ies], dadd[ies], social 
workers, [and] doctors.” In subsequent conversations with Ms. Allard, she indicated that 
while teaching in a high need urban school like Johnson High had always required her to 
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go “above and beyond” the call of duty in terms of unrecognized forms of care for 
students (Fieldnote, 10/12/13), mass cuts to support staffing like counselors, school 
psychologists, and classroom aids only exacerbated the emotional tax exacted by 
“wearing all of these extra hats.”  
 Teachers certainly bemoaned the salary and healthcare benefits concessions as a 
product of a conspiracy to break their union and make room for the total domination of 
charter school networks. Yet teachers pointed more their unrecognized emotional work as 
they attended to the basic needs of their students while managing the stresses of 
deplorable conditions of the school as the budget cuts deepened in 2013-2014. This 
emotional work, performed within and beyond the bounds of the classroom, through the 
management of students’ personal issues and the scramble for the basic resources to do 
their jobs, increased the premium for what I term the “affective rewards” of educating.  I 
define affective rewards as the interactions and experiences that inform educators’ 
feelings of value and efficacy. Following Downey’s (2007) theory of “teacher work” as a 
meaning-making process that spills beyond the confines of classroom praxis, a 
“simultaneous battle to make meaning of their jobs and to make their jobs meaningful” 
(25), I suggest that the implications of the budget cut and stress of impending closure for 
teachers and administration, increased the premium educators placed on the affective 
rewards of their work. Affective rewards became one of the coping mechanisms teachers 
developed to salvage meaning from work they felt was being devalued by the marketized 
direction of the district.  
In other words, facing threats to their incomes and the further deterioration of 
their working conditions, feeling effective and valued by their students became of greater 
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importance to teachers, and figured more significantly into their plans for “saving” 
Johnson High. Conceptualizing affective rewards as one of the mechanisms driving 
teachers’ to continue their work in the face of what they perceived as the decline of their 
craft and public education more generally, locates the spaces and interactions with 
students that teachers came to value in an increasingly hopeless environment. Further, it 
allows one to understand a branding process as not merely grounded in sending symbols 
to the larger marketplace of educational care and value, but a source of emotional 
sustenance and hope for desperate staff and students as they fought to survive as a school.  
The Affective Rewards of Teaching ELLs 
 In my third chapter, I described the terminology deployed to depict the bifurcated 
social relations of Johnson High’s diverse student body. While the school boasted 
students from a myriad of countries and linguistic backgrounds, teachers, administrators, 
and students alike divided the student population into two distilled groups: “ELLs” and 
“Americans.”  These categories had pseudonyms, but for the most part, participants 
across the board used these terms to invoke a particular set of behaviors and 
identifications that students belonging to each group exhibited. Staff and students alike 
framed ELLs, while overwhelmingly of Asian descent, as well behaved, easy to manage, 
and “caring” for their teachers and overall educational trajectories. Americans, 
conversely, were seen as deviant, violent, irreverent to authority, and “not valuing” their 
education. These students broke down across a range of racial categories, but mostly 
included African-American students and second-generation Cambodian students. 
However, of the native-born students, two thirds were African-American, therefore 
indexing a strong association between the negative behaviors of the “Americans” and 
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those of African-American males in particular. Teachers also, for the most part, taught 
either solely ELL students in the SHELTER program, or non-ELLs, “Americans” or 
“urban students”, in the general program.  Hence, this distinction not only signified the 
school’s two prevalent social categories, but also mapped neatly onto staff-student and 
student-student relationships and the curricular organization of the school.   
 While these categories carried weight at Johnson High throughout my preliminary 
fieldwork (September 2010- August 2013), and ostensibly much earlier, the increasing 
numbers of ELL students leading up to AY 2013-2014, as well as the budget cuts in May 
2013, had implications for the ways in which these educators perceived their 
responsibilities and obligations to students as well as relationships with other teachers. 
With larger class sizes and scant assistance, having “well-behaved” students made all the 
difference in weathering the effects of the budget cuts. When I asked teachers who taught 
primarily ELL students, how the budget cuts have affected their practice, they often cited 
how their experience wasn’t representative of the general experience of teachers at 
Johnson High and also the district at-large. Mr. Raymond explained, 
I feel like I’m in paradise because I, for some reason, was very lucky to get 
assigned to all of the ELL and international students. They’re very well mannered 
and I don’t really have discipline problems. If I do, a slap on the wrist is more 
than enough to set them straight. So I’m very fortunate and I don’t think my 
interpretation of what’s happening in this school under the budget cuts is accurate 
because I don’t have all of the students. I don’t have many of the urban students. 
(Interview, 4/10/14)  
 
Another teacher, Mr. Darling, a history teacher in the SHELTER program, when I asked 
him about the teachers’ reactions to over-enrollments in their classes prior to the leveling 
of students in November, he explained the differences in having “ELLs” versus a general 
class post-budget cut.  
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Most people won’t say anything if the kids are like these kids [pointing to a his 
classroom full of ELL students].  Mr. Raymond, even with 38 kids in his class, 
isn’t going to say anything about the illegality of this because those kids behave. 
No issues. He’s not a crybaby. But if it’s a bad class of American kids, well, that’s 
a different story. People start squawking if it’s bad (Fieldnote, 11/26/13)   
 
In both quotes, Darling and Raymond point to differential affective impacts of teaching 
an ELL class versus a class of “urban” or “American” youth. Understanding “American” 
students as requiring the expenditure of more energy to manage, each frames the teaching 
an “American” class as a recipe for burnout. Conversely, a class of “38 of these [ELL] 
kids”, even with scarce resources, demands far less emotional energy. As teachers felt the 
creep of more responsibilities with less compensation, or the wearing of “extra hats” that 
Ms. Allard described with an impending salary and benefits cut, they couched their 
emotional energy in a language of scarcity as well. Mr. Raymond and Mr. Darling’s 
testimonies underscore the valuable emotional energy saved by teachers that had 
SHELTER and ELL classes, and the increasing value of that energy as the labor crunch at 
the school level came to bear on their time.  
 In addition to facilitating the conservation of emotional energy for teachers, ELLs 
offered greater affective rewards, or increased feelings of value and efficacy in their work 
to students.   
Mr. Darling: Now the ELL kids are a little bit different than the Americans.  
They are forced to learn more because they must acquire the language to succeed 
in the work force and at home to help their parents. I see a group of people that 
come to America and must learn the language, and as a result, their behavior is 
going to be better and they’re more willing to learn. Whereas the American kids, 
it seems like high school is passing time. When I say American kids, I mean the 
ones in this school. That’s a stereotype, and maybe I’m feeding into it, but that’s 
what I see. I’ll give every kid my best, but the ELL kids just seem to have places 
in teachers’ hearts because they come, they respect you, they’re kind. They make 
you feel like all of this crap in the district is worth it, that your job is worth it 
(Interview, 1/8/14).   
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The fact that ELL kids “come”, “respect” their teachers, and are “kind” points to an 
affective preference for teaching ELLs, particularly in a climate where teachers like Ms. 
Allard feel increasingly undervalued and deprofessionalized by the district and state’s 
treatment. By making him feel that his “job is worth it”, Mr. Darling could tolerate the 
“crap” at the district-level. Ms. Betty, conversely, felt just the opposite about her 
“American students.”  
The ELL kids don’t tell you to go fuck yourself. The other day I had a girl who I 
didn’t even know that was on her phone in the hallway. I told her to get off of her 
phone. She started cursing at me and yelling at me and I said, you still have to put 
your phone away. I didn’t really react but she crossed the hallway to get in my 
face and threaten me. Then she told me to go home, get my daughter, bring her 
here, and she’ll rumble with my daughter. I wrote this all up on a pink slip, to 
which to the dean, in front of the child sitting there, cause I went down to check 
on it, but with no staff in the office and Mr. Keo freaking out with no help, 
nothing got done about it. So yeah, it pays to have ELL kids when you’re getting 
no support from anywhere else. Even if they wanted to support you, they can’t. 
(Interview, 12/17/13)  
 
In a sense, the feeling of value induced by work with ELL students, compensated Mr. 
Darling and Ms. Betty for their mounting frustration with the implications of the district’s 
budget crisis. Mr. Darling highlighted the feelings of efficacy and respect from ELL 
students, and Ms. Betty, conversely, discussed the emotional costs of teaching students 
that bring negative energy to class. Ms. Betty especially points to the lack of 
administrative capacity to support her in these moments, therefore compounding the costs 
of managing difficult students. In other words the affective rewards of ELLs became of 
greater import, as the struggle to make meaning of his work in a beleaguered district 
simultaneously grew more difficult.  
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Educating Everyone? 
In Mr. Darling’s excerpt, he does not assign blame to the native-born students for 
their behavior and even acknowledges that he might be “feeding into” a “stereotype” 
them. However, he admits that the stereotype accurately fits his experience in his “this 
school.” In saying this, Mr. Darling draws the distinction between Americans students at 
Johnson High, a neighborhood high school, and American students across a progressively 
stratified district. With larger numbers of charter schools and the steady presence of 
selective magnet schools, teachers and administrators harbored a growing sentiment, 
alluded to also in Chapter 2, that they were receiving the district’s students with the 
greatest needs. Resenting having to take the students that charters and magnet schools 
either would not accept, or would eject for a series of transgressions, educators would 
argue that it was namely students with behavioral issues and low academic aspirations 
unfairly earning neighborhood schools their poor reputations.  
Many teachers like Mr. Darling, however, struggled to reconcile their mission as a 
neighborhood school to “educate everyone” with the understanding that accepting 
everyone would have implications for the fate of their school as well as their day-to-day 
struggle to implement curriculum without resources. In the former section I described 
how teachers perceived the affective rewards of teaching ELLs as far greater than 
American students. I also argued that in a school with insufficient resources, emotional 
energy and affective rewards like demonstrations of respect and gratitude became 
increasingly valuable forms of exchange with students. In turn, the enrollment of ELLs 
and the value of their behavior as both a statistic as well as an affective commodity in the 
classroom dramatically impacted the relationships between students and teachers. The 
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enrollment of ELLs especially prompted questions about the ethics of ELL-ification and 
its implications for educating “all” of Johnson High’s students.   
Mr. Cassidy: In this school, I see the American kids losing out a lot. Between me 
and you, I really think that they want to keep this school open and do the right 
thing, but the only way to do that is to make it an ELL school. I do believe that 
because the kids actually feel that. The American kids say that…Oh, yeah!  They 
ask, “Are they making this an ELL school?” And I always tell them that they 
can’t because it’s an neighborhood high school but ya know, what they can do is 
just keep making the student numbers bigger and bigger and a lot of these kids are 
finally going to say, “You know what, I’m going to go somewhere else.” They’re 
driving them out. Ya know? (Interview, 3/19/14) 
 
Teachers like Mr. Cassidy faced a moral dilemma in terms of the “right” course of action 
to keep the school open. Mr. Cassidy understands that the fate of the school hinges on 
whether they can enroll students that will improve both their numbers and climate 
statistics, but he also sees how a shift in the school’s identity might alienate American 
students that already attend the school. This could also hurt their numbers as a school 
catering to ELLs risks “driving [the Americans] out.” In a conversation with another 
teacher, he lamented, “We have to remember sometimes that there are a significant 
number of non-ELL students here that we still have to educate. We can’t leave them 
behind either” (Fieldnote 3/4/14).  By branding the school as a “good school” to the 
district, one deserving of keeping open, the teachers saw risk in compromising the 
mission of the “neighborhood school”, to provide a public good to all children. However, 
with scarce resources and the threat of closure ever-present in the decision-making of the 
teachers and administrators, building a school culture around addressing the needs of 
“American” kids seemed implausible.   
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Questioning the Success Academy  
Mr. Keo: The idea of the Success Academy was you take all of the students who 
are overage, under credits, behavior, that don’t go to class, who hang out in the 
gym. You round them up instead of sending them from class to class, you keep 
them there and you send the teachers in there. As incentive for them, they get to 
come here a little later and they get to leave a little earlier. And we would buy a 
program—computer-based program—A+ program that they can actually work at 
their own pace. They earn credits with the support of the teachers there. I think 
the idea—instead of having these kids walk around, grow older, and drop out, 
they would have the opportunity to bond amongst themselves and among the 
same teachers. They know that they’re not superstars, but at least someone cares 
for them. It was successful in the first year, but with the budget cuts that wiped 
out my whole special education department, no common planning time, no plan to 
meet, the whole program became very gray.” (Interview, 5/5/14)   
  
The moral dilemma of “educating everyone” manifested itself nowhere else more 
strongly than in the institutionalization and maintenance of the Success Academy. The 
initial intent behind starting the Success Academy in AY 2012-2013 was to offer a more 
personalized space for students with “behavioral management problems” to receive a 
modified curriculum and truncated school day. The teachers would ideally have special 
education backgrounds, trained to implement individual education plans (IEPs) and 
manage ‘problematic’ behavior in a circumscribed area of the building.  Students would 
feel “cared for” by teachers that were dedicated to bringing them up to speed, as Mr. Keo 
explained in the opening quotation, given the opportunity to atone for their missing 
credits and poor academic performance in a supportive environment.   
However, with the budget cuts, the implementation of the program suffered, 
raising questions of legality and equity, but also the necessity of continuing the program 
with limited staff.  Mr. Keo underscored the loss of teachers in the special education 
department as a key consequence of the budget cuts.   
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Mr. Glyn: The Success Academy really backfired. It really did. Last year when 
we had a couple of other teachers, it was a real program to nurture these kids. 
With no faculty this year, it’s a holding cell. It’s to keep them out of the general 
population because if they were in classes with 40 kids, it would be chaos. Chaos! 
This is a budgetary issue too because people say you can’t throw money at a 
problem, but money would have helped to fix this! We would have had different 
people down there and we could have had actual programs instead of A+. I mean, 
what is that? You don’t want to deal with a kid in any capacity so you just stick 
them in front of a computer. That’s what I’m bugged about. There’s no educating 
them socially and emotionally. That’s a perfect example of how the budget cuts 
are having an impact on our ability to educate the kids who need us most. 
(Interview, 4/9/14) 
 
Mr. Glyn describes the Success Academy as  “holding cell” post-budget cut, a place to 
keep students out of the “general population” as to stave off ensuing chaos. With so few 
staff, the necessity for the Success Academy persisted, however at the expense of its 
students’ educational quality. To preserve order and learning climate for the “general 
population”, a population increasingly comprised of ELL students, “problem kids” would 
have to go without. Another teacher, Mr. Raymond, lamented the message sent to the 
students of the Success Academy, and the rest of the student body by allowing the 
program to continue.  
It’s a necessary evil, I guess. Ethically, it feels kind of wrong, because what 
you’re doing is saying hey, these kids are failures, so we’re going to isolate them 
and keep them from poisoning the rest of the groups. It makes sense and it’s very 
pragmatic. It’s hard to say that these students will become nothing and that we 
just need to keep them away from the rest of the kids so that somebody can learn. 
And we’ll pass and graduate them but they’re not at any kind of level that they’re 
going to be functioning well. It does not seem completely ethical and I’m sure 
there are legal ramifications for it. Our climate numbers look great, but our school 
is failing to educate everyone. So it’s that kind of shortsightedness that’s hurting 
us too. (Interview, 4/10/14) 
 
Mr. Raymond interpreted the tracking of students through the Success Academy as a 
threat to the overall charge of the school to “educate everyone.” By isolating the 
“problem kids”, the school was able to control the damage done by the school’s forced 
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enrollment of “American” students, mitigating the risk of behavior problems and violent 
incidents. However, in doing this, teachers and administration felt that they shirked their 
duty to provide equitable educational opportunities to the entire study body. Mr. 
Raymond’s excerpt distills a deep, underlying concern among the staff that the 
“shortsightedness” of strategies focused purely on improving climate numbers would 
implicate their moral responsibility to treat all of their students as pupils to be educated 
instead of risks to be managed.  
The American vs. ELL Faculty Rifts  
Many staff throughout the year voiced grievances in teacher professional 
development meetings and in their interviews, drawing attention to the necessity of 
meeting differential student needs but also the climate and school identity issues resulting 
from the growing chasm between these students. They cited the budget cuts as damaging 
for opportunities for contact between ELL students. Aside from the loss of funds for 
extracurricular activities and elective classes like music where “American”, or non-ELL, 
and “ELL” students could mingle, one teacher, Mr. Cassidy, discussed the consequence 
of expanding class sizes and loss of teacher labor for mediating cross-generational 
relationships.  
Yeah, because the class sizes are bigger, you’re just running around trying to get 
things together.  A lot of teachers now are trying to teach as many kids as they can 
in that 40 or 50 minute frame and putting so much, like 40 kids sometimes, it’s 
hard to do the fun things.  If you have a really integrated class, it’s hard to say, 
“Oh, today we’re not going to do equations.  We’re going to do 1v1s and rotate.”  
Teachers can’t afford to do that anymore.  We need smaller class sizes and less 
testing to do that.  
 
Mr. Cassidy points to a few issues that staff across both the SHELTER and general 
programs highlighted.  The lack of “fun” things to do, those not pertaining to test 
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preparation, made it difficult to cultivate a cohesive school culture where students could 
build on a common identity. Many teachers especially felt that without fieldtrips, classes 
like music and art, and school-wide events, the chasm between the “American” and 
“ELL” populations widened considerably.  
 With the growing number of ELL students, the number of teachers dedicated 
solely to the instruction of ELL students also experienced a dramatic increase. Similar to 
the students, the bifurcated student identity structure of ELL v. American mapped neatly 
onto the teaching staff as well with more than half of the teachers working with primarily 
ELL students and the other half with the native-born population. As the budget crisis of 
AY ’13-14 escalated stress levels with swelling class sizes and workloads, tensions arose 
between teachers of primarily ELL students and teachers of the native-born. Perceptions 
circulated among teachers of “American” students that ELL teachers “had it easy” and 
did not inherit the same disciplinary issues in overcrowded classrooms. Mr. Cassidy, a 
Success Academy teacher, describes the staff rift.   
Well, there’s some tension I think because sometimes when the ELL teachers get 
on their soapbox and say, like, when we’re talking about discipline or kids 
running around in the hallways or terrorizing these congested classes, some of the 
ELL teachers will say, “Oh, well I’m out in the hallway and I tell these kids to 
move on and they don’t listen to me but MY KIDS, they come right into class and 
they sit and do their work.”  So, they kind of separate them without separatin’ em, 
ya see?  “My kids” ya know, or “our kids”, so it’s kind of like “our kids” and their 
kids. (Interview, 3/19/14)    
 
ELL teachers, conversely, oftentimes villainized the native-born students and accused 
their teachers of ignoring incidents of native-born students bullying ELL students. After 
an incident one day where an African-American student shoved a Bhutanese student into 
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a locker in front of an African-American teacher, Ms. Betty, a white ELL teacher, 
complained to me in the privacy of her classroom.  
 I just don’t understand how you can’t see the humanity in your students. They 
work with these tough American kids and they lose their empathy for my kids.  
They just don’t understand them or what their backgrounds are. They’re Philly 
teachers, the kinds of people that have a pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps type 
of approach. And Mr. Keo, well, he was a refugee, but now is too so afraid that 
people will think he’s favoring “the Asians.”  That’s a very real thing here, 
especially now with so many ELLs coming in. The American teachers think we 
baby the Asian kids and that they get everything and the Black kids get nothing. 
(Fieldnote, 10/14/13) 
 
Embedded in Ms. Betty’s grievance is a racialized critique of alliances between students 
and faculty. She frames teachers that taught mostly native-born students American as 
callous, not empathetic to the needs of her students, and hardened by years of working 
with “these tough American kids.” American, in this case, is synonymous with native-
born students exhibiting the behaviors associated with African-American boys, and ELL, 
with first-generation Asian students. She alludes to Mr. Keo, in spite of his background 
as a Khmer refugee, as paralyzed in his management of the race politics of these tensions. 
He explains the predicament he confronts as he mediates heightened racial tensions 
among students and staff.  
I sometimes try and convince myself it’s only in my head that I’m seeing it, but 
it’s happened too many times. I had one of my supervisors ask me in a meeting, 
“Are you trying to convert this into an all-Asian school?”  I said, excuse me? I run 
a neighborhood high school. I don’t have control over that. And the teacher 
tensions, I mean, that’s the elephant in the room I’m trying to tackle. I want 
people to understand this is not about who you’re teaching; it’s about what you’re 
teaching. It does not help knowing that we have no common planning time for 
them to meet to plan accordingly and build relationships. The ELL teachers all 
specialize in working with the ELL students and the American teachers, you 
know, teach the American students. We try to get everybody into the same pod, 
but it’s just like they’re in here, and they’re in there. No they’re not mixing, and I 
see that. I want to resolve that tension but I don’t know how. (Interview, 5/5/14)  
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Already fielding accusations by community members and district-management that he is 
trying to “convert [Johnson High] into an all-Asian school”, Mr. Keo pointed to the 
underbelly of attracting ELL students in order to boost student numbers: strained staff 
relations. His identity as a former Asian ELL student, and now an Asian principal of a 
school with growing numbers of Asian students, complicates his leadership role as 
advocate for two disparate interest groups. Plagued by anxiety around the school closure 
threat, he internalizes the imperative to build the school’s reputation around its ELL 
program, with the aim of improving climate statistics to protect the Johnson High from 
district-level scrutiny.  
Yet, at the same time, as teachers’ working conditions worsen under the budget 
cuts, perceptions over how the administration and staff were distributing scarce resources 
and privileges between ELL and American staff emerged. These resources did not just 
amount to materials and supplies, but the energies that affective rewards of that staff 
perceived stemmed differentially from working with ELL versus native-born students. 
Mr. Keo acknowledged that this is the “elephant in the room”, but without resources and 
time to support teachers dealing with the bulk of the behavior problems, he is at a loss, 
admitting, “I want to resolve that tension but I don’t know how.”  
Teacher Professional Development: Exposing the Fault Lines  
The fault lines between ELLs and American teachers became more glaring in 
fraught conversations at teacher professional development meetings (PDs). Of the four 
held throughout the year, the administration dedicated large chunks of each to discuss the 
implications of increased enrollment of “problem kids” from charter schools and other 
district schools, as well as their implications for school climate. At a PD in February 
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2014, many of teachers that worked mostly with the native-born population voiced 
criticism that they felt unsupported by the administration in their classrooms when then 
disciplined their students. The conversation involved four teachers of solely native-born 
students (Ms. Alexis, Ms. Ralley, Ms. Abruzzi and Mr. Cassidy) and the principal, Mr. 
Keo.   
Ms. Alexis: If there are rules, then they need to be enforced. If a student threatens 
me or someone else, we can’t just have them get a 30-minute detention. That’s not 
appropriate. I’m saying that the school climate is slipping.  
Ms. Ralley: I mean, these kids are disrupting every other kid in that classroom. 
We’ve discussed this, and you said come up with an alternative plan. Guess what, 
I don’t have one. What do you do with the kid who’s suspended and nobody 
comes to pick them up, who just comes back to the classroom and disrupts all of 
the other kids that can barely keep it together themselves? I don’t know what the 
answer is, but this year it’s getting worse, and only some of us have to deal with it.  
Mr. Keo: We are dealing with more kids that have problems that are transferring 
into our school from other places. We’ve been working on it and trying to find 
other options, but we can only do so much. We have to keep these kids here 
because everyone dumps them on us. We don’t have the resources to have in-
house suspensions anymore and the state limits the number of out-of-school 
suspensions that we can have. I thought I would have more autonomy, but with no 
resources, it’s hard.  
Ms. Abruzzi: But it jeopardizes the education of everyone else in that classroom, 
especially the general population.  
Mr. Cassidy:  We’re just in a bad spot. We’re getting these kids that are coming 
out of these charter schools and then we can’t move them no matter what they do 
because there’s nowhere to move them to. By law we have to take them.  
Mr. Keo: I think the other issue is that these charter schools have lots of mental 
health services, but we don’t have that and there’s nobody here to work with these 
really tough kids. (Recording, Teacher PD, 2/5/14)  
 
The issue of inheriting “problem kids” from other schools (i.e. magnet, charter, parochial) 
throughout the year introduced further complexity to the divide between ELL teachers, 
American teachers, and the administration. Ms. Ralley stresses, “This year it’s getting 
worse and only some of us have to really deal with it.” As resources to support 
disciplinary mechanisms like in-school suspensions waned under the budget cuts, 
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teachers of the native-born students felt that they were unfairly called to handle the issues 
associated with “problem kids” while ELL teachers classrooms’ remained relatively 
unscathed. Mr. Keo laments the lack of resources like mental health services for the 
“really tough kids” and the bureaucratic red tape around remedies like in-school and out-
of-school suspensions. He admits that “with no resources” it’s difficult to find effective 
solutions to Ms. Ralley’s grievance. He also draws attention to the absurdity of charter 
schools with resources “dumping” students onto neighborhood schools that lack state-
funded supports.  
“Problem Kids” and In-school Suspensions 
The previous section exposes the widening rift between staff teaching native-born 
students and those teaching ELL students. With the budget cuts and a lack of support 
staff, teachers saw the emotional costs of teaching native-born students, particular those 
with behavioral issues, as higher and disproportionately falling on some teachers’ 
shoulders and not others. To return to the related issues of school climate data and the 
threat of closure, teachers of American students also felt discriminated against in their 
handling of what they perceived to be an unfair workload. In another PD in late April, an 
assistant superintendent and Mr. Keo jointly approached the staff with a document that 
ranked the top five high schools across the city in terms of annual in-school suspensions. 
Johnson High ranked at the top of the list. In-school suspensions were the preferred 
method of disciplining students to preserve attendance numbers. Instead of sending 
students home, “in-house” removed “problem students” from the classroom and held 
them in a discipline room, not ironically, in the basement next to the Success Academy. 
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Without an assistant principal or classroom aides, and overcrowded classes, teachers of 
American students felt that in-school suspensions were their only tool to maintain order.   
Mr. Keo: We made it to the point where we are the highest school with in-school 
suspensions in the city of Philadelphia. So in-house suspensions, if you look at 
this, we made it to the top where [The Superintendent] actually asked him what 
the hell just happened at Johnson High.  
Mr. Cassidy: I think that we need to take into account that a lot of these numbers 
are inflated. If you look at the in-houses, I would say that 90 percent of those are 
the same kids.  
Mr. Keo: At Dr. Hite’s level, he sees the number and it goes to the associate 
superintendent and then it comes to me. They don’t look further than the number 
and that’s a problem based on where we stand on a closures list. 
Ms. Betty: It always feels like you get penalized when you do the right thing12.  
Doesn’t it feel like that every time? You can’t say that these problems aren’t 
happening in the other schools! They’re just not doing anything about it.  
Mr. Rudolph: This could be one possible read though. Maybe we’re being more 
vigilant in enforcing the disciplinary standards so perhaps our numbers look 
higher because of that.  Is that one reason that our numbers look higher?   
Mr. Keo: We can’t speculate because it doesn’t matter. They see the numbers, so 
we need to give them numbers. (Recording, 4/5/14)  
 
Frustration mounted in the voices of the teachers as they felt “penalized” for doing the 
“right thing.” The idea of not being able to “win” permeated the remainder of the 
conversations at the PD, many of them complaining that their only option to cope with 
the spike in behavioral problems without additional resources was to send students to “in-
house.” By sending students home through an out-of-school suspension, the teachers 
damaged their attendance numbers, another key statistic considered in the school closure 
survey. Backed into a corner, teachers like Mr. Rudolph beckoned Mr. Keo to “read” the 
statistics differently, to consider that maybe the teachers were actually doing their jobs by 
enforcing “disciplinary standards.”  
                                                           
12 Ms. Betty is referring to the disciplining of students by enforcing rules with in and out of school 
suspensions.  
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However, Mr. Keo could only entertain the teachers’ protests, not act on them.  
Citing “numbers” as the bottom-line criteria for the death or survival of the school, Mr. 
Keo dejectedly meets the teachers’ protests with an inevitable conclusion: “They see 
numbers, so we need to give them numbers.” The administration elided issues of school 
stratification, resource scarcity, and support for the schools’ neediest students, issues 
which the teachers voice as central to foregone production of in-school suspension 
numbers, and instead placed the onus back on teachers to improve those numbers without 
subsequent support. Pressure from the district to keep those numbers down without 
considering the multitude of factors influencing their production, reinforced Mr. Keo’s 
fears that, at the end of day, the decision to keep Johnson High open will hinge on the 
same blind, “evidence-based” process. Regardless of whether he wanted to support his 
staff or not, Mr. Keo felt that he no choice but to accept the ultimatum handed to him by 
the superintendent to improve the school’s climate numbers.      
Following the PD that day, I sat by the fence in the schoolyard with Mr. Keo 
where he admitted that he felt not only burnt out, but also morally compromised.  
This numbers game is just too much sometimes. I’ve gotten our attendance 
numbers up, which is a good thing because it keeps us open, but it’s a bad thing 
because these knuckleheads come from other schools and [District office] doesn’t 
support us with the staff. Do you know that [charter school in the same 
neighborhood] has a school culture administrator and four assistant principals and 
they still don’t have a good school environment? They send all of their problem 
kids to us and we still outperform them with a quarter of the staff. I want to serve 
everyone, even the problem kids, but I can’t! Not when we’re evaluated by these 
standards with no support. I haven’t heard anything about us closing recently but 
there’s always the rumor that we are on the list. I don’t know what’s going to 
happen in May - probably something similar to last year until they bleed us dry by 
2017 and 90 percent of the city schools are charters except for the [magnet 
schools]. There will be nobody left to fight. Even my union - we’ve accepted a 
freeze these last two years and this year we’re taking a salary cut. I’m just tired. 
I’m not sleeping. (Fieldnote, 4/5/14) 
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The exhaustion in Mr. Keo’s voice was apparent as he described the moral dilemma that 
the “numbers” game imposed on his leadership. By improving statistics in one area, 
enrollment and attendance, Mr. Keo struggled with keeping climate statistics in shape. 
This quote is rife with a critique of school stratification, what he perceives as the root of 
this issue. Calling attention to well-staffed charter schools that eject “problem kids” 
which ultimately land on Johnson High’s doorstep, he felt that his hands were tied in 
terms of serving them without support staff like assistant principals and counselors. He 
also felt guilt in placing the responsibility on teachers of native-born students to manage 
students with behavior problems without the proper supports. The energies that educating 
these students required, compounded by pay and benefits cuts, compounded feelings of 
burnout among teachers.  Returning to the strategy of rejecting students with problematic 
behavior from outside the catchment and confining ‘problem kids’ he was forced to 
accept from the school’s catchment in the Success Academy (see Chapter 3, pg. 18), Mr. 
Keo mourns the fact that he feels he has no other option but to treat these students as risks 
instead of as children in need of support. These risks took the form of not only poor 
climate data, but also the risks to the affective rewards required to sustain staff as they 
endured deplorable working conditions and hostile politics at the state and district levels 
for public schools and their teachers.  
The Multicultural Day Debacle  
 By May 28th of AY 2013-2014, the principals’ union had already accepted pay 
and benefits cuts, and the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers (PFT), the teacher’s union, 
was in the midst of a battle to stave off a 13 percent salary reduction and cuts to their 
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healthcare coverage. This prospect compounded a 5-year pay freeze. Morale among staff 
was at an all-time low as teachers questioned their future in a district that they sensed was 
trying to “drive [them] out” (Fieldnote, 5/28/14). Attempting to “salvage” what was left 
of an “ungodly year” for the students, teachers dug into their own pockets through 
donations and fundraising to support “Multicultural Week”, an annual school celebration 
(Fieldnote, 4/30/14). Multicultural Week consisted of two half-days, one of which was 
dedicated to watching musical, dance, and cultural performances in the auditorium, 
prepared by overwhelmingly ELL students, and another half-day of food sampling where 
teachers provided students with small stipends to cook tasting menus of foods from their 
countries. The following passage comes from an extended fieldnote from the cultural 
performances day.  
The day of cultural performances turned out to be more controversial than 
I anticipated. Sitting in on a class of mostly 9th grade ‘American’ students in the 
morning before the performances, Ms. London fielded grumbles from students 
that felt that the performances did not reflect their culture (Fieldnote, 5/28/14). 
Walking into the auditorium where the performances were taking place was a 
clear divide. The front two thirds of the room consisted of mostly ELL students, 
while classes composed of mostly of American students to sat in the back. As I sat 
by the wall, chips of paint and plaster fell onto my shoulders from the decaying 
auditorium ceiling. A tearful ELL teacher, Ms. Dowd, grabbed my shoulder with 
tears in her eyes as the stream of students carrying their countries’ flag streamed 
down the aisles. Bollywood music, Vietnamese, Indonesian bamboo instrument 
songs, Spanish rap, AA breakdancing, Chinese pop, and Burmese ethnic songs 
and dances induced resounding applause from the crowd. There were break 
dances, Mexican and Karen-Burmese rapping, and a poetry reading in Chinese by 
an African-American senior female. A Pakistani senior girl sang a song in Urdu 
and the Nepali boys erupted with shouts of encouragement, recognizing the words 
from a language so similar to their own.  
The two culminating performances included a Bollywood tandem dance 
by a Nepali junior male and an Indian sophomore girl and 15-person Nepali crew 
with one Karen freshman female putting on a hip hop dance. The sole Karen girl 
admitted to me after that her Karen friends’ performances were too “calm” for her 
and that she preferred the hip-hop “feeling.” The audience throughout was mostly 
quiet, captivated by the performances, but cheering raucously at their conclusions. 
 155
Ms. Lavery, another ELL teacher, looked over at me and asked, “Why can’t we 
have more of this and less testing?” Another teacher circled the room, snapping 
photos to post on the website and hall by the main office. Mr. Keo and other 
teachers sitting on the sides beamed with pride. Exiting the auditorium, I said to 
Ms. London, “My heart was full today. I have to remember days like today, 
because they were so rare this year. If only there were more opportunities to 
celebrate these students.” She remained silent, turned, and walked away 
(Fieldnote, 5/28/14) 
The cultural day, while a point of pride for the school, and a bright spot in a year devoid 
of extracurricular activities, also exposed the effects of the shifting school identity as a 
result of the ELL-ification of the school. Admittedly, my own involvement as a 
participant observer in mostly ELL and shelter classes throughout the year positioned me 
to admire the resilience of the staff and students to put on such a performance. I was also 
more familiar with the performers as most of them were ELL students that I had worked 
with in classrooms. My interaction with Ms. London in the latter half of the fieldnote did 
not go without recourse. Ms. London, a teacher of both SHELTER and general 
population history classes, later that evening, emailed me with critique of the event.  
At some point, I'd like to give you another perspective. Your feelings about 
yesterday may be tempered if you sat in my seat. I was in the back - by the section 
where mostly African-American students sat. I also heard a lot of "I'm not going 
to that" in my 2nd period class. It is two schools - the ELLs (note who performed 
- not reflective of the entire school) and the US born. There is no effort by 
administration to address it - it is taboo to bring it up. There is a lot of frustration 
by the non-ELL teachers. Anyway, while yesterday was nice for the students who 
participated, from the "back of the room" (or of the bus...) it was very different. 
(Email Correspondence, 5/29/14)  
 
 After receiving this email, I found myself experiencing the same kind of tension 
permeating the staff. I had made an inadvertent comment in a moment of pride for the 
students I had come to know and love during my three years at Johnson High, but had 
simultaneously angered a teacher that saw the performances as “not reflective of the 
entire school”, and actively marginalizing the native-born and largely Black population. 
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In her email, she draws an explicit connection between the “back of the room” and the 
“back of the bus”, tethering the spatial dimensions of the assembly to a larger critique of 
the racism that textured the treatment of Black youth in the school as the ELL population 
grew. In an interview with another teacher briefly following the event, Mr. Glyn echoed 
Ms. London’s concerns about the growing chasm between the native-born (American) 
and ELL students, as the ELL population became the majority of the student body.   
It could have been a great opportunity for the whole school to get involved in 
something like that and bring the whole school together a little bit, but instead 
there’s this sense that culturally there are some other aspects of the school that are 
a little bit bleached out. Like we have this richness and multiculturalism in the 
school, it’s unbelievable! But are we being truly inclusive? Some people are seen 
as having legitimate culture versus an American kind of whateverness. We want 
people to see our “culture” so that they won’t close us down but it’s a specific 
kind of culture they want them to see, ya know? (Interview, 6/3/14)    
 
Mr. Glyn introduces the idea of “legitimate culture” versus “American culture”, a notion 
that Ms. London understood as divisive in terms of representation in the multicultural 
performance day as well as the strategy of marketing the school as a haven for ELL 
students. Though many of the teachers voiced that turning the school into one which 
attracted high numbers of ELL students to both bolster numbers and improve climate 
statistics was a strategy of necessity, a public educators, they felt conflicted by the 
ultimate consequences of the school’s identity shift. In being “multicultural”, first 
generation immigrant youth became the face of Johnson High, oftentimes at the expense 
of the native-born students, two thirds of which were Black. Mr. Glyn refers to 
perceptions around American youth as “bleached out” culturally, or a kind of cultural 
“whateverness” that was dismissed in favor of celebrating students from other countries.  
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Through the marketing of the school’s mission as a supportive environment for 
ELL students, the administration and teachers exploited cultural politics to as a resource 
to fuel positive perceptions of the school as “diverse.” However, as teachers like Mr. 
Glyn and Ms. London point out, this drawing on culture as a resource legitimated 
particular student types over others. This problem manifested itself through the fraught 
spatial dynamics of the multicultural performance assembly, the relations between staff 
teaching ELLs and those teaching the general population, as well as relationships 
between American and ELL peers.    
********************************** 
Mr. Keo: Are the students affected by the cuts? Absolutely. Some are more than 
others of course because the cuts take the special education support, making them 
the most vulnerable. We’re losing the resources. I think the ELL population is 
doing pretty well here in this school. We didn’t lose any students. In fact, the ELL 
population gained more in this school because I’ve allocated I guess—I’m more 
biased toward the ELLs because I was one myself. They’ve gained more support 
because we also have more dynamic ELL teachers who help bring in resources 
from the outside. The regular ed students too, are also being affected because 
we’re limited on supplies and classroom assistance.   (Interview, 5/5/14)  
 
Teachers and administrators across the school, even those that taught primarily ELLs, 
often said that they felt that the impact of the budget cuts and school closures had 
disproportionately adverse impact on the native born students of the school, primarily 
African-American students that made up the majority of the native-born at Johnson High. 
In Chapter 3 I argued that the strategies to improve quality hinged on two overlapping 
processes of value creation and risk management through the ELL-ification of the school 
and the exclusionary enrollment and tracking practices of students with behavioral issues.  
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Throughout this chapter I have sought to answer my third research question by 
illustrating the dilemmas in educators’ ethics, purpose, and praxis that surface when 
neighborhood schools seek to brand their schools around selective student populations.  
 Given that school closures implicate districts like Philadelphia’s suffering from 
fiscal crises that compound the trauma of school closures, I drew on Downey’s (2007) 
theory of teacher work to explore branding as not only a process that seeks to create value 
in neighborhood school deemed substandard in urban districts stratified by charter and 
magnet schools, but also as means to convince down-trodden educators that their work is 
meaningful. Many teachers articulated a profound sense of burnout and hopelessness, 
citing pay and benefits cuts amidst a background of intensifying standards without 
resources, demands on their time, and imminent threat to their livelihoods (via closure) as 
responsible for their demoralization. Struggling to make sense of their predicament and 
fighting to salvage import from their labor and care, administrators and principals placed 
higher premiums on their students’ demonstrations of gratitude, respect, and effort. In 
other words, the “affective rewards” stemming from positive, energizing interactions with 
students became the lynchpin of sustaining their work in the face of what many perceived 
as attacks to the integrity of their profession.   
 The “meaning-making” process is not unique to the craft of teaching, as it 
pervades many forms of care work. What I argue in this chapter is that branding the 
school around ELL students accomplished more than merely giving the school a 
marketable reputation. The unstable and desperate state of affairs induced by the district’s 
fiscal crisis and impending plans to consolidate schools, precipitated a staff-wide trauma 
for which the affective rewards of working with ELL students served as the antidote. 
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Though many teachers pointed to the implicit racism is favoring ELLs in their 
preferences for and treatment of their students, surviving the grueling days required 
minimizing the expense of negative energy and maximizing feelings of efficacy. They 
admitted that under different circumstances – a district climate and school environment 
with adequate resources, compensation, and staff morale – that they might have more 
patience and care to offer students with greater needs. Yet with growing responsibilities 
in their personal lives and classrooms, compounded by existential fears of the future 
unemployment, persisting required distancing themselves from sources of stress.  
 In turn, the branding process created a moral economy that traded on the affect 
produced by positive educator-student interactions with ELL students. If one likened the 
school to a company that not only branded itself to broaden its consumer base but to also 
expand employee satisfaction, ELL-ification and risk management accomplished both 
goals. A school with a hopeful trajectory, bolstered by an atmosphere of customers’ 
praise and appreciation for their work, enabled teachers to tolerate what they perceived as 
the “district’s bullshit” and allowing the branding process to continue (Field note, 
11/5/13).    
However, the consumer-producer relationship did not laminate as neatly onto 
traditional notions of student-public educator relations at Johnson. First, if one employs 
the market metaphor, companies the produce commodities tend to have control over their 
inputs and materials. Many teachers voiced that an illusion of control existed at the 
district-level as officials expected the school to deliver a quality “product”, evaluated vis-
à-vis quantification, without the kinds of resources, supports, and autonomy afforded to 
privately managed schools like charters. Second, if markets are predicated on choice, 
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both consumers through purchasing and producers through branding effectively “choose” 
one another. Many students and teachers noted that the core mission of the neighborhood 
school was free and unfettered access to public education for all students. Even in their 
efforts to behave like a business, the district still required the school to admit all students 
within their catchment, ultimately mitigating the “choice” both students and teachers felt 
around their school and students. Teachers of native-born students highlighted these 
discrepancies in their frustration of ELL teachers’ “easier jobs” and Mr. Keo in the 
opening vignette where he condemned the district:  
You devalue the work we do with the toughest kids, the ones that are hardest to 
get to, the ones that nobody is looking out for….What’s happening is we’re 
dismantling public education piece by piece. We’ve made it into a commodity and 
the irony of it all is that the kids at the bottom don’t have any choice, even though 
we’re supposedly all about “choice” (Fieldnote, 1/28/14). 
 
These educators’ narratives and actions, or the process of sense making that informed the 
school’s branding strategies, reveals that when administrators and teachers’ work shifts in 
scope and scale from pedagogic and democratic to managerial and entrepreneurial, their 
praxis damages the compassion and care available for the students’ with the greatest 
emotional needs. By understanding teachers’ labor as part of a care economy that trades 
in affect, one can see the moral dilemmas that surface when marketization forces schools 
and educators to frame their students in absolute terms of risk and value. Backed into a 
corner by the threat of closure, these educators reluctantly and remorsefully employed 
these strategies in an effort to “save” the school for the students they believed would 
sustain their numbers and their declining energies.  
 In the following chapter I delve deeper into a different economy of service 
provision that the school created to signify school value and consequently attract higher 
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enrollments: partnerships with non-profit organizations. As the fiscal crisis worsened in 
the district from 2011 to 2013, these private partners came to play an increasingly central 
role in filling gaps in resources and labor. However, these organizations also had tapered 
missions and targeted student populations based on their or the funders’ theory of the 
schools’ problems. This next chapter therefore examines both another branding 
mechanism and the quandaries it generated for equitable governance and opportunity at 
Johnson High. 
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CHAPTER 5: FRAUGHT COLLABORATION: PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
AND NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS IN CRISIS 
 
“The Vultures Come Heavy” 
In spite of Johnson High’s missing guidance counselor, nurse, and adequate 
staffing, the school boasted 16 “community partnerships” with a host of philanthropic, 
non-profit, and for-profit organizations. Mr. Drew, a part-time coordinator of a non-profit 
organization, Guitars and Hoops, highlights the strange bedfellow relationship that his 
organization and other partners developed with Johnson High as fiscal conditions 
worsened in the district. 
We’re not really hustling for that because we have so many kids. We’re actually 
getting 9 more slots next month to meet the demand.  Our program is growing like 
crazy because our utilization is through the roof. We can’t even get students to not 
come when it’s snowing. We’re like, no, you can’t come, there’s no school!  I 
teach guitar, piano, coach soccer, and also do urban farming. I mean, yeah, like 
any decaying object, the vultures come heavy. Just being a vulture myself, you 
know, it’s kind of like a carcass. The school system is already dead so we’re all 
just scrambling to feed on what’s left of it. (Interview, 1/30/14) 
 
Mr. Drew discussed at length in his interview how austerity policies like school closures 
and budget cuts across the district, policies that framed neighborhood schools as 
disposable, created a dual-imperative for schools to both fill chronic resource gaps in 
labor and supplies as well as to market the school through programming to potential 
students as well as the district. Comparing the partners to “vultures…feeding on what’s 
left” of a dying public school system, partners also wielded the crisis as an opportunity to 
demonstrate “impact” and justify the significance of their continued presence. Moreover, 
the imperative to “save the school” through partnerships factored heavily into the 
administration’s school branding plan. Each principal saw partnering service-providers as 
promoting a culture of opportunity for students as well as building political capital with 
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well-connected individuals that had influence at the city and district levels. The district’s 
own efforts to facilitate the partnering of non-profit organizations in its resurrection of 
the Office of Strategic Partnerships further reinforced administrators’ understanding of 
partners as a means to demonstrate “quality” to district-level auditors looking to close 
schools. 
While Johnson High did work with a major partner to offer career-oriented 
curriculum throughout the last fifteen years, until 2011, it was the only consistent partner 
working in the building. The district also facilitated this partnership, linking Career 
Ready, this particular partner, to the school in order to build an integrated curriculum 
through federal funding that targeted monies toward career readiness. However, the 
number of independently established partners increased dramatically after Johnson’s 
placement on the school closures list in May of 2011, attracting upwards of 13 additional 
partners (Interview, 2/28/14). Many organizations also deepened their resource and labor 
commitments following the budget cuts in May 2013 (Interview, 3/11/14). The dire 
circumstances stemming from the budget crisis therefore mobilized and justified the 
presence of private entities in the school. These 16 “public-private partnerships” (PPPs) 
were therefore forged in response to different dimensions of crisis, driven by school’s 
need for labor, resources, and political allies that many of the leadership of these non-
profits organizations maintained, as well as the non-profits’ own needs to frame their 
services as critical to their funding stakeholders. Under these unprecedented conditions, 
partners at Johnson High had an almost unfettered freedom to pursue their organizations’ 
mission, allocate resources, and dramatically influence the cultural politics of the 
school’s branding process. 
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Public-Private Partnerships in Education 
Scholars have termed public-private partnerships in education as “the new mode 
of educational governance” (Robertson et al. 2012), a medium which ranges from 
corporate support for school reform (Bhanji 2012), for-profit and non-profit school 
management contracting (Bartlett et al. 2002; Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon 2011; 
Cucchiara 2013; Koyama 2010), philanthropic interventions in schools (Brown 2012; 
Reckhow and Snyder 2014; van Fleet 2012), and “community schools” where 
organizations tied to health and adult literacy, offer family-centered programming 
(Jacobson and Blank 2011). Extant scholarship has however largely focused on the 
relative value or danger of relying on PPPs in furthering educational improvement 
without adequately depicting how politico-economic shifts in funding and policy agendas 
are currently shaping PPPs’ role in educational provision nor the internal politics of 
public schools (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006). Further, little is known about the ways in 
which increases in private organizations’ coordination with schools in crisis are affecting 
the school governance and distribution of educational resources.  
This chapter explores PPPs as a resource garnering and marketing strategy for 
“failing” urban schools. I examine Johnson High’s reliance on 16 non-profit partnerships 
throughout three years of continual cutbacks and closure threats as part of the larger 
project in urban public education to brand schools within expanding educational 
marketplaces as well as an index of the increasing privatization of public services within 
public institutions (Katz 2010). I targeted five partners with deep resource commitments 
to the school to study the paradox that emerged when partners became embedded in 
school’s survival strategy. For, on one hand, Johnson High as a public school was 
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constitutionally mandated to provide “a thorough and efficient education for all” and was 
held to strict standards of accountability for achieving this mandate (Education Law 
Center, 2014). Yet, at the same time, school leadership desperate for support, relied on 
PPPs that, by their very design, served students selectively and lacked accountability to 
school leadership. This dilemma implies two central questions at the heart of this chapter 
that relate to my second and third research questions (Chapter 1, 37): 1) How have 
austerity and school competition shifted the role of PPPs in neighborhood schools? 2) 
What are the implications of relying on PPPs as both marketing mechanisms as well as 
core public education service providers for ensuring equitable educational access and 
opportunities for vulnerable student populations?  
I conceptualize how the schools’ need for private partnerships has become part of 
a broader strategy to bolster the traditional neighborhood and charter schools’ appeal and 
reputation through external programming in order to attract larger enrollments. However, 
the forging of partnerships is also a product of a fiscal and existential crisis in public 
education that creates a necessity for partners’ to fill resource voids, shifting their role 
from traditionally supplemental service provision to becoming central providers. In order 
to analyze this change in school governance in relation to equity of educational access 
and opportunity, I turn to theoretical frameworks developed in anthropological studies of 
poverty and the privatization of government social services (Roy 2012; Soss, Fording, 
and Schram 2011). Vincanne Adams (2013), in her ethnographic analysis of the 
privatization of disaster relief in the reconstruction of post-Katrina New Orleans, 
highlights the role of affect in the work of private sector organizations, which in the case 
of Katrina involved a constellation of grass-roots, community, faith-based, and for-profit 
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organizations. Adams defines affect as a type of purposive ethics, informed by a sense of 
emotional urgency that then prompts social action (Roy 2012: 107). She employs the 
concept of an “affect economy” to explain how with privatization, affect concerning the 
plight of the poor incites calls for “emotional responsiveness” and induces action, having 
the ability to “generate new business investments and free labor for a struggling 
economy” (2012: 209). Her analysis illuminates how replacing government responsibility 
for vulnerable populations with privatized or market-mechanized forms of care results in 
an unregulated, uneven distribution of services that puts critical state-led safety-net 
infrastructures and the people they protect at risk. Resources, in turn, are allocated 
selectively in relation to how poor citizens are positioned along a spectrum of 
“deservingness” of care.  
Important insights can be gained from using the concept of an affect economy in 
analyzing how the shift from state-provided educational resources to private ones through 
PPPs are both affecting the distribution of services in schools like Johnson High as well 
as the brand messaging that school leaders imagine as valuable and therefore competitive 
in the marketplace. Financial crisis-induced suffering has triggered a kind of moral 
imperative, similar to Adam’s depiction of the humanitarian imperative in post-Katrina 
New Orleans, affectively mobilizing a network of PPPs to rescue imperiled schools. The 
constellation of private organizations that have responded to these needs are largely 
unregulated and unevenly distributed (Interview, 3/21/14). The PPPs providing 
educational services are also called to action in relation to differing “moral panics,” or 
understandings of educational issues and problems that inform how they target and 
prioritize resource allocation. This sets in motion a cultural politics of recognition within 
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the schools where particular social categories of students are affectively identified as 
“deserving” of educational care (Ticktin 2011). I argue in this chapter that PPPs’ cultural 
politics of recognition, where certain student categories are valued over others, are 
closely related to the ways that administrators and staff strategize around developing 
school brands around particular students. By attracting and retaining partners that serve 
valued student populations through selectively-serving PPPs, schools can reinforce other 
branding strategies that target these same students. Attention to the role of affect as a 
generative force underlying PPP’s allocation of resources and care, then, provides a 
powerful window on the processes and resulting cultural politics of PPPs educational 
resource allocation as well as the implications for ensuring educational equity for all.  
I argue in this chapter that the conditions precipitating from this district-wide 
crisis forced a kind of fraught collaboration between private providers and the school as 
the administration felt they had no choice but to rely on these non-profits to provide core 
educational services, labor, and political leverage in an increasingly ominous district 
climate. I show that the demands of marketing the school of the school as “ deserving” of 
remaining open through partners introduced questions of equity in resource distribution 
as well as coordination among competing partners. The desperation engendered by the 
retrenchment of state-funded supports in district schools inevitably intensified the need 
for PPPs as not only branding mechanisms, but also to keep the school solvent in the 
middle of the “doomsday” budget crisis of AY 2013-2014.  
Targeted Tracking  
In order to more fully understand how partners influenced both the social 
dynamics of the school as well as the distribution of resources across the student body, I 
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selected five of the organizations with the deepest resource and staff commitments to 
track. These five organizations all contributed full and part-time staff, provided supply 
budgets to the school, and influenced curricular planning.   
1. Career Ready13  
Mission: To expand life and economic options for Philadelphia public school students 
through career-focused programming that prepares young people for employment and 
post-secondary education using the career academy model.   
Targeted Population: General student body   
Impact Measures: Graduation rates, postsecondary enrollment, income  
2. Service for Salvation  
Mission: With your support we are breaking the cycle of poverty, illiteracy and low 
expectations through youth service programs in many of America’s most under-resourced 
high schools and by building schools in some of the world’s poorest villages  
Targeted Population: General student body  
Impact Measures: hours of engagement, numbers of students engaged, graduation rates, 
college enrollment rates  
3. Guitars and Hoops  
Mission: The primary goal of this program is to provide learning opportunities through 
innovative activities through Project Based Learning instruction. Youth work together in 
groups on creative projects for a minimum of two hours daily for two days per week 
during the school year. These projects sessions are hands-on experiences where students 
learn and solve problems reflected in everyday life and develop 21st Century Skills. 
                                                           
13 All organizations and names of staff are pseudonyms.  
 169
Youth cleverly tackle difficult subjects that impact their lives. Youth address a 
community need through various projects ending with culminating events, presentations, 
and/or shows through the uniqueness of program offerings such as digital media, music, 
fitness, dance, photography, and poetry.   
Targeted Population: 40 slots available – first come, first serve enrollment  
Impact Measures: enrollment, graduation rates, participation rates  
4. Refugee Aid   
Mission: Refugee Education is a federally funded program that supplements educational 
support services for migratory children. The program assists school districts and charters 
in coordinating the continuity of educational services for children who have had their 
schooling interrupted.  
Targeted Population: K-12 students whose parents work with raw food products   
Impact Measures: reading and math standardized test scores, enrollment, graduation 
rates, college enrollment   
4. College Dreams   
Mission: Through grants to high poverty schools, to prepare students to enter and succeed 
in postsecondary education  
Targeted Population: members of senior class  
Impact Measures:  4-year college admission rates, matriculation rates,  
I hypothesized that these organizations would have the greatest influence on the 
school’s culture and also speak to broader trends across the partners, namely which 
students were being targeted for services, how these partners’ framed the needs of the 
students and school, and how these services shaped perceptions of equity and school 
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quality among students. More closely tracking the activities of these organizations 
allowed me to “go deep” with these organizations, conducting interviews with 15 of their 
upper-level management in addition to observing their activities closely in in-school, 
after-school and weekend programming. It was my initial work with Refugee Aid as a 
teacher and volunteer that first directed me to Johnson High as a site to explore the 
experiences of ELL students. In turn, I had closer relationships with several of the 
partners, namely Refugee Aid, by the time I began Phase II of the study (see Chapter 1, 
section under “Methodology”).    
The Work of Crisis: Creating a “Need” for Partnerships  
Mr. Wood: The more partnerships you have, the better your resume right? If 
every school is on an equal playing field, I mean, if you look at the school from a 
data perspective then they all have a justification to close it right because of 
NCLB standards14. The next question is, what’s the point?  It costs money to keep 
this school that was built in 1913 open because you’ll have to rebuild it. When 
you have the numbers against you and the facilities against you, the things you 
can put in your pros column to balance out your cons column is your community 
partnerships and the positive things you can point to that are in your school. 
Partners are a huge part of promoting your school. You hope that people pass 
through your doors and get you exposure to networking, resources, and more 
partners. (Interview, 3/5/14) 
 
 Mr. Wood’s acutely captures a set of interrelated pressures that engendered a 
“need” for community partnerships as a marketing mechanism, beginning in AY 2011-
2012 when the School District of Philadelphia released its first school closures list. In a 
destitute district, particularly in the context of the AY 2013-2014 budget crisis, Johnson 
High administrators and teachers knew that the district releasing funds to renovate their 
building was unlikely. Additionally, with high numbers of ELL students and charter 
school refugees entering their doors and decreasing resources like staff and supplies, 
                                                           
14 No Child Left Behind.  
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improving test scores also felt increasingly like a pipe dream. Therefore, as Mr. Wood so 
eloquently explains, the school saw partnerships as an opportunity balance out their 
overwhelming “cons” column to draw positive attention to the school. 
 As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the number of partnerships increased at 
Johnson High during the tenure of the previous principal, Mr. Brown. Many teachers that 
worked under his reign cited the “juice,” or entrepreneurial spirit, that he brought to the 
building. Many attributed the growing number of partners to Mr. Brown’s efforts to 
market the school and entice students through partners’ offered opportunities to enroll. 
However, in the wake of the budget crisis, partners took on a new role: filling major 
service gaps. Many teachers indicated that during their tenure, they had seen large 
increases in the number of partners coming to the aid of the school.  
Mr. Wood: Well, originally Career Ready was the only game in town. They were 
the only external organization that we partnered with. Service for Salvation, just 
as recently as two years ago, was just an after-school club that met on 
Wednesdays. They decided this year to implement a full roll out of being here 
everyday with two full-time staff. And how do you say no to someone when they 
say that, especially now with no resources? Of course, no problem, it’s good just 
to have the extra person to help you coordinate and do things. I mean, Guitars and 
Hoops, they’re more after-school and they’re picking up where we no longer have 
extracurricular money to pay teachers do these things. We used to have choir, we 
used to have the Gamer’s Club. I was paid to run that club three days per week. 
But as that money dried up, we’ve had partners like Guitars and Hoops come in 
and say, “Oh, well we’ll run after-school programs in your school and you don’t 
have to pay for them anymore.”  So it’s really the quest for private money to pay 
what used to be covered by the district. (Interview, 3/5/14) 
 
Another teacher, Mr. Darling, a 16-year veteran teacher, corroborated Mr. Wood’s claim 
that the partners have increasingly come to fill critical service gaps, even in classrooms.  
Yeah, [the partners] definitely have made an imprint in the school and have 
showed up at teacher meetings and filled in the gaps that were needed because of 
time and resources. Some teachers could not step up to the place as they have in 
 172
the past and Service for Salvation and other organizations have filled those 
footprints.  (Interview, 1/7/14)  
 
With overcrowded classrooms, no supplies, and a chronic lack of support staff like a 
school counselor, nurse, classroom and lunchroom aids, secretaries, and janitors, Mr. 
Wood and Mr. Darling again highlight the lack of choice that Mr. Keo felt in terms of 
allowing partners to enter the building, shifting partners’ role from supplemental to core 
service providers. Whereas the school only had one partner providing in-school staffing 
and resources prior to AY 2011-2012, by AY 2013-2014 it had five.  
This shift became apparent in “community partners meetings”, a gathering of the 
16 partners on the first Tuesday of every month where one of the partners, Guitars and 
Hoops, provided a “partnerships coordinator” to orchestrate and synthesize services and 
programming (Fieldnote 10/4/13). I attended nine of these meetings throughout the 
school year, intrigued by the paradox emerging from the budget cut: though the school 
supported a student population of high-need students (e.g. refugees, special-education 
students) without a guidance counselor, reading specialist, and school psychologist, it had 
a force of privately sponsored labor that amounted to almost half of its remaining 
teaching staff after the budget cuts. Mr. Keo oftentimes attended these meetings, voicing 
the emergent needs of the school and drawing on partners to fill in the gaps. The full-time 
coordinator for College Dreams and part-time staff from Refugee Aid, and Career Ready 
offered fieldtrips, financial aid workshops, and application help for select students 
enrolled in their programs. The Service for Salvation and Guitar and Hoops coordinators, 
two full-time staff with an office in the building, provided budgets for fieldtrips to service 
projects, and school-wide assemblies. After receiving word in a professional development 
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meeting from the superintendent that the former year’s School Improvement Grant (SIG), 
a release of funds from the state for schools that demonstrate the greatest need, had been 
changed from delayed status to rescinded, Mr. Keo admitted,  
Well that’s how it goes, it happens every year. I just have to find someone 
private who will get me what I need. That’s why I have all of these non-profit 
people in here. I care about the kids. As the principal of a school I feel like I am 
the CEO of my building, pretty much running it with the staff I have, with no 
support from anywhere else. There’s nothing in the school so you have to look 
elsewhere and make deals with these people. They provide something for the 
school and then they get their data and they can keep applying for grants. 
(Recorded Conversation at PD, 11/6/13) 
 
Mr. Keo here employs a kind of “market-speak”, comparing himself to a CEO of a 
building instead of a principal. Instead of merely managing state-provided resources, he 
felt responsible for recruiting and employing private organizations to provide 
programming formerly funded by district budgets. In exchange for providing the non-
profits with the “data” they needed to apply for grants and therefore perpetuate their own 
missions, Mr. Keo received programming for his students that he could not provide with 
a retrenched budget commitment and little promise of improvement in the future. Other 
teachers employed a similar “market-speak” as the principal, questioning whether non-
profit organizations could accomplish the same goals as teacher-run extracurricular and 
in-school programming with greater “efficiency.”  
Mr. Glyn: We don’t have a choice. I mean, that’s kind of presupposing that 
educators are the best people to deliver those services. Maybe the people with 
unique experiences like the Service for Salvation and Guitars and Hoops 
coordinators bring a different scope? They’re not exactly building programs that 
are driven by an educator’s point of view. I don’t know. There’s resourcefulness 
to it because we’re getting these groups in and we’re kind of discovering how 
much more efficiently we can work. I mean, the budget cuts have just totally 
decimated us. (Interview, 4/9/14) 
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Many teachers and students that I interviewed even lauded administrators like Mr. Brown 
and Mr. Keo for looking to outside organizations to give the students opportunities. 
Commenting one day on the role of College Dreams’ coordinator to an independent 
evaluator of the program, Mr. Wood lamented, 
These kids are woefully underserved with no one to help them navigate the 
application system. I’ve tried to do it, but I have so many other responsibilities. 
There’s no counselor. These kids are getting from College Dreams what the 
School District and the state don’t provide. We need five of your coordinators, not 
just one. (Fieldnote, 10/30/13) 
 
Mr. Wood and Mr. Glyn point to a resourcefulness in drawing on partner services 
in light of the budget cuts. Mr. Wood’s comment of needing “five” of College Dreams’ 
coordinator underscores the critical services several of the organizations provided in the 
absence of support staff in AY 2013-2014. Hence, the affective dimensions of the crisis 
on two fronts, impending closure and resource shortages, shaped productive relationships 
between school staff and partner staff. Teachers and administrators, desperate for 
“bodies” in hallways and packed classrooms, felt lucky that these organizations were 
there at all.  
Accountability Ironies  
On the surface, the employment of partnerships accomplished an increasing 
number of goals as conditions worsened. Teachers and administrators drew on partner 
staff in a multitude of school-wide initiatives, administrative processes, and in-class 
projects. However, as partners became progressively more embedded as core service 
providers, questions around the ethics of their work and their implications for the 
schools’ trajectory began to circulate among both staff and the providers themselves. In 
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an interview with the former principal of the school, Mr. Brown, he described the 
importance of selectivity in terms of allowing partners into the building.  
I think you really have to be selective of whom you bring into your building and 
why you’re bringing them in. I don’t think you say yes to everybody, and that’s a 
tough thing. You have to have the smarts to know your school community and 
what is going to support your kids, because people want to get into your building 
for multiple reasons and they’re not always up front with them. (Interview 4/7/14)  
 
Mr. Brown, the principal before the budget cut AY 2013-2014 budget cut, corroborates 
Bryk's (2010) notion of program coherence and making sure that programming, 
regardless of where it comes from, a private or public entity, blends in such a way that it 
aligns with the vision of the school and the needs of the students. He also points to the 
tensions that can arise from an administrator’s interpretation of the needs of the students 
and the “multiple reasons” that a partnering organization might want to enter the school.  
 While Mr. Brown had more latitude in his selectivity of partners to market 
Johnson High, the AY 2013-2014 budget cuts severely compromised Mr. Keo’s ability to 
deny partners entrance to the building. Returning to the vignette from Chapter 3, with so 
few staff in the main office, he oftentimes did not know who was in the building or had 
time to observe their programming. Mr. Keo felt that he did not have much choice in 
terms of the kinds of programming he allowed in. Citing the need for “bodies” and 
“things for the kids,” he repeatedly argued in interviews and after-school conversations 
that the pressure to admit external programmers in order to bring some relief to an 
overworked staff made it difficult to implement a coherent vision for the school. 
However, Mr. Keo was critical of the position that the budget crisis and district overhaul 
of its neighborhood schools placed him in.  
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I don’t have a reading specialist or basic staffing. I’m accountable for what 
happens to our test scores regardless of what kinds of resources I have, which 
ultimately means that the school could close. What pisses me off though is these 
organizations are not staffed by educators. They’re non-profits. They have no 
certified teachers, yet they get money from the state and foundations, whereas, 
we, the school, cannot apply for that. The only reason I need them is because 
nobody will give me money to run my fucking school. I know it’s a game that 
we’re playing. We make each other look good, but the reality is, they are not 
educators. They’re just passing through. (Recorded Conversation, 12/4/13)  
 
Mr. Keo’s appraisal of the partners here was wrought with resentment. He needed them 
because “regardless of what kinds of resources” at his disposal, the district held him 
accountable for the performance of the school and continued failure foreshadowed 
closure. As he pointed out though, the partners were eligible to apply for private funding 
and in the end were not liable for the school’s overall outcomes (as evaluated by the 
district). They also are not “certified educators” and, as Mr. Keo understands, do not 
harbor a long-term commitment to the public education system like he and the school’s 
teachers. In “the game” that Mr. Keo and the partners play, they partners offer resources 
to the school and in turn, make the school more alluring. In return, the school bolsters 
partners’ engagement data and promotional narratives of helping a school in the midst of 
a budget crisis.  
As Mr. Keo indicates, he is forced to engage these non-profits because “nobody 
will give [him] money to run [his] fucking school.” He and many teachers drew attention 
to this irony, that in an era of high-stakes accountability where the absolute consequence 
for poor performance was school closure, they, as public educators, were held 
accountable for the school’s fate as an institution. Even though they had no control over 
the district and state’s decision-making around the parameters and conditions that 
produced school failure, they ultimately shouldered the bulk of the responsibility. Yet, 
 177
Mr. Keo and the teachers also relied on non-profit organizations to accomplish this 
mission that were accountable to neither them nor the district. “Just passing through”, 
most of the organizations had informal agreements with the school and no written 
contracts for the kinds of resources that would be exchanged. Not in a position to bargain, 
Johnson High remained subject to the whim of the partners’ fluctuating material and 
labor commitments. Ms. Betty, an ELL teacher, levels of an extrapolated critique of how 
the employment of partners has diminished pressure on the state to properly fund schools.  
I’m glad they’re here because we need stuff and Guitars and Hoops and Service 
for Salvation have given me supplies, support, and money for fieldtrips. But just 
from a purely critical standpoint, that means that the district doesn’t have to do it. 
I’m sure that they love all of these people coming in and supporting our schools. 
It takes the pressure off of them and they use it as a marketing tool for schools 
and for the quality of what’s going on and I resent that. I feel like the state 
doesn’t fund us appropriately but they still get the benefit. But it enables them to 
cut and cut and I do resent that. It’s a double-edge sword because they hold us to 
the same standards whether we have the resources or not.  It affects us as a 
school if we fail. Are we failing by the standards that I care about? I don’t care if 
we fail by PSSA or Keystone standards, but I care if we fail because kids are 
getting hurt and they are. (Interview 12/23/13)  
 
Comparing partners to a “double-edge sword”, Ms. Betty captures both the  
benefit of their presence as they allow the school to acquire resources to accomplish their 
goals, yet simultaneously, “enables [the state] to cut and cut.” She postulates that perhaps 
in the absence of the partners, political pressure would mount on the state to properly 
fund the district for its activities. In her critique, Ms. Betty refers to partners as a 
“marketing tool” and a metric to measure the “quality” of what’s going on, begrudging 
the ways in which partners sanitize the politics behind precipitous drops in school 
funding that make their presence possible and necessary. Like Mr. Keo, she ties the roots 
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of the school’s predicament to a larger district reform strategy to compensate for budget 
shortfalls through contracting.  
 Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon (2011), in their work on marketization in the School 
District of Philadelphia thoroughly document the contracting of school management and 
curricula to private for-profit and non-profit organizations. They also mention briefly that 
district since the mid-2000s began to increasingly look for private sector “partners” to 
assist in reform efforts. These partners included local non-profits, universities, and 
community organizations. Cucchiara and her colleagues however focused specifically on 
the formalization of partners’ work in schools through contracts with the district instead 
of informal agreements, and the implications for partners’ to “act independently, voice 
criticism, and hold the district accountable” when potentially criticizing the district could 
imperil partners’ collaboration with schools (2480). My work at Johnson High and 
conversations with administrators at the district level in this political moment suggest a 
shift in accountability from the district and the partners that work with schools, to the 
schools themselves. Mass budget shortfalls at the district level severely truncated the 
oversight of partnerships at the district-level and also compounded school-level pressure 
to operate and market one’s school through the resources that partners provided.  
Drawing on Adams (2013) work on the moral affect economy of post-Katrina 
New Orleans, this void in oversight of partners due to diminished capacity at the district-
level, opened up a space for the proliferation of private partners to do the work of the 
state. I will show in this next section that given these conditions, PPPs enjoyed almost 
complete autonomy to define the needs of the school based on their missions as well as 
distribute critical resources based on these missions. Such resource distribution initiated a 
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cultural politics of recognition for certain student groups, introducing questions around 
equity, the invisibility of particular groups of students’ needs, and overall efficacy when 
each of the organizations acted in the name of their organization and its constructed 
mission, and not necessarily administrators’, teachers’, and students’ voiced needs.   
Defining the Problem and Missing the Mark: The College Dreams Case   
Though I conducted participant observation in six classrooms, I draw on my more 
consistent experiences in one class to explore these tensions. It was part of my agreement 
when I came to the school as a hybridized “researcher/tutor” to spend 6th period of every 
day helping with this group of students. This class, a group of 18 sophomores, was hand 
selected by two teachers who were trained by an appendage program of College Dreams. 
The program was supposed to be purchased through a School Improvement Grant (SIG) 
and rolled out in middle school for students to prepare them through a specialized 
curriculum for postsecondary education. However, in a neighborhood high school like 
Johnson High, the implementation of such a program, like many of the programs 
provided through the partners, faced many challenges. First, the state did not release the 
SIG grant at the beginning of the year due to cuts in staff at the district level stemming 
from the budget crisis. The program required the purchase of a $5,000 library and paid 
training for a team of teachers that would work closely with these students. Again, due to 
mass layoffs and uncertainty hovering in hiring throughout the fall of 2013, selecting a 
team of teachers to structure the program became impossible for Mr. Keo.  
So while the stability of the school certainly hindered the efficacy of the program, 
the real pitfalls of the College Dreams program laid in the one-size-fits all approach to a 
narrowly defined problem, an approach that many of the non-profits shared. College 
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Dreams, a program designed to improve postsecondary education matriculation and 
persistence rates, framed college access issues among low-income youth as a matter of 
skill-based deficiencies and a lack of long-term vision. By targeting those deficiencies 
through a curriculum which stressed the acquisition of higher-level “critical thinking” 
skills as well as surrounding promising students with other college-bound youth and 
trained teachers in every subject, the students could overcome these obstacles and 
persevere in their quest for postsecondary education, namely enrollment in 4-year 
colleges. The program also incorporated “volunteer” college students as tutors, recruiting 
from universities in the area to offer role models to aspiring college goers.  
Unfortunately, this program did not align with the nuanced context of the school. 
With so few staff and an ongoing budget crisis, the time and resources to recruit a team of 
teachers to implement the program were nonexistent. To complicate matters, the students 
started the program several years late. Johnson High’s student body was composed of an 
amalgam of students coming from a mix of neighborhood, charter, and parochial schools 
across the city, most of which did not have the program. Thus, regardless of the district’s 
stability, any neighborhood high school administrator would struggle to maintain the 
cohort continuity from middle school to high school. Finally, Johnson High’s ethnic and 
linguistic diversity made the curriculum of the program almost impossible to implement. 
The curriculum was predicated on a high degree of English fluency as well as literacy. 
The two teachers, Ms. Allard and Ms. London, designated to recruit students and oversee 
the program, admitted that did not receive enough applications to field a class, and, from 
the applications they did receive, very few students in the school were adequately 
 181
prepared to handle the curriculum (Fieldnote, 11/16/13). In addition, the school’s lack of 
proximity to a major university made the recruitment and maintenance of tutors difficult.  
These issues converged particularly around “the tutorial”, or the break out of 
small groups of four students to go over their assignments and present confusing material 
to be solved by the group. Since the program administrators were unable to arrange for 
consistent tutors, the teacher and myself struggled to go between groups to facilitate the 
tutorial. Below is an extended fieldnote describing a typical tutorial class in late 
February.  
From there I sat with one of the groups of all ELL students to complete the 
tutorial. Most of the kids couldn’t understand one another and were straining to 
decipher through the accent. They couldn’t take notes because they couldn’t make 
out the words. Most of the tutorials either were incomplete. Even I couldn’t 
answer their questions about the layout of the tutorial worksheet. Ms. Allard 
confided in me at the end of the class, “Even I don’t understand this stuff, so I 
don’t know how they’re supposed to. The head of the program at the district told 
me that this has been a mess in the city schools because nobody can afford to pay 
for it or be trained to teach it. This also wasn’t designed for a school that is 
majority ELL.” We finally found out today that the tutors will not be coming at all 
this year because their class schedules changed and the commute was too difficult 
to swing. (Fieldnote, 2/20/14)  
 
In the fieldnote I highlight a range of issues with partner programming which I will 
address more in depth in the coming sections. However, College Dreams’ incompatibility 
with the school-level context drove its implementation troubles. Most of the students in 
the class struggled with basic literacy and English, therefore regardless of how much the 
teacher modified the curriculum, most could not access the program’s sophisticated 
academic language. Ms. Betty, confided:   
Most of these partners’ programming is bullshit. Everybody is drinking the Kool-
Aid trying to get kids into college, but there’s no reading specialist to figure out 
why my kid can’t spell dog. They aren’t looking at the cold hard reality: our kids 
can’t read. They expect that a non-profit intervention will get these kids from 
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point A to point Z. Most of these kids can’t write a coherent sentence and nobody 
wants to have those hard conversations about why. This is about illiteracy but 
nobody wants to fund that. (Fieldnote, 10/14/13)  
 
Ms. Betty points to a glaring discrepancy between the design and intent of partners’ 
programming, particularly those pushing college, and the unique needs of the student 
body. With so many first-generation immigrant students, many of whom had interrupted 
educational backgrounds (e.g. refugee and undocumented youth), the program did not 
address their actual needs. This discrepancy also points to how organizations’ oftentimes 
operate on a blanket definition of a social problem from which they generalize and scale 
their efforts without taking context into account.  
Moral Dilemmas of Partner Work  
 The coordinators of College Dreams, one who offered full-time counseling in the 
school, Mr. Lytle, and the other who coordinated tutors part-time district-wide, Ms. 
Collie, both admitted that oftentimes they felt a severe disjuncture between the mission of 
their organizations and the needs of the school. With so many ELL students and students 
labeled as having learning disabilities and behavior issues in the school, they felt their 
top-down organizational mandates did not map well onto the students’ needs as well as 
the school’s ability to support their program with matching resources.  
College Dreams does function predominantly in neighborhood public schools. 
They haven’t had much success in Philly, but I think it would do well in our more 
selective schools that have more advanced kids. I mean, they still need support, 
but the program is better suited for those kinds of students, and there’s a little bit 
less crisis in those schools. If you have crisis, then you need more funding, which 
this school doesn’t have. (Interview, 3/6/14) 
 
Her testimony highlights not only the mismatch between the program’s curriculum and 
the needs of the students, but also the debilitating effects that the school’s overcrowded, 
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understaffed condition have on the full implementation of their programming. Without 
time and resources, the principal could not afford to train the team of teachers it would 
require to carry out this program with fidelity.  
Because of these mismatches between top-down mandates and the school’s 
nuanced needs, partner staff often experienced moral dilemmas over the purpose and 
efficacy of their work. Sitting in one day at the end of AY 2013-2014 with Mr. Lytle in 
his office, I observed him as helped one of the school’s best students, a first-generation 
Mexican senior, Juan, navigate a financial aid portal for a Pennsylvania State branch 
campus. Living with an aunt while his parents remained in Mexico, Juan saw a $20,000 
differential in the cost of the school and the financial aid he received. Mr. Lytle explained 
the difference between the subsidized and unsubsidized loans, already part of the 
package. Juan replied, “I don’t think I can afford this even with the scholarships that I 
applied for. Most of them are only $300 for one year.” Mr. Lytle responded, “You, my 
friend, are learning what so many students who want to go to Penn State are learning: it 
just ain’t cheap” (Fieldnote, 4/2/14). Of all of the Latino students, Juan was one of few 
that had his citizenship, had scored high on several AP exams, and was extremely 
motivated to apply for scholarships in order to pursue his dream of becoming an electrical 
engineer. However, at the end of the day, Mr. Lytle could not guarantee that funds would 
come through to support his postsecondary education.  
Between cutbacks and the state and federal levels for Pell grants that created 
situations like Juan’s, and the myriad of other financial, logistical, psycho-emotional 
issues that arose throughout AY 2013-2014 for immigrant and native-born students alike, 
Mr. Lytle admitted that within the senior class, the cohort selected by College Dreams to 
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receive his services, most of the students would not be going to 4 year colleges. Having 
been responsible for following this group of students for three years of high school, he 
lamented on the unforeseen difficulties.  
I expected much higher rates of kids going to 4-year colleges. It felt like there 
were so many challenges with this school that I was just figuring out as I went 
along. When they chose this school, they were looking at schools with primarily 
low graduation rates and low college attendance. That was it. But they didn’t 
really understand the reasons perhaps why this was happening that were outside 
of the school’s control. The immigration status and FAFSA forms were two of the 
biggest issues. We have kids who are undocumented here who don’t get any 
financial aid. There is a glass ceiling for them. I bring these issues to the 
spokesperson for College Dreams and he’s like, “Hmm, that’s tough. I guess there 
just aren’t a lot of options for them, or here are what the limited ones are.” What 
was really eye-opening was going through their forms and seeing some of the 
parents’ incomes. You know that people are low-income but you’re not exactly 
sure what that means. Some of these kids have one parent making something in 
the low teens. There’s also special ed. and the Success Academy that I haven’t 
really touched at all. I just didn’t have time and also, even if I did, didn’t know 
how if they could barely graduate. I was spread so thin. There was just so much 
that we had no idea about. (Fieldnote, 5/12/14) 
 
Acting on behalf of his organization’s mission, to increase college admission rates 
through heavy investments in information, college trips, workshops, and counseling, Mr. 
Lytle committed three years of his life to a group of 160 students. With only 34 
matriculating to four-year schools at the end of his tenure with College Dreams, he 
doubted the overall efficacy of a program that failed to consider factors beyond the scope 
of both the school and program’s control: immigration status, access to financial aid, 
poverty, and a severe lack of preparation. While the Latino population only comprised 12 
percent of the student body, lacking social security numbers barred many of the higher-
achieving Latino seniors from the financial aid application. Also, with so many “special 
ed” and Success Academy students missing necessary credits in the senior class, Mr. 
Lytle admitted that they weren’t “really touched at all” as meeting the needs of students 
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that might actually qualify already “spread [him] so thin”. Exhausted and melancholy by 
May, this jaded idealist wrestled with his conscience, trying to make sense of his 
relationships with these students and the impact his work had on their lives.  
The Quest for “Meaning” amidst Instability   
Like many of the partner staff working the school, Mr. Lytle questioned the 
underlying assumptions of his organization: assumptions that narrowly constructed the 
problem and therefore their interventions in ways that did not heed the major issues that 
prevented children from accessing postsecondary education: poverty, language, and 
preparation. These moral dilemmas arose frequently among these partner staff as many 
were underpaid and overworked, accepting contingent contracts without full-time 
benefits. They felt that “making a difference” in the lives of these students could 
compensate for the insecurity of their labor. Mr. Drew, the 31 year old, white, male 
coordinator of Guitars and Hoops, explained his arrangements with his organization.  
My job description says that I’m supposed to come and show up as a group leader 
at 2 and leave by 6. However, I come in from like 12 to 6, sometimes earlier. I 
design all of my programs and 100 percent of the recruiting. I work with 
administrative staff here, do payroll, lesson plans, sit in partner meetings, 
community events, um, whatever is pretty much asked of me. I mean, they’ve 
been talking about it for three years to bring me on for full time and benefits but it 
hasn’t really worked out. I do work 40+ hours a week a lot, even though I’m only 
part-time. Thank god I’m healthy because I don’t get health insurance. 
Sometimes the grants fall through and the full-time thing doesn’t work out, but I 
actually enjoy my job because I get to work with kids and make a difference in 
their lives. As long as you make the best of it and there’s some money, then you’ll 
always do successfully in this business. (Interview, 1/30/14) 
 
While Mr. Drew’s organization was one of the more stable partners with the school, his 
testimony captures a theme running through these positions: high degrees of 
unrecognized labor and insecurity. Comparable to the teachers’ discussing the escalated 
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significance of affective rewards in their work (Chapter 4), the professional insecurity 
that partner staff endured was offset by their perceptions of “impact” on the students they 
worked with. To reiterate, “making a difference” atoned for the mounting responsibilities 
amidst inadequate compensation and few pathways to promotion.   
 However, for many staff, this insecurity wore on them as they began making 
commitments in their personal lives. Almost all of the partner staff worked for 
organizations that operated from a mix of public and philanthropic-corporate grants, 
though usually more of the latter. The impending threat of a layoff at the end of a grant 
cycle scared many struggling to support families, mortgages, and crushing student loan 
debt. With a master’s degree in educational policy, Ms. Shore, the coordinator of the 
partner meetings and an employee of Guitars and Hoops, faced a heavy predicament as 
the grant supporting her approached its end. Not knowing whether it would be renewed 
or that she would be out of a position, she described her difficulty in remaining 
committed to her chosen work.  
I’m nervous because I’m going to need a job in June possibly. I’m not 
complaining, but the personal piece of this is that it’s a non-profit and it’s not like 
I’m making a ton of money anyway. I mean, I have a master’s from an Ivy 
League school and an undergrad degree in mathematics and now I have to figure 
out how to market what I do to funders so that either someone will fund me now 
or possibly hire me down the line. Part of me is constantly looking to see what 
other opportunities are there, but then I’m with these kids and part of this great 
school, and I’m like, wow, I want to continue to do this. For me, personally, that 
internal battle is always there. (Interview, 5/28/14)  
 
As the AY 2013-2014 wound down, Ms. Shore’s struggle to balance what she 
perceived as meaningful work with the perpetual uncertainty of her position mirrored 
became a prominent topic in my unstructured interviews with partner staff. Yet these 
conversations differed slightly from those with teachers and administrators in that this 
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group of partner staff, though clearly worried about the future, understood job instability 
as par for the course, a permanent feature of grant-funded non-profit work. Ms. Shore 
claims that she’s “not complaining” but that questions whether her credentials that might 
serve her better in another industry, one which potentially would not induce as much 
anxiety about her career’s direction. Ms. Shore fought her reconcile her urge to be treated 
as young professional with promising career but also to pursue her ideals through her 
organization. The precarity that Ms. Shore experienced also suggests a lack of investment 
that these organizations encourage as their staff must continuously hedge their bets on 
other opportunities that might be more stable. This lack of investment raises questions 
about the sustainability of PPPs as core service providers, as their instability creates a 
contingent, insecure workforce that cannot afford to remain committed to their 
organizations’ work.  
Equity in Service Provision?   
The moral dilemmas of partner work lay in the production of meaning within a 
zone of professional precarity. Negotiating tensions between mandates of their 
organization, their commitments to the youth they served, and pressures in their personal 
lives, these partners worked tirelessly to provide opportunities for students in the face of 
the budget-cut imposed tumult of the AY 2013-2014 school year. They collaborated with 
teachers on planning field-trips, offered after-school programming that would not have 
been there otherwise, and went beyond their job descriptions to act as security guards and 
lunch monitors to stymie the chaos in the hallways and cafeteria. In other words, they 
were an undeniable factor in keeping Johnson High afloat, and, in spite of criticisms, the 
teachers and administration were largely grateful for their presence. 
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 Yet the crisis-induced “need” for partners to fill resource and labor gaps 
introduced a set of paradoxes that the principal felt was both troubling and unavoidable. 
First, though the partners were operating as core service providers, the partners’ ultimate 
allegiances were to their organizations, their funders, and not Johnson High. Second, as 
the school relied on these organizations to provide essential services for a school 
designed to serve all students, the partners, by their very design, targeted selected, limited 
groups of students. Therefore, questions of equity in partner resource distribution 
surfaced as the partners rallied around particular categories of students to target for 
services and largely neglected others.15  
 “Refugee Porn” and The Marketable Immigrant  
 Of the five organizations I followed, Service for Salvation, Guitars and Hoops, 
and Career Ready all had “open access” or allowed any student in the school to sign up. 
College Dreams and Refugee Aid worked with students that met particular criteria. In the 
case of College Dreams, the coordinator only offered services to the senior class while 
Refugee Aid solely targeted first-generation immigrant students whose parents worked 
with raw food products. Of the five organizations, all, with the exception of Service for 
Salvation, had limited slots available. Many of them operated on a first come, first serve 
basis, interested in both raw participation numbers as well as recruiting particular kinds 
of students that they felt would be demonstrate the “impact” of their program. Thus, the 
composition of a partner’s served population hinged equally on these criteria, leaving 
partner staff some leeway to recruit students and target them for services.  
                                                           
15 Mr. Lytle testimony in the previous section somewhat alludes to this problem, as he admitted that large 
proportions of the senior class, an already restricted group, went untouched by his services.  
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The skewed provision of resources to first generation Asian students, namely 
refugee students, arose as a point of contention throughout the year. As I mentioned in 
the Chapter 2, Johnson High was home to a large number of recently resettled refugee 
students, specifically ethnic minorities from Bhutan and Burma. It was actually through 
my preliminary fieldwork these students in their communities through Refugee Aid that I 
found myself at Johnson High.16 I initially assumed when I followed these youth into the 
school that they would not be recognized as refugees and that other categories of racial 
and linguistic difference would replace the category (i.e. Asian, ELL, immigrant).  
Though these latter categories did matter, particularly in terms of how teachers 
processed and acted upon them, it surprised me that refugee youth received the most 
support in the school in terms of non-profit services. Bhutanese and Burmese students 
constituted ninety-eight percept of Refugee Aid’s caseload in AY 2013-2014, therefore 
qualifying these students for access to five part-time staff that interfaced with teachers 
and administrators over their issues, after-school homework help, home visits, and a 
Saturday program that provided supplemental English classes to themselves and their 
parents. While the disproportionate enrollment of these students wasn’t problematic in 
isolation, the fact that the school did not have a counselor to serve the entire study body 
in September of 2013, complicated the question of equity as the school continued to rely 
on partners like Refugee Aid to selectively fill in service and resource gaps.  
Its qualifying criteria and funders, a mix of federal and philanthropic grants 
legally bound Refugee Aid to only serve students whose parents worked with raw food 
products. For refugees coming to Philadelphia to work in meatpacking and produce 
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packaging factories, this meant that their children were able to participate and benefit 
from the program. The coordinators at Refugee Aid always voiced that the stipulations of 
their federal grants limited their work to students that fit this criteria. Further, they also 
felt the need to market themselves to private funders as public funds for the programming 
became increasingly unavailable. When discussing how the refugee category affected the 
ways in which their organization marketed itself to funders and collaborating 
organizations, Ms. Kraft, the assistant program director, explained the power of the 
category.   
Well I think the problem is that everyone wants to help a refugee. Ya know, who 
doesn’t want to help a refugee? You know what I mean?  So a lot of funders and 
volunteers come to us because it’s like shooting fish in a barrel. I mean, you see it 
on TV all the time and there are all of those commercials that have like kids with 
the flies on their faces and if people say, “Oh, I help refugees,” then people 
always think they’re so great. Honestly, it helps us to have refugees in our 
program (Interview, 1/14/14) 
 
To describe the affective cache of the category in attracting funders and volunteers, Ms. 
Kraft deploys the metaphor “like shooting fish in a barrel.” Analogous to the 
phenomenon in medical “voluntourism” where companies sell the affective experience of 
being the “white savior” (McLennan 2014; Cole 2012), Ms. Kraft  believes that having 
refugees in the program offers the same experience to funders and volunteers that 
contribute money and labor in exchange for “think[ing] they’re so great.” In other words, 
Refugee Aid capitalized on affect generated by the global circulation of refugee suffering 
and white humanitarianism rampant in media portrayals of the Global South, mobilizing 
energy and resources to support their organization’s mission.  
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Another program coordinator at Refugee Aid struggled not only with his 
organization, the multitude of other organizations at the city and neighborhood levels that 
used refugees as a way to garner support.    
Mr. Michaels: People see the word “refugee” and they want to help and donate. 
Nonprofits are really good at selling that for grants and it’s definitely a dichotomy 
that I struggle with. I hate selling people this picture of helping “poor refugees.” 
They’re good people and they need help just like a lot of other groups who need 
help, but I think with non-profits needing funding, they need to like sell the sob-
story and be like, “Look at these persecuted refugees that we’re helping.” I don’t 
know if I ever told you this before, but some of the staff at [my old organization], 
well, they would tell these like extreme refugee stories to get money. We would 
call it “refugee porn” like where these non-profits are one-upping each other with 
one more fucked up story after another. We’re all drawn to those extreme stories 
but I think that’s one of the biggest problems is that people care about the 
“refugee” but there’s less compassion for an undocumented person. I think that 
[our organization] doesn’t do that good of a job at bringing all of those people in 
because we’re just so busy with our different programs out looking for donations 
and funding. People aren’t as drawn in when you say you’re helping immigrants 
in Philly, but if paint this story like, “Oh, they’re brand new!  And they’re from 
Bhutan! And they wear these colorful clothes! And they’re refugees!”  People like 
eat that up. They love that. People get recognized for extreme stories but not just 
for the mundane, regular, difficult needs in their lives. (Interview, 1/23/14)  
 
Mr. Michaels points to a critical issue of the marketization of particular categories of 
students to perpetuate the organization and the moral dilemmas that arise from that. If 
Refugee Aid worked in a well-funded school and provided supplemental services to 
refugee youth specifically, the issue of equitable resource distribution would be less 
convoluted because the underlying assumption is that school-provided supports (i.e. 
counselors, reading specialists, classroom aids) for all students exist. But as organizations 
like Refugee Aid bring resources selectively into a school without those supports, Mr. 
Michaels highlights there are dangers to relying on partners that must market themselves 
in specific ways to survive. Serving refugee youth was not only part of their mandate, but 
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also advantageous as it enabled them to entice exploit the affective power of the refugee 
category in the philanthropic world to garner more funding.  
Invisible Immigrants   
The issue of selective service provision that Mr. Michaels discussed in his 
interview played out throughout the year, raising red flags among teachers and staff that 
felt both critical of partners but also grateful for their support. In an after-school meeting 
one day among several teachers and the Service for Salvation coordinator, Ms. Crowley, 
these tensions peppered the conversation. Ms. Crowley wanted to elicit feedback, ideas, 
and commitments from teachers to help her put on a school-wide service day where she 
could reach her “engagement goals” for the year and spend the money allocated for larger 
events. Distributing sheets around the room with pie charts and bar graphs of the number 
of students and hours of service logged, Ms. Crowley told the teachers that she was 
mandated to “touch” at least 150 students through this event (Fieldnote, 3/19/14). As she 
described her vision for the day, a combination of speakers coming into the auditorium 
and excursions into the neighborhood to do park cleanups, the teachers scrunched their 
faces in concern, voicing worries over overcrowding in the auditorium, having the right 
number of chaperones, being responsible for collecting permission slips, and what to do 
with the kids that would inevitably not turn theirs in. Proposing alternative ideas, like 
smaller service projects for specific grades, Ms. Crowley interrupted them one by one, 
citing the need to reach her “engagement goals” through a school-wide service day. “I 
have to hit 150 students. I have no choice. That’s how I have to spend this money.” 
Uncomfortable with silence in the room, Ms. Crowley ended the meeting by thanking the 
teachers for their input. Following the meeting, Ms. Betty and Ms. London hung behind.  
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Ms. Betty:  I don’t know about these programs sometimes. Only the kids who can 
actually do stuff after-school and on weekends can participate in these. All of the 
kids from Central America have to work. Maybe she should ask why her 
“engagement” data doesn’t always look so good. 
Ms. London: Yes, I know, the refugee category is so political. These kids from 
Honduras are refugees and aren’t recognized as such and it makes all the 
difference in the world in terms of what kind of an education they get with all of 
these partners here. The Burmese and Bhutanese have support services from 
Refugee Aid and all of these organizations because they fit that category.” 
(Fieldnote, 3/19/14) 
 
The strain of the meeting over the issue of the service day and the exchange between Ms. 
Betty and Ms. London highlight the obfuscating effects of partners’ data pressures as well 
as the invisibility of particular kinds of student needs within this economy of partner 
programming. Again, with mandates to meet specific benchmarks of “impact” like Ms. 
Crowley’s “engagement goals”, coordinators oftentimes did not pay attention to the input 
of teachers and staff. As the 8 teachers attempted to give Ms. Crowley input, she 
eschewed their ideas by citing her lack of “choice” in manipulating the top-down 
directives of the event. This issue arose often in collaborations between partner staff, 
teachers, and administrators, as partners would be broached to use resources beyond the 
‘scope’ of their organization’s mission.  
Ms. Betty and Ms. London also point to how a singular focus on these top-down 
directives conflict with questions of accessibility and need. Ms. Betty underscores the 
lack of support for Latino students, specifically those from parts of Central America that 
fled violence and poverty, and entered the U.S. without supports, oftentimes as 
undocumented, unaccompanied minors. The school experienced, like many districts 
across the U.S. in AY 2013-2014, a spike in students from Central American countries. 
Many of the students were living in homes with cousins or siblings and oftentimes had no 
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running water, or electricity. Though this trend culminated in a national state of 
emergency in April of 2014 (Children on the Run 2014), teachers in the building 
experienced a heightened consciousness of this issue as students would broach them with 
their personal issues and ask for help. 
Overwhelmed by the need and with nobody to turn to, the teachers voiced 
criticisms of partner programming that did not take into account perhaps why only 
specific kinds of students were attending their programming, or were legitimizing certain 
forms of suffering and immigrant categories over others (i.e. refugees). Complaining one 
day about a mural arts project introduced by one of the partners to the students in her 
class, Ms. Betty boiled over.   
[yelling] There are all of these issues in the Latino community like pregnancy, 
immigration status, extreme poverty, and this woman is painting murals. She has 
a degree in Fine Arts and that’s awesome that she painted murals in Ecuador, but 
is that really what the community needs? I see this all over the place and it drives 
me nuts. They wanted these kids to stay after school to paint murals, but if they 
knew anything about undocumented kids, they would realize that they have 
restaurant jobs to run to after-school. How can you be that out of touch? They 
want everyone to go to college without realizing that there is a glass ceiling for 
the undocumented kids. The refugees and documented Asian immigrants get 
everything, all of the volunteers and non-profits in the world, but there’s nothing 
to be done for the undocumented kids. They’re invisible.  (Fieldnote, 4/24/14)  
 
As more and more mental health issues arose amongst the Central American and 
undocumented Mexican students in the school, oftentimes resulting from trauma crossing 
the border or spiraling home finance situations, teachers like Ms. Betty searched for 
partners that might be able to help address these problems. At these junctures the line 
between researcher, advocate, and social worker blurred for me as much as the teachers. 
As I sought out other organizations doing mental health work under the advisory of 
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several of Refugee Aid’s caseworkers, their staff advised me to attend a neighborhood-
level school partners meeting where I might make some connections.  
At a meeting in June 2014, I met a social worker that had established a storefront 
mental clinic in the neighborhood. When I asked her which populations she worked with, 
she responded, “I work mainly with Burmese and Bhutanese refugees. We are actually 
expanding our program at Johnson High next year. I’ve just met with the principal to 
discuss possibilities of doing pull-out therapy with those kids.” I asked her whether she 
would have flexibility to work with undocumented Central American and Mexican 
students. The social worker politely declined, “I know, I would like to, but nobody will 
give me money to do that.” (Fieldnote, 6/2/14).  
These two instances point to a central issue among all partners – that their funding 
streams, mission, and structure induced a top-down approach to managing the socio-
emotional and academic issues. Instead of performing needs’ assessments or doing due 
diligence and research on the needs to the school, PPPs staff and leadership of PPPs 
consistently looked to fit the square-pegs of their work into oftentimes the round holes of 
the school’s and student body’s wants. This uneven mapping of missions onto the needs’ 
geography resulted in a mismatch, rendering essential needs and opportunities of many 
students invisible.  
Unmarketable Minorities: The Marginalization of the Native-Born  
 Like the strategy to enroll Asian students, the strategy to employ partners to save 
the school mobilized staff and students around particular categories of racial, ethnic, and 
political difference to both statistically and affectively brand the school as one deserving 
of staying open. However, also like the first strategy, the second marginalized native-
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born students as partners also funneled resources toward students that they felt would 
demonstrate the most “impact” and market themselves to future funders. I described the 
affective dimensions of the refugee category in the distribution of partner resources in the 
previous section, a within-group analysis resource distribution among ELL students. 
However, teachers also noticed large rifts between attention paid by partners to ELL or 
“immigrant” and “American” or “urban” students.   
Mr. Cassidy: We used to have more stuff for everyone, but we don’t anymore. I 
mean, there are some American kids that benefit, but I do think the ELL kids 
dominate these non-profits. The American kids don’t want to participate because 
they might be treated differently ‘cause technically, the ELL kids are nicer right? 
They do target the more Asian nationalities and it takes away from the American 
students. I get the sense that they feel that. We preach diversity but we’re not 
diverse. The partners too, they’re like, the ELL kids are nice kids so why am I 
going to take a chance on an African-American kid who’s questionable? I’m 
going to have to deal with his attitude or something when I could just have this 
nice Bhutanese kid that I can just teach guitar to. See?  (Interview, 3/28/14)  
 
Mr. Cassidy underlines not only the affective dimension of partner resource provision, or 
partner preferences for servicing ELL students because they believed they were “nicer,” 
but also the ways in which the snowball effect of partners focusing on ELL students 
created feelings of exclusion among native-born students. Teachers and partners alike 
said that even when they noticed skewed enrollments of first-generation immigrant 
students, most of Asian descent, they did not always know how to address the disparity or 
have time to address it given the many demands on their time.  
 When I asked Mr. Keo in an interview whether he noticed partners’ 
disproportional enrollment of Asian ELL students in their programming, he admitted that 
it was a problem, but not one that he was in the position to fix because he needed the 
partners so desperately.  
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Race still matters a lot here. Guitars and Hoops has mostly Asian kids with no 
black kids. I’m aware of it but having them is better than having nothing. There’s 
definitely some friction between the Black and Asian kids but I don’t know it’s 
about race or whether it’s just kids being kids, you now, the boys trying to act up 
to defend their manhood. For the most part, we speak 24 different languages here 
but all manage get along which is one of the highlights n this school and 
something I take pride in. It’s a neighborhood high school, but the race issue with 
the partners is something that I can’t seem to touch on, but I’ve seen it for years. I 
don’t know whether the Black kids don’t feel comfortable joining in or that they 
see no value in these extra programs. The Asian kids, they value their education 
and take advantage of it. (Interview, 5/14)  
 
Teachers that saw the skewed enrollment of Asian students in partner programming as 
indicative of greater “care” for their education, felt similarly to Mr. Keo that they could 
not disentangle native-born students’ feelings of discomfort from those of academic 
complacency. Even if they could, they did not feel much control in terms of changing the 
social dynamics of partners’ programming. At the end of the day, “having [the partners 
was] better than having nothing,” as Mr. Keo claimed.  
 Partner self-criticism textured my conversations with partners concerned that they 
were potentially exacerbating social rifts between ELL and native-born, mostly Black 
students. Service for Salvation tried to atone for these rifts by facilitating a tutoring 
exchange between College Dreams’ students and a rudimentary level ELL class. 
However, many admitted that the draw of working in a school like Johnson High was the 
“immigrant hope” that fueled participation in their programs. A high-level administrator 
overseeing the implementation of the College Dreams program described the advantage 
of partnering with schools with lower percentages of “American” students.   
Ms. Tolentine: The most refreshing part about working in this school with more 
immigrants is that there’s a level of hope and focus that’s different than other 
schools with multi-generational poverty in that those kids don’t see that education 
is going to make a difference. They don’t see that there’s something—if I work 
hard, something will shift. So like at a school with lots of native-born students, 
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like it’s a harder sell in some ways because the immigrant kids are like, “Oh 
we’re going to college.” (Interview, 3/21/14)  
 
Engaging in the same “market-speak” that many of the partners often used in community 
meetings, Ms. Tolentine explains that part of working as a partner is “selling” the idea of 
social mobility through education to children. In order for one’s program to have the kind 
of “impact”, measured usually through attendance, hours of participation, and ultimately 
graduation and college admission rates, each program had to attain a level of “buy-in.”  
While Louie (2012) referred to this phenomenon as the “immigrant bargain” or 
first-generation immigrant youths’ attempt to recompense their parents’ sacrifices by 
making it to college, I see this “immigrant hope” as being somewhat different. Many of 
the first-generation students that attended Johnson High did not have the language, 
foundational skills, or means to pursue higher education. However, this was often not of 
interest to the partners who oftentimes cared about attracting hard numbers and the 
marketing of individual success stories to funders. It was this buy-in to their program that 
they desired more than longer-term outcomes in terms of college admission rates. In this 
case, the partners traded on “immigrant hope,” a kind of currency in a funding climate 
where programs lived and died by the sword of evidence-based “impact.” Such a trade 
exacted a value from first generation immigrant students, namely refugee youth, which 
increased their value as organizations in the grant-funding marketplace. However, 
partners framed native-born students that lacked the “buy-in” discussed by Ms. Tolentine, 
as disinterested and not worth the investment of their time, energy, and organization’s 
funding.  
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A Sustainable Strategy?  
By the end of the 2014, three of the five major partners in the school pulled their 
programs. College Dreams’ largest grant elapsed and Career Ready decided to implement 
a new model where they would be consolidating their resources and crowding them in 
just a few high schools (Fieldnote, 3/12/14). Service for Salvation’s national office 
announced that they could not develop an enduring, self-sufficient funding plan in 
Philadelphia and therefore had to pull out (Recording, 12/13/14). With their pullout, the 
school lost four full-time staff, one of which served as a counselor for the entire senior 
class, funds for college trips, financial aid workshops, internship opportunities, and 
political capital in a district that had declared “partnerships” as a key reform strategy in 
its Action Plan 2.0, a document outlining the direction of district policies. Career Ready’s 
instability was not unprecedented, as they had promised funds for a new biomedical 
program and donated lab renovation years before and had lost their grant (Interview, 
3/19/14). The principal and collaborating teacher of Career Ready both were disappointed 
but not surprised by the retracted commitment to the school.  
Mr. Cassidy: I mean, when we first started, we had three different career track 
programs and it was really positive. The staffers designated for each program 
were here all of the time, we had tons of trips. But ya know, that was the high 
time and of course you have the low times with the budget crisis and all of that. 
They lose money too because they’re a non-profit and businesses aren’t putting as 
much money in so the first three years were great and then funding started 
stopping around 2010. I mean, yah, I was in hog heaven. Anything I asked for I 
got from them, which was great. It’s not that way anymore, and now they’re gone 
for good just like that. (Interview, 3/19/14)  
 
With the pullout of the Career Ready and College Dreams, many of the teachers worried 
about their students and what kinds of resources they would need to attract to fill the void 
left. At community partner meetings in the last two months of school, Mr. Keo would 
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approach the partners, desperately asking whether they could pick up slack. While some 
partners obliged his entreaties, oftentimes an awkward silence permeated the room, many 
partners reluctant to commit more resources to objectives outside the scope of their 
mission. The coordinator of Service for Salvation, Ms. Crowley, one day in May, 
frustrated with having had to play a “security guard” throughout the year and play a role 
on disciplinary committees, finally broke down. “I’m sorry, Mr. Keo, but I can’t use my 
organization’s money and time to do all of these things that you ask of us.” At the 
meetings conclusion, I conducted an interview with a coordinator of Guitars and Hoops 
that had take it upon herself to run these meetings. Exasperated and despondent, she 
vented to me.  
Ms. Shore: I think that’s where I get to that point where I’m like, jeez, how is this 
helpful? It’s such a difficult thing because when you market a program, you want 
something quick and concise and simple, but those are just Band-Aids.  It doesn’t 
really get to the real issues. It’s not systemic. We can’t always do the things he 
asks of us and even if we could, is that really our responsibility? (Interview, 
5/28/14)  
 
Ms. Shore’s questions about employing partners as a strategy to combat resource scarcity 
in the school highlights another problem, the moral dilemmas that arise from perpetual 
“mission slip” as new and old partners come and go. Calling the partners “Band-Aids”, 
she is uncertain of the sustainability of leaning heavily on partners that are inherently 
unstable and subject to fluctuations in grant cycles and the whims of the market. Partners 
made no bones about their missions and the objectives of their programming. They were 
accountable to their funders and evaluation measures before the needs of the school. 
However, as the crisis deepened and Mr. Keo became more desperate, their role as core 
service providers raised questions about the limits of their work and whether they could, 
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in good conscience, eschew their organization’s priorities in favor of attending to the 
immediate needs of the school.  
A Slippery Slope: Internal Privatization and Paranoia    
 In the second half of the year, partners’ relationships with students, families and 
other institutions, particularly charter schools, posed further questions about whether the 
“agendas” of the partners actually aligned with the school’s interests. Earlier in the 
chapter, Mr. Brown, the former principal, discussed the importance of selectivity in 
allowing partners into the building, explaining that partners may have ulterior motives. 
With the expansion of charter schools in the district in the previous years and the mass 
closure of district schools in May 2013, many teachers voiced a criticism that private 
partners, while necessary in the context of the budget crisis and harsh school performance 
evaluation system, introduced a dangerous encroachment of the private sector on a public 
institution.  
Mr. Wood: I think people are fine with marketing ourselves to private funding 
sources as long as it’s happening the way is now. If more community partners 
came and wanted to help out, of course we would say yes. What you fear the most 
is someone going to come in and say, “We’re going to make this the Beautiful 
Sunshine Academy and turn it into a charter school because we have this other 
model that we think works better.” Now you’re out. Especially when you look at 
the growing number of seats that have been turned over to charter schools, and the 
shrinking numbers of seats in public schools, the bottom line is with the charter 
schools, there’s private money flowing through there, and private money serves 
itself, not the students. Partners also serve themselves before they serve us 
(Interview 3/5/14)   
 
Many teachers, like Mr. Wood, drew parallels between the private nature of partners and 
the private nature of charter schools, fearful of the slippery slope of forfeiting too much 
control and power to private entities. Mr. Wood warns that “private money serves itself” 
and that partners also “serve themselves before they serve [the school]. Concerned about 
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the overall survival of Johnson High, his anecdote highlights the contradiction between 
resisting the ultimate consequence of neoliberal education policies, closure, through 
partners, while also engaging private entities, the perceived root of the closure threat.  
Pigeon-holed and feeling a lack of choice, Mr. Keo proceeded throughout the near 
to nurture relationships with the partners and integrate them into the school community. 
However, a series of events beginning in January heightened paranoia that the partners 
might actually be subverting the school’s survival strategies, rather than bolstering them. 
In several Facebook posts of Burmese refugee students, I came to learn that many had 
applied to a large charter high school in the same neighborhood and had been accepted 
(Field note 1/6/14). These students had received application assistance from Refugee Aid 
and their staff, specifically a prominent Burmese staff member that had cultivated a 
strong relationship with an ELL teacher there. As a long-time tutor and volunteer with 
Refugee Aid, I consulted another staff member about these students, questioning whether 
they, as an organization, supported charter school applications. Ms. Kraft, the co-director, 
explained the predicament.  
I mean, it doesn’t matter if it’s a charter school or a public school. Whoever has 
our students, we’ll work with them. I mean, the charter schools are pulling our 
good kids and the parents think the schools are safer and have better staff to 
student ratios. If our students want to go to charter schools, we support them. A 
lot of the Burmese and Bhutanese have applied. Actually, most of them, because 
the word on the street is that [Mastery] Charter School is the best. One of our 
Burmese-speaking staff is a huge proponent and now everyone is drinking the 
Kool-Aid. I mean, not many of the high school kids will get in because they want 
the little ones that will move through their programs. But if someone drops, 
they’re might be free spaces. (Interview, 1/14/14) 
 
As Ms. Kraft highlights, their allegiance is to the students they serve and not to Johnson 
High.  
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As the semester wore on, several teachers and Mr. Keo got wind that staff at 
Refugee Aid were deliberately enrolling their high-achieving refugee students at a local 
charter school. A confrontation ensued where Mr. Keo called a co-director at Refugee 
Aid and accused the organization of undermining the standing of the school and 
imperiling its numbers. He also accused the staff of “brainwashing” vulnerable refugee 
parents into thinking that a charter school would serve them better. Indignant and 
offended, a series of heated emailed exchanges ensued, Mr. Keo drawing support from a 
vocal ELL teacher, Ms. Betty, and the part-time bilingual counselor responsible for 
corresponding and translating for Burmese families, and the staff of Refugee Aid. In a 
conference between his staff and those of Refugee Aid, Mr. Keo’s anger boiled over.   
I have little control over what you people do and how your missions contribute to 
what’s happening here academically. I have no choice but to let you come in here, 
and so I opt to trust you because what’s the alternative?  Having nobody? I 
assume you are the lesser of two evils, but then you go and do something like this, 
help these people poach my students. What am I supposed to think?  (Fieldnote, 
4/29/13) 
 
Refugee Aid staff, fearful that they would lose their standing in the school, insisted that 
they respected Johnson High’s ELL program and encouraged their students to come 
enroll there. They assured Mr. Keo and Ms. Betty that the scale of the impact was small 
and that the majority of the students probably would not be accepted anyway. Mr. 
Michaels, a case manager, assured him,  
As you know, we are always encouraging our students to go to Johnson, largely 
because of the support and dedication they received from you and other excellent 
teachers and staff. We just want our advanced students to have more 
opportunities. We don’t want to deny them those opportunities if a charter school 
and not a neighborhood school is able to provide them. As an organization, we 
have to support what’s best for the students” (Email Correspondence, 4/28/14).   
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 However, independent consultations with each camp following the confrontation 
revealed a deep level of mistrust and uneasiness. My conversation with Ms. Betty and 
Mr. Keo after the Refugee Aid staff left the main office was fraught with anger and moral 
dilemma.  
Mr. Keo: We have charters poaching our good kids here already. There are non-
educational institutions popping up left and right. With everybody trying to 
compete for that money and students, the ethical piece is thrown out of the 
window. For us, it’s more difficult because we are a neighborhood high school, 
and as a neighborhood high school we have to take students from all over who the 
charter schools don’t want. Having an organization like that who’s willing to 
enroll kids in charters under our nose challenges the integrity of our school. We 
need our numbers because if we don’t have that number, we close. The good kids 
get into the charters, but what happens to the rest of them?   
Ms. Betty: [Refugee Aid] is so shady. I don’t think they get it. They keep telling 
me that if there are opportunities, then we shouldn’t prevent our good kids from 
going, that we can just take the low-level ELL crowd. Well, I take that personally. 
Just because we’re a neighborhood school doesn’t mean we’re a bad school. I 
told them that these schools aren’t going to take the [names of three low English-
level Burmese students], that they want the quiet, high achieving [names of three 
high-level Burmese students]. So what happens to them when our school closes? 
Where do they go? Do they get warehoused somewhere where they won’t be part 
of a community or acknowledged for who they are? I’m an invested teacher and I 
think it’s fucked up when you use our school for your program and then you 
undermine my livelihood and hope by taking my kids away from me. We have so 
little hope already so this feels like an assault [crying]…like we’re being used and 
dumped because we’re not good enough. The partners don’t see our fate wrapped 
up in this seemingly innocent act, that when they close schools like us, charters 
open in our place. I don’t think they see it that way because they’re advocating for 
a very select group of kids, but what about the rest of the kids that those schools 
don’t want? I believe that equitable, nurturing public education is what’s best for 
all of our kids, and it’s a serious philosophical difference that we have.  (Recorded 
Conversation, 4/29/14) 
 
Listening to this conversation was one of my more difficult moments throughout my 
fieldwork. I felt caught at the center of an ideological battle where the question over what 
was “best for the kids” straddled two camps where I held dear friends. My two years of 
prior fieldwork with Refugee Aid, an organization responsible for my entry into the 
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neighborhood’s newer refugee communities and ultimately Johnson High, was a result of 
working and teaching in their program. Caught in the middle, I was asked to “choose” a 
side, between a teacher and principal that I had grown to respect and ache for in their 
struggle to keep the school alive, and a partner that did thorough, well-intentioned work 
with, what Ms. Betty correctly describes, as a “very select group of kids.”  
************************************** 
Throughout this chapter I have detailed the pressures that created need for 
partnerships – the confluence of an extraordinary budget crisis that intensified the 
material needs of the school as well as the expanding education market in Philadelphia 
that placed the onus on neighborhood schools to compete with charter schools for 
enrollments. In spite of their reservations about partner accountability and their 
potentially ulterior motives for being there, both principals and teachers felt they had no 
choice but to allow partners to enter the building in order to either replace lost services or 
make them a more palatable option for students and families. Returning to my second and 
third research questions – aimed at understanding how partners worked in conjunction 
with the schools’ other strategies to brand Johnson High as a quality high school – 
Johnson High’s administrators, teachers, and staff developed strange bedfellow 
relationships with non-profits not just due to austerity but also because of market 
pressures to compete with charter schools. Understood as a mechanism to bolster the 
school’s reputation in the larger neighborhood and city, Mr. Brown and Mr. Keo forged 
partnerships with non-profits that would extend their ability to not only attract great 
enrollments but influence people of persuasion by forming relationships with well-
connected individuals at the city-level. If powerful individuals and their organizations by 
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extension were making investments in the school, administrators hoped that the district 
would be less likely to subject the school to closure.  
As the fiscal crisis in the district worsened in the last years of Mr. Brown’s tenure 
and the first two years of Mr. Keo’s appointment to principal, partners served a more 
practical purpose: plugging their resources into service and material voids left by budget 
cuts. Becoming core service providers in the absence of district-funded school supports, 
Mr. Keo especially saw partners as the only way to keep Johnson High afloat on an 
everyday basis. Partner staff became disciplinarians, hall monitors, chaperones, and 
funders of school events and fieldtrips. Further, by bringing in partners that specialized in 
serving ELL students, Mr. Keo recognized partners as a means to attract the kinds of 
students that would not only strengthen enrollment but also fortify his climate data.  
However, this strategy to build the schools’ service capacity through partners was 
rife with moral as well as practical dilemmas. College Dreams, a particularly committed 
partner, served as a ideal case to examine the chasms between the top-down mission of an 
organization and the ways in which mission elided the more nuanced needs of the school 
through program’s implementation. Partner staff struggled to reconcile their 
organization’s mission and accountability to funding sources with the student’s and larger 
school community’s unique needs and personal dilemmas.  
Partners, similarly to the administrators and teachers working to build an ELL-
centric brand, confronted equity in service provision as their design targeted select group 
of students for their programs. Specific categories of student, namely first-generation 
refugee youth, triggered an affect that both attracted partnering organizations and allowed 
them to frame their work as “impactful” to their funders. As many partners articulated, 
 207
the humanitarian appeal of a refugee cause allowed them to market their missions as 
more worthy of philanthropic funding sources, cashing in on the global circulation of 
“white saviorism” that they incited humanitarian care for these students. However, these 
narrowly constructed targets rendered the needs of other high need populations, namely 
the undocumented students and the native-born, invisible. As one partner explains, 
undocumented students narratives do not trade as well in the non-profit marketplace as 
“refugee porn”, or the horrific atrocities that made refugee youth more attractive to save. 
 Questions over the sustainability and utility of partnering organizations also arose 
often as partner grants elapsed and partners shifted their foci, leaving the school without 
resources it so desperately needed. Vignettes fraught with teachers’ and administrators’ 
doubt around partners ‘ trustworthiness and intentions also indicated an unease and 
borderline paranoia over partners’ as possible agents of privatization and the charter 
school movement. In the case of Refugee Aid actively helping some of their cases to 
apply to charter schools, administrators like Mr. Keo had to ultimately reconsider 
whether the motives of the partners and their missions were compatible with the 
overarching goal of the branding process: to save the school from closure. Moreover, as 
partners began to exert more influence on the student body and school, teachers also 
wondered if the short-term relief that they brought with them, mitigated the political 
pressure that continued resource scarcity would place on the district and state to properly 
fund their schools.   
 The employment of partners to brand the school, however, contributed to an 
existential questioning not only among the teachers, administrators, and students, but the 
partner staff themselves. As the school felt an amplified sense of accountability to the 
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district and state for their “performance” across a range of aforementioned criteria, 
partners lacked accountability to the school and state. Partner loyalties conversely lied in 
demonstrating “impact” to their funders; impact defined by their missions and prescribed 
interventions. As the school came to increasingly rely on partners’ services after the 
budget cuts, teachers especially questioned the ethics of building “on top of” partners that 
selectively served particular student populations.  
Looking to Vincanne Adams' (2013) observations in post-Katrina New Orleans, 
this non-profit network at Johnson justified its presence through the crisis and also 
operated without oversight or coordination. Several actually used the crisis in their 
promotional materials and “impact” evaluations to demonstrate the utility of their 
services and market themselves to philanthropic funders. Yet it was this strategy that also 
rendered them unstable, as grants and subsequently staffing, came and went.  
 This strategy therefore demonstrates what happens when state and district 
manufactured crisis removes supports for neighborhood schools, forcing them to look 
beyond their walls for resources to continue to provide basic educational services and 
compete in the education market. Highly volatile non-profits prioritizing their 
perpetuation as organizations serving select populations over the inclusive and 
democratic mission of the neighborhood school played a role in the uneven distribution 
of school resources. While partnerships functioned as a stopgap measure to stymie the 
exodus of state-funded supports, they also became another mechanism through which the 
school funneled resources to students deemed valuable to the school’s brand. In many 
ways, the non-profits drew on the same affective power of first-generation Asian students 
as the school’s leadership, namely refugee youth, to promote and market the mission and 
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impact of their organization. In other words, they became valuable commodities that non-
profits could “sell” to raise money and please stakeholders. Aggregated with the 
administration’s internal strategies to enroll ELL students and minimize the visibility and 
numbers of native-born, largely African-American, students, partnerships exacerbated 
feelings of marginalization and segregation among the latter group. This next chapter will 
detail students’ responses to the emergence of what Ms. London termed as “two schools” 
(Chapter 4) and its implications for their educational trajectories.  
 210
CHAPTER 6 – “YOU PLAY THE HAND YOU’RE DEALT”: STUDENT VOICES 
AT JOHNSON HIGH 
 
“A Lost Opportunity” 
Everyone is afraid of the school closing, so people want to make notes of the bad 
things. I’m pretty sure more good things happen than bad things. If they closed us, 
it would be bad for the neighborhood because the school plays an important role 
in the how people relate to one another. If I see you in school and in the 
neighborhood, and I have to work with you in a group here, then I know that 
you’re not a possible threat. It would be a lost opportunity to know your 
neighbors. The school is the meeting ground, the connection place. It would be 
that missing (pause) like if everybody goes to charters, nobody cares about the 
place that they’re from. That’s why I go here. I can say, hey, that’s MY school in 
[Johnson High’s neighborhood]. But if I go up to North Philly, it’s just another 
place. I pay more attention to what’s going on in my neighborhood and my school 
if I feel like they’re mine. The school enlightens people. In this city, not many 
people leave their neighborhoods. The school presents the opportunity to know 
different kinds of people and see through their eyes. You need knowledge to fight 
ignorance. Kids know OF each other, and that’s a good thing, even if they don’t 
hang out.  (Interview with Eric, 2/20/14)  
 
            ******************************* 
Eric is an 18-year old African-American senior at Johnson High, a student that in 
his four years has experienced the full gamut of the strategies used to try to save Johnson 
High. His four years also coincided with unprecedented tumult at the district level across 
two superintendents. When I asked him to imagine the feelings he would have should 
Johnson High close, he insightfully addressed the implications that a closure would have 
for not only his own sense of belonging, but also the macro-level relations of the larger 
neighborhood. Describing the school as “the meeting ground, the connection place,” Eric 
invokes notions of a community and place building through an educational space. A 
school, according to Eric, establishes bonds between diverse neighborhood constituencies 
through children. Embedded within his quote is a critique of the ways in which the 
expansion of charter schools erodes feelings and understandings of neighborhoods as 
 211
places of belonging and family history. “That’s why I go here,” he explains, “I can say, 
hey, that’s MY school…but if I go up to North Philly, it’s just another place.”   
Eric opens this chapter because his insights encapsulate the critiques, fears, and 
hopes of the Johnson High’s student body as they bore witness to the devastating effects 
of the austerity policies at the district level in their classrooms, hallways, and 
neighborhood. I dedicate this chapter to their voices because their narratives ultimately 
reveal the youth-centered impacts that this constellation of market fundamentalist policies 
exact on their lives and trajectories as emerging adults and citizens-in-the-making. I focus 
particularly on their perceptions of their educational quality as well as how the school-
level strategies to save Johnson High from closure influenced their peer-to-peer 
relationships. Their responses to the micro-level influence of these policies, I argue, 
expose much about the limits of these reforms.  
Further, their responses they illuminate the ways in which neighborhood schools 
responding to these reforms structure youth inclusion and exclusion. By focusing on 
students’ reactions toward the triangulating influences of the school-level strategies, I 
also show how these policies (i.e. which frame particular student types as threatening and 
others as worthy) fracture possibilities to facilitate successful, sustained relations across 
diverse student bodies. No study within the school closures literature has focused on how 
attending schools slated for potential closure influence students’ perceptions of school 
value or the ways that they relate to their communities. Their perspectives matter to the 
degree that they reflect feelings of respect and belonging as well as their willingness to 
enroll and invest their time and energy in the school’s health and future.  
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 The chapter moves from students’ perceptions of neighborhood schools within the 
schema of “school choice” in Philadelphia. I discuss how the stratification of schools 
within the expanding range of options affect students’ understandings and attitude toward 
the traditional neighborhood school. I then move into students’ critiques of the 
community partners, noting their instability and selectivity in service provision. I finally 
discuss students’ understandings of their peers as particular strategies racialized students 
along the ELL-American spectrum. Together these sections craft an account of the 
instability of the school’s brand as many students lost faith in the school to serve the 
needs of the entire population as well as survive as a divided institution.  
Perceptions of Neighborhood Schools  
The “Hierarchy” of Schools   
Of the six classes that I observed regularly at Johnson High, I spent almost every 
day in the College Dreams sponsored class of 25 sophomores. The group was a mix of 
higher-level ELL students and native-born students, and the ratios fluctuated throughout 
the year pending the attrition and transfer rates. Of the 25 students, there was one 15 year 
old, White student, James. James was an anomaly in a school that at the time of the 
research, was less than 10 percent White, and of the White students, many have been 
ejected from parochial schools and charter schools for behavior problems. James was 
quiet and generally kept to himself, completing work so that he could retreat behind a 
textbook to sleep without the teacher noticing him. Playing the class tutor meant that I 
spent many classes sitting with him, keeping him “focused” as per the teacher’s request, 
and asking him about his life.  
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James was born and raised two blocks from the school to an Irish mother and 
Italian father, streets of the neighborhood that are interestingly still home to those white 
ethnic populations. His older brother graduated several years prior from the other 
neighborhood high school and then lived on marine on base in California. His mother 
also attended another neighborhood high school where she became pregnant at 17 with 
his brother and subsequently dropped out. She worked as a temporary receptionist for 
dentists around the area, but often did not have regular or consistent hours. His stepfather, 
a construction worker, also only worked when he was “called in” for a job. On a day in 
late September, as Johnson High roiled in the chaos imposed by the budget cuts, James 
described to me his predicament as a student attending a “neighborhood school.”  
I mean, I really wanted to go to Catholic school but they’ve gotten a lot more 
expensive, like $5,000 a year. I mean, I don’t mind it here that much. Like you 
have the magnet schools and Catholic schools up here [gestures with hands high], 
and charters are here [lowers hands down] and then there’s the neighborhood 
school here at the bottom of the barrel [lowers hands further]. I mean, Johnson 
High isn’t as bad as [other neighborhood high school], not as dangerous, but it’s 
still down here because it’s a neighborhood school. And then with all of the 
budget cuts, it sucks even more, ya know? (Fieldnote, 9/26/13)  
 
Delineating the rungs of school “quality” in Philadelphia, James places his Johnson High 
at “the bottom of the barrel” echoing similar sentiments as Mr. Keo in Chapter 3 toward 
the overarching perception that neighborhood schools are “bad” because “bad kids” go to 
them. James distances himself from the school’s reputation by pointing that he himself 
“wanted to go to a Catholic school but they’ve gotten more expensive, like $5,000 a 
year,” citing his lack of choice in attending Johnson. In a system where charter schools 
have further injected “choice” into the marketplace of urban school options, James points 
out that those at “the bottom” do not enjoy that same choice for prohibitive tuitions at 
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Catholic schools or losing in a charter school lottery ultimately relegates them to non-
selective high schools. Further exacerbating his plight, he feels, are the budget cuts that 
have disparately affected district-run neighborhood schools that rely solely on state and 
city-level tax revenues. When I asked James whether he had plans to apply to college, he 
told me that he probably would not. In spite of his placement in the College Dreams’ 
cohort, he explained, “I mean, I go to Johnson High right? Didn’t I just explain that to 
you? Like, I’m not that smart. I’m tryin’ to just find a job now down at Modell’s so that I 
can pay for my shoes and stuff. With mom not working, I gotta pay for my own stuff” 
(Field note, 9/26/13)  
 Many students in addition to James felt compelled to transfer to “better schools” 
like charters and magnet schools, particularly when stressful situations arose regarding 
the building’s infrastructure and the lack of cleaning staff. A bed bug problem descended 
on several classrooms mid-year, but with no funds to hire a fumigator, the students and 
teachers had no choice but to bring personal repellent cans (Fieldnote 2/5/14). With a 
leaking roof, asbestos-ridden 4th floor, disintegrating dry wall, and only two part-time 
cleaning staff to cover a building large enough to accommodate 2000 students, the air 
quality suffered enormously. Ms. Allard, the teacher of the College Dreams class, was 
hospitalized on three separate occasions for in-school asthma attacks (Field note, 5/4/14). 
During one of her absences, I sat with two native-born Asian and Latino male students, 
discussing the possibility of transferring. Brian, the son of Vietnamese refugees, Tony, 
the son of two Lao refugees, and Leo and Joseph, the sons of first-generation Mexican 
parents.   
Leo: I applied to charters in the 8th grade but I didn’t get accepted.  
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Joseph: I wanted to, but my parents didn’t know what to do. They don’t speak 
much English.  
Tony: I really want to transfer though. This school is so gross with all of the shit 
on the floor and stuff. Like, Ms. Allard ain’t even here because it’s makin’ her 
sick. I want to transfer to an arts charter school or somethin’. Johnson, it’s just not 
me. I’m better than this so I want to graduate from a better school.  
Brian: Yeah, it’s too late though. I mean, we are in 10th grade.  
Joseph: My parents can’t really help me so I guess I’m staying here.  (Fieldnote, 
10/1/13)  
 
In the middle of this conversation, Joseph turned to me and asked, “Ms. Julie, do you 
think you could help me apply to a charter school? We don’t have the counselor this year 
to help us.” Telling him that I was not familiar with the charter school lottery process and 
that I would look into it for him, I still felt conflicted. Privy to the principal’s worries that 
students might leave, I didn’t want to encourage students to flee the school in search of 
the greener pastures of a charter. At the same time, I wanted them to know that their 
grievances with the “shit on the floor” and their perceptions of the quality of the 
education they were receiving did not fall on deaf ears.  
This conversation however pointed to a larger problem – that students like James 
and Joseph felt the stigma of attending a “neighborhood school” based purely on the fact 
it was non-selective. Their feelings reflected Mr. Keo and the teachers’ views that the 
schools’ non-selectivity and its inability to completely exclude “problem kids” made it 
difficult to appear valuable and worth saving as an institution. Collectively these 
responses raised questions about deservingness and public education. First, what message 
does increasing educational “choice” send to students like James and Joseph, that, 
because of their parents’ inability to send them somewhere else, have no choice but to 
attend an increasingly underfunded neighborhood school? Second, what other recourse 
did educators like Mr. Keo have but to compete in the marketplace?  
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The American Dream Denied: ELL Student Perspectives  
 While native-born students like James and Joseph certainly voiced criticisms 
about the ways in which the budget cuts and school closures imperiled their education, 
they always dismissed the crisis as just another district-produced calamity that would 
come and go. Eric, the senior that opened the chapter, when questioned about the budget 
cuts, would constantly say, “You play the hand you’re dealt” (Interview, 2/20/14), 
accepting his lack of control over the state of his school. However, the responses and 
perspectives of diverse first-generation immigrant population, students that were coming 
into contact with the American education system for the first time from a multitude of 
contexts, differed in their level of shock and alarm. These students, arriving at Johnson 
High from refugee camps, war zones, and collapsed economies, compared the 
educational quality their schools to Philadelphia’s in essays, senior projects, and district-
budget meetings, voicing their concerns about the potentially false promise made to them 
through the Horatio Algiers narrative.  
Lila , a Pakistani student from the Swat Valley, a contested territory in northern 
Pakistan near the Afghan border, immigrated to the United States because extremist 
groups closed the schools in her region. Hell-bent on making it to college, she battled her 
family to attend public school in Philadelphia and even convinced them to allow her to 
apply to community college. At an SRC meeting, she stood in front of 200 people, after 
having only learned English 9 months prior, and rebuked district and state officials for 
the current state of the system.    
You need to do better. This school district is one of the biggest in the United 
States and you should not cut the budget because the education is the most 
important. I mean, in Pakistan, we studied a lot of science classes and I don’t have 
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as many here. We had books for everyone. Here, 4 of us have to share in class. In 
our ELL classes, we should not have 35 students. What do you want for your new 
citizens? This is a developed country! There is no excuse! (Fieldnote, 4/14/14) 
 
Several other students took on the district budget crisis and mass school closures in their 
senior projects. Barat, a Bangladeshi student that force-transferred to Johnson High in 
September of her senior year after her former high school closed, lamented that not only 
had the school closures hurt her support network as she applied for colleges, but that it 
had ended her family’s history in the school.  
I was surprised, because in my country they don’t shut down schools. When I 
heard it’s the whole school, I mean, I know we didn’t have enough students. I was 
disappointed because a lot of my favorite teachers got laid off. It was my first 
kind of home when I came. My uncle went and a lot of my family and community 
went to that school and they have good careers now – pharmacist, finance. So 
they all got like a good education there. (Interview, 4/15/14)  
 
Both Barat and Lila ’s quotes reflect a general incredulity among the immigrant students 
that the state of public education in the U.S. could be worse than their own countries. 
Though many appreciated the fact that school was “free”, grateful for the opportunity to 
attend school without paying fees, they frequently felt resentful that educational 
attainment, their ticket to upward mobility and the primary reason for their family’s 
migration, could be subject to such political whims. Many students echoed the “hierarchy 
of schools” discourse deployed by many native-born students, citing the shame they felt 
for attending a neighborhood high school. David, a recent Tunisian immigrant, explains 
his disappointment when he discovered the meaning of a “neighborhood school.”   
I have a lot of friends in charter schools and I feel like they have their education. I 
think that their students are different in that they are chosen. But in here, it’s a 
neighborhood school, so whoever wants to come, Mr. Keo has to accept them. It’s 
like the reputation of the school you see?  So when I first came here, a lot of my 
father’s friends were like, “David, what high school are you going to?” and I was 
like, “Johnson High School.”  And they were like, “Johnson?  It’s a bad school 
 218
right?”  But the thing is, like when I came here, I wasn’t so excited to be honest 
because they made me feel like I was going to a horrible school, but I didn’t know 
about the schools here. Why should it matter so much? (Interview, 4/10/14) 
 
David “didn’t know about the schools” but learned through interactions with other 
students and family friends that the non-selectivity of his high school qualified it as a 
“bad” school. Thus, he entered Johnson High feeling like it could not provide him with a  
decent public education. However, in later conversations and informal interviews with 
David, an active member of several partners’ programs as well as the National Honor 
Society, he said that his experience at Johnson High did not warrant its reputation. Citing 
to caring, hard-working teachers, and the numerous partnerships Mr. Keo and Mr. 
O’Donnell had brought into the school like Service for Salvation and College Dreams, 
David said that he felt the opportunities were available if students applied themselves.  
 Again, David points to the central issue of perceptions of value driving the 
enrollment in neighborhood schools. As a recent immigrant, he initially felt that a free 
public education was a blessing bestowed upon him. The discourse of choice that 
influenced his extended family’s conversations over school value tainted his own faith in 
the school until he could see opportunities expressed through his personal experiences 
with faculty. He remained in the school through senior year even after receiving an 
opportunity to leave for a special admission school across the city (Fieldnote, 11/13/12). 
However, the administration’s fear of losing students like David to charter and magnet 
schools prompted them to both continue seeking out private partners to increase the 
school’s appeal, and minimize the risk that particular student populations posed to the 
school’s reputation.  
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Student Critiques of Community Partners 
Noting the Fissures  
 While most students, first-generation immigrant and native-born alike, praised the 
school for allowing private providers to fill the gaps in services pre and post-budget cuts, 
several criticized the accessibility of those programs and their overall diagnoses of the 
schools’ needs. Sondra, one of the few white senior female students, came to Johnson 
High from South Jersey after her mother and four siblings moved in with their aunt 
following her parents’ divorce. In between the move to the neighborhood and the divorce, 
her family lived in a Red Roof Inn by the airport and then a shelter in Center City. At the 
time of her interview in early 2014, she lived with her siblings, three cousins, and aunt. 
Working at a grocery store as a cashier a few blocks from Johnson High, her mother 
struggled to establish an independent household. When I met Sondra in a calculus class at 
the beginning of the 2013 school year and asked her about her future plans, she planned 
to attend a college in central Pennsylvania where she would study to become a veterinary 
technical assistant. In continuous conversation with Mr. Lytle, the coordinator of College 
Dreams, Sondra received his help with the applications for the college as well as financial 
aid.  
However, when it came to funding the trip out to take the placement test in 
November, Mr. Lytle could not directly provide the funds for the $60 round-trip bus 
ticket or the hotel costs. Not able to ask her mother for help, Sondra forwent the 
placement test and decided to apply for a job at the local grocery store with her mother. 
In a conversation in Mr. Lytle’s office, she sighed. 
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I mean, what can I do? I can’t ask my mom for the money because she doesn’t 
have it. And then what would I do if I got out there? How would I afford to get 
home if I had to? Also, with my migraines and eating stuff, I don’t know if I 
could even make it on my own there. The doctors at the clinic here know my case. 
I appreciate all Mr. Lytle can do, but he can only do so much, ya know?  
 (Fieldnote, 11/10/13) 
 
I learned later in a formal interview that Sondra suffered a serious carbon monoxide leak 
in her home several years ago has left her with chronic migraines and an inability to keep 
food down. She felt that between her responsibilities at home caring for her siblings 
while her mother worked, her relationship with several doctors at the public clinic, and 
the prohibitive living costs of attending a college so far away, that the barriers to pursuing 
a career as a vet tech were too steep. 
Even though Mr. Lytle provided information and assistance through the 
application process, Sondra points out that sometimes the keys to persistence go beyond 
the program’s capacity. Perhaps Mr. Lytle could help her navigate a university 
admissions website, but he could not resolve the difficult realities introduced by her 
family’s poverty (i.e. $60 bus ticket). Sondra was additionally vocal about the 
discrepancy between partners’ constructions of student needs and consequently, their 
programming, and what she perceived as their actual needs. Nostalgic for her earlier high 
school years before the budget cuts, she complained,  
I don’t mind community service, it’s fun an all, but I already do a lot of service on 
my own. All of these [community partners] want you to do service after-school 
and on the weekends. Like that’s going to get me into college? I mean, ya know, 
yes and no right? It’s really about money for me. They want us to do so much 
community service. You go home, you gotta work and take care of other people, 
but then you also have to take care of your community. It’s overwhelming for 
kids. Sometimes you just need to do somethin’ artsy. You wanna do somethin’ 
with your inner self and not always help other people.  (Interview, 2/7/14)  
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Sondra specifically refers to the mission of Service for Salvation that ran after-school and 
weekend service programming for students. Service for Salvation, a national organization 
founded by a finance executive, rooted its mission in addressing poverty and illiteracy by 
“breaking the cycle of low expectations” in poor communities in the U.S. and abroad 
through service education (Interview, 1/10/14). This particular organization constructed 
the “education crisis” as a global struggle, framing service education as antidote to 
structural educational deficits in both urban areas of the United States and developing 
countries. Sondra directly critiques this construction of the education crisis and more 
importantly, the remedy they propose to solving it: service. Pointing to her unrecognized 
forms of service (i.e. childcare for siblings, responsibilities in a single-parent household), 
Sondra finds fault with Service for Salvation’s failure to recognize the impediments 
imposed on her trajectory not from her “low expectations” of herself but because of the 
structural constraints of living in poverty.  
Partner Instability  
Sondra ’s testimony, in addition to pointing out the organization’s misdiagnosis of 
students’ needs, laments the loss of teacher-led creative after-school programs that she 
enjoyed prior to the budget cuts. “Sometimes you just wanna do somethin’ with your 
inner self and not always help other people,” referenced the outlet that a music teacher 
provided her through an in-school choir to express herself through song.  
Yeah, I mean, we don’t have as many things like we used to in the 9th grade.  I 
used to be in choir, ya know? We still got chess club but Mr. Lytle [College 
Dreams coordinator] runs it but he’ll be gone next year. And all of the sports got 
cut. Like everything we used to have in 9th grade, there’s nothin’ anymore. And I 
think that’s what’s really hurtin’ the school. Nobody wants to be here because it’s 
like borin’ –  there’s nothin’ to do after-school and there’s nothin’ to do during 
school. Even the Work Ready folks, they’re leavin’. I came here for that program 
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and they’ll be gone next year. There’s nothin’ really to do except go to class.  I 
mean, granted that’s what school’s for, but you always want to look forward to 
somethin’.  (Interview, 2/7/14) 
Even though the school had 16 community partners, many of whom provided after-
school programming either at the school or a neutral site, Sondra felt like “there’s really 
nothin’ to do.” This comment points to two issues: 1) partners missing of the mark 2) 
their instability. One of the reasons Sondra attended Johnson High was to benefit from 
Career Ready’s “academy” programming, a combination of in-school and after-school 
curriculum and internship experience intended to prepare students for careers in specific 
fields like hospitality and tourism and urban education. Throughout Sondra’s time at 
Johnson, Career Ready had truncated their funds and staff dedicated to implementing the 
program, culminating in mass pull out from the school at the end of AY 2013-2014 
(Fieldnote, 6/18/14). Understanding partner programming as unstable as the 
extracurricular funding, Sondra’s critique draws attention to the ways in which partner 
programming exacerbated the instability of the school’s resources.  
Selective Service Provision  
 A final yet ubiquitous critique of the community partners industry, shared by both 
native-born and specific groups of ELL students, stressed how partners’ narrow 
constructions of the problems of the school and the missions of their organizations 
rendered visible certain groups for targeted services, and invisible others. In a community 
partner meeting in February of 2014, Mr. Keo asked the community partners whether 
they would like to function as class sponsors for the following year. With no 
extracurricular budget to pay teachers to take on the additional responsibilities, Mr. Keo 
implored the non-profit staff to volunteer their labor.  
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We don’t have enough money to pay for a sponsor for every grade. I barely have 
enough money to buy envelopes. The District is broke. Next year’s budget is 
coming out and it’s not going to be pretty. There isn’t going to be money for the 
teachers’ pensions, so there isn’t going to be any for class sponsorship for sure.  
 
Several of the partners raised their hands as potential volunteers for next year with the 
caveat that should their grants elapse and not be renewed, they might not be employed by 
their organization and able to take on the responsibility. Listening intently to the 
conversation, an invited student to the meeting, Jorie, voiced his frustration with the 
proposed arrangement.  
I think it’s a problem that we don’t have a sponsor for the junior class so that we 
can come together and plan events. We don’t get anything. It also bothers me that 
the seniors get everything. Everyone wants to help them. Like, Mr. Lytle helps 
them and he won’t help me. Isn’t that what we need for a quality education? Isn’t 
that what we need to learn to lead? Is this America? Really? Equality for all?    
 
Mr. Keo responded,  
Yes, you’re right, the seniors are spoiled because they get College Dreams, but 
you have to remember that he’s paid for by a grant and not by us. Mr. Lytle isn’t 
my employee so I can’t control whom he decides to help. As long as our 
educational system is based on taxes, this is the America you’re going to get. 
You’re going to have to take it up with the governor. (Fieldnote, 2/20/14)  
 
Jorie furrowed his brow and put his hand in his chin. While Mr. Keo continued on with 
the meeting, David, who had also been invited to attend the meeting, turned to me and 
confessed,  
To be honest, I wish I lived I the suburbs. I hear a lot of good things about the 
schools. I like Johnson but I don’t feel like I have an advantage. I’m an immigrant 
so I don’t know a lot of things. I want to go to Drexel for engineering but I need 
to find information and Mr. Lytle [College Dreams coordinator] isn’t allowed to 
help me. And Refugee Support, they can’t help me because I don’t qualify. 
  
This idea of seeing resources in the school and not being able to access them because of 
partners’ stringent qualifying criteria frustrated both ELL and native-born students. 
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Because College Dreams targeted only the senior class, other students did not have the 
option of receiving help from the coordinator. In addition, the case managers and tutors 
provided through Refugee Support only offered services to students that qualified for 
their program. David and Jorie alike, both first-generation immigrants, did not have 
parents that worked with raw food products. Their fathers drove cabs and their mothers 
ran their households. Without a counselor that year and no promise of that position 
stabilizing with the budget in the coming year, David and Jorie were incredulous that 
such inequity could exist in the system. Jorie in fact asked, “Is this America? Really? 
Equality for all?”  
Racial Triangulation and Peer Relations 
The Performance of Care  
Juan: I hear that many schools are closing and all of that stuff, but I also know 
that many American students don’t want to study. The people who care are the 
immigrant students. When I was in Mexico, if you’re a good student, they send 
you to another school to study. I mean, I don’t know if they can do that here, but 
if the school is getting so poor or old, they can close it, and the students who care 
can move to another school. I think that’s a good idea because they’re going to a 
school that has students that care about what they’re going to be. (Interview, 
4/7/14)  
 
Juan’s recommendation encapsulates the rift in student categorizations that the 
school traded on in its branding process of Johnson High. Not dissimilar to the ways in 
which teachers and the administration differentiated between student “types”, the 
injection of increasing numbers of immigrant students to boost enrollment numbers and 
improve perceivably mutable statistics like “school climate” exacerbated the social 
distance between ELL and native-born students (i.e. “Americans”). Students took up 
these discourses and circulated them amongst each other, immigrant students oftentimes 
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characterizing “American” students, as lacking reverence for both their education and 
their teachers. Such insubordination, as Juan explained, warranted the closing of schools 
disproportionately attended by students who don’t “care about what they’re going to be.” 
This imperative to perform “care” for one’s education intensified as resources 
disappeared and the punishment for appearing apathetic as a collective student body 
loomed.  
Immigrant students oftentimes cited shock at the “behaviors” of “Americans” and 
feared them in their classrooms and hallways. They also saw them as a threat to the 
“quality” of the education they were receiving. One day in the back of a calculus class I 
was observing, I spoke with a first-generation Vietnamese student about my project. I 
told him that I was interested in immigration and education and thought that Johnson 
High would be a good place to conduct the project because of its diversity. He responded,  
Oh! That’s a big issue here. The problem in this school is that there are a lot of 
students that don’t care. You know, the ones that are born here, they say bad 
things, are loud, and fight. Some of the Asians were born here, so maybe they’re 
just like African-Americans, like cursing, beating people up. Like the Chinese 
boys, you know, with the yellow hair and earrings. They fight with the Black kids. 
I don’t understand. How can you not care? The Cambodian girls are pregnant and 
think that Obama is going to take care of them. Every day I go home, I see 
Cambodians walking with a baby stroller. It’s like Asian minds right, Asian 
people, like teach their kids to look toward the future. Our parents teach us that 
education is important and that’s why we came here. I’m not their friend because 
they destroy my education. They’re why they think we have a bad school and they 
want to close us (Fieldnote, 12/18/13) 
 
Peter, by linking behavior and race, constructs a particular kind of student that poses a 
threat to the “quality” of his education. Students that “say bad things, are loud, and fight” 
demonstrate a lack of “care” for their education and in turn dilute the quality of the 
education he and his parents “came here” from Vietnam to attain. Through association 
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with students demonstrating these problematic behaviors (i.e. “beating people up, 
cursing”, teen pregnancy, dress), Peter feels that the value of his high school is 
diminished.  
Like Juan, Peter tethers a deficit analysis of his peers to the school’s overarching 
categorization as a “bad school.” Their perspectives demonstrate that perceptions of value 
of the neighborhood are highly racialized, indexed by their feelings toward students that 
exhibit behaviors that they find unbecoming. Again, the term “American” becomes 
slippery as Peter notes is disdain for “Asian students” that were “born here” and act “just 
like African-Americans”. Asserting that he’s “not friends with them because they destroy 
[his] education” he harbors resentment for the students that “don’t care” and refuses to 
associate with them. Like Mr. Keo and Success Academy teachers in Chapter 2, second-
generation Cambodians that rely on public assistance (i.e. “think that Obama will take 
care of them”) are equally indictable for threatening Johnson High’s reputation. Both 
Peter and Juan assign blame to “American” students for diluting their perceived “quality” 
of their education and bringing risk to the sustainability of the institution.  
It Ain’t About Race?: December 2013  
This idea that the “American” students were responsible for degrading 
perceptions of the school therefore was not limited to the administration and teaching 
staff. First generation immigrant students consistently asserted that abstaining from 
contact with “Americans” was the best policy. This included not only African-American 
students, but also “dangerous Asians” like Cambodians as well as White students that 
they felt exhibited the same behaviors. Aware that the school had also suffered at the 
hands of the budget cuts, oftentimes first-generation students eschewed blaming he 
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district for Johnson High’s predicament and instead villainized their native-born or 
“American” peers.  
As the school became a pressure cooker throughout the fall with so few staff, 
morale dropped and tensions began to mount in hallways, classrooms, the lunchroom, 
and schoolyard. By December, several skirmishes between students in the hallways 
escalated into violent incidents after school. By the end of the month, questions over 
whether the incidents were “racially motivated” circulated amongst the staff, 
administration, and study body. Given the violent events several years prior at Johnson’s 
sister neighborhood school where African-American students allegedly attacked Asian 
students, Mr. Keo worried that should the media construe the incidents as “racial”, that 
the school would further increase its consideration for closure. Calling a meeting of the 
community partners and the police chief, Mr. Keo addressed the room:   
 Johnson is very quiet. We usually don’t have racial conflicts. For some strange 
reason this December we had four incidents. These incidents were inside and 
outside the school to the point where some of our students, low-level ELL 
students who speak limited English, were being targeted. I don’t believe that we 
have any hate-crimes going on but I want to make sure that if there is a 
perception that we address it. December 5th, we had an incident at after-school 
with a Chinese student having his cell-phone stolen by African-American 
students from here. On December 13th we had an incidents with Nepali students 
and two African-American students. On December 17th we had a fight involving 
a transfer white student on his first day here that was challenged by an African-
American student. The last fight was an unusual incident in the cafeteria: an 
African-American student decided to take a Chinese-American student’s lunch. 
I’m bringing this up because I can understand where this perception comes from. 
In each of those four incidents, we suspended the students who committed the 
crime. Because many have heard about what transpired at [sister high school], 
the lower level students expressed concerns. (Meeting Recording, 1/6/14) 
 
The ambivalence in Mr. Keo’s account of the problem pervaded the rest of the school as 
labeling the incidents as “racial” might influence perceptions of the school as hostile to 
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vulnerable “ELL” students, the primary pillar of the first strategy to keep the school open. 
As Mr. Keo points out, even though he doesn’t “believe” that “hate-crimes are going on”, 
should perceptions of the school as “dangerous” travel through the neighborhood, both 
enrollment and their climate evaluation would drop.  
When the teachers and principal got word that several of the ELL students, mostly 
first-generation Asians, and their parents were reconsidering sending their kids to school 
out of fear that they might be attacked by “Americans”, in the following violence 
prevention meeting Mr. Keo and the superintendent begged partners to draft a “climate 
improvement plan” to evaluate whether the tensions in the school were in fact, “racial.” 
Mr. Keo enlisted Ms. Shore and Ms. Crowley, the partner coordinators of Service for 
Salvation and Career Ready, as well as myself to implement a staff and student survey 
and focus groups to gage perceptions of racial tensions school-wide. My responsibility 
was to gather representative groups of students from a range of categories – racial, ethnic, 
English-language status, generation, and grade – to conduct focus groups around issues of 
peer relationships.  
In five hour-long focus groups with heterogeneous sampling across grades, I 
found remarkably similar patterns in student perceptions of race tensions. All groups 
admitted that large increases in the number of ELL students in recent years, the 
bifurcated curriculum put in place to address linguistic differences between the native-
born and ELLs, and the favored treatment of ELL students by staff, teachers, and 
administrators exacerbated the segregation and relations between “ELL” students and 
native-born students. It was also apparent that ELL students felt more strongly that 
tensions existed between the native-born and themselves than the native-born. The 
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native-born however reported, particularly the seniors, feelings of exclusion and a 
devaluing of their contributions to the school community in the last several years. These 
trends mirrored survey results that suggested that ELL students were more likely to report 
feeling respected by their teachers than non-ELLs and that they felt that their culture was 
valued (Survey Results, 2/20/14). In a senior focus group with five students – Sondra 
(white-female), Eric (African-American male), Michael (African-American male), Sally 
(African-American female), and Sam (second generation Cambodian-American) – these 
students processed their opinions around these issues.  
Sam: Well, I think it’s because those ELL teachers are nicer.  
Sondra: Well at the end of the year there’s like this award ceremony that we all 
have, and we all come to get our awards, but then it’s like all the Asians. They get 
all of the awards and we don’t get nothin’. Don’t they care about what we do?  
Sally: I mean, I think they deserve it because they work hard.  I would never work 
that hard (laughing). 
Eric: Yeah, because like I said, that’s what they be comin’ here for! We in 
general take education more lightly because it’s like, education. 
Sondra: What are you talkin’ about?! I take it seriously! I get straight As and I 
was homeless for like 2 years! I work my butt off. 
Sam: I try hard too because I want to be an inspiration toward my younger 
siblings but yeah, sometimes I feel like everybody in this school likes the ELL 
students more.   
Michael: Yeah, the ELL teachers give em’ whatever they want.  They give em’ 
breakfast and stuff. We don’t get no breakfast. We gotta be somethin’ special to 
get breakfast.   
Eric: They might nurture the ELL students a lil’ bit more because they not from 
here, and maybe the American students don’t understand. I don’t have a problem. 
They just wanna welcome ‘em to America. 
Sondra: I mean, yeah, they do get help a lot, like from the partners right, but I 
don’t take offense to it because sometimes they do need it. Because like, I do the 
IDs and stuff, and most of the kids don’t know what I’m sayin’ and I am real glad 
that they have someone to help them learn English and stuff.  (Focus Group, 
1/18/14)  
 
This focus group, while admitting that they felt that the ELL students had more caring 
teachers and received most of the accolades at the beginning of the year, overwhelmingly 
 230
respected the work ethic of the ELL students and appreciate their need for extra “help” 
from the partner staff and teachers because of the language barrier that they faced. 
However, Sondra asks, “Don’t they care about what we do?” pointing to a sensed 
marginalization as the school became increasingly ELL-dominated.  
 In a focus group of heterogeneous, native-born sophomores, their analysis of the 
source of the violence between the native-born and ELL students in December centered 
much more around perceptions of weakness and not necessarily “race.” In focus group, 
Sean is a White male, Kevin is an African-American male, Nina is an African-American 
female, and Jackson is a Cambodian-American male.  
Julie: What do you think about the ELL students in this school?  
Kevin: They be easy targets.  
Julie: Because of their race? 
Kevin: People see ‘em walking home and they think they weak and won’t fight 
back so they just want to go and jump ‘em. I don’t be havin’ classes with ‘em 
though, so I don’t know.  
Sean: The Pakistanis be [referring to Bhutanese refugees] smellin’ and loud and 
they be aggravatin’ us so people bang their heads in lockers.  
Nina: Yeah, but people always be messin’ with people. It ain’t about race though. 
They can be like disrespectful because we don’t know what they sayin’, and they 
be laughin’ at you and lookin’ at you.   
Julie: Do you think if they mixed the classes and lunches more, things would be 
better? Like you could communicate more and get to know each other? 
Jackson: It would be way worse. The hallways ain’t got like, no teachers, so you 
would have kids fightin’ in class and then callin’ ‘em into the hallways. If the 
schools keep closin’ and we get more, it’s gonna be bad up in here. (Focus Group 
Recording, 1/30/14)  
 
This conversation spoke to several additional issues that complemented the seniors’ 
perspectives on ELL-native-born relationships in the school. The students deployed terms 
like “us” and “them” to signify two crystallized categories of students: “American” and 
“ELL.” As Jackson points out, these categories gained traction as the administration 
deliberately enacted practices to enroll ELL students from both closed schools and other 
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neighborhood high schools across the city. Without additional staff, an increasingly 
isomorphic curriculum, and no resources to implement programming that would facilitate 
sustained conversations between these groups of students, the students, both ELL and 
American were left to develop their own judgments of “the other.” Perceiving ELLs as 
“weak” and unable to defend themselves, Kevin underscores an opportunism that native-
born students saw in bullying ELLs. Jackson warns that “should school keep closin’ and 
we get more, it’s gonna be bad up in here”, pointing to his fears that further injections of 
ELL students might exacerbate relations between the two groups.  
The students of this group stayed close to the notion that the treatment “ain’t 
about race” but rather based on expression of an identity through particular behaviors.  
While ELLs at Johnson were overwhelmingly of Asian descent, that category broke 
down across a wide range of ethnic groups and generational statuses. Lydia, a college-
bound African-American senior and a transfer student from another closed high school, 
explained the linkage between behavior and race.  
And it’s also not even about race, because the Asians—the foreign Asians, they 
don’t communicate with the American Asians at all. So it’s much more about 
behaviors and actions. I don’t care what race you are, if I can’t connect with you, 
it’s hard. Like—Cambodians come here and they have American Cambodians. 
The American Cambodians, they live their lives the American way and haven’t 
had the chance to experience their original culture where their parents came from. 
I see the tension between those two groups also. Our culture is totally different – 
like the way we talk, what music we listen to, who we see on TV. Because even in 
my old school, which was majority black, we had a lot of Haitians and Jamaicans 
and it was still separate. They stuck with themselves; we stuck with ourselves, 
even though we quote-unquote look the same. So I don’t think it’s race at all. It’s 
like how you represent yourself. (Interview, 4/11/14)   
 
Lydia introduces the generational status differences that obscured simple breakdowns in 
race-relations at the school level. Drawing on her experiences as an African-American 
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student with many first-generation black immigrant populations, she compares first and 
second generation Cambodian relations at Johnson to her old high school. Arguing “it’s 
so much more about behaviors and actions…it’s like how you represent yourself,” Lydia 
echoed Peter and several ELL students claims that race in this context was permeable 
based on the kinds of behaviors that a student exhibited, specifically for the second-
generation Asian students of Cambodian and Vietnamese descent that they felt did not 
align themselves with the values of ‘authentic’ Asianness.  
********************************************* 
It depends, if they’re parents are born here, they’re probably like the Americans, 
but if they were born in other countries, they’re probably harder workers.  
(Interview with Miguel, 4/1/14) 
 
Being “ELL” or “Asian” among the students meant consistent performances of 
hard work, self-discipline, compliance, and passivity. “Americanness”, conversely, 
indexed an opposite set of behaviors: laziness, unruliness, defiance, and brashness. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, the administration and teachers understood the latter 
set of behaviors attached to “Americanness” to endanger the school’s collective 
performance via the district’s evaluative criteria (i.e. climate statistics, utilization) for 
closure consideration. In other words, the conflation of “risk” and “Americanness” at the 
school-level was driven by the school’s response to the district’s definition of failure. The 
branding process of the school as a response to this interpretation of the policy, traded on 
the category of “ELL” or “immigrant” to both enroll less risky students and attract private 
partnerships.  
However, by reifying these categories through closure resistance strategies, 
American students largely felt marginalized as a result. As a school, deep fears that 
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“Americans” posed a danger to their safety as well as the school’s fate still permeated the 
ELL student body. First-generation immigrant students like Juan and Peter criticized 
these “types” of students for bringing a “bad” reputation to their school. Others like 
David felt that the non-selectivity of the school made it less appealing to attend. The 
ways in which the strategies to “brand” Johnson High as school worthy of remaining 
open exacerbated relations between “ELL” students and “American” students, manifest 
in December 2013’s violence and students’ narratives “othering” each group. The 
racialized pitting of “risky” students against “model” students within these strategies 
represents what scholars have termed “racial triangulation”, or the relative valorization of 
“Asianness” over “Blackness” (Kim 1999; Tang 2011). Few native-born students in 
interviews, focus groups, and informal interactions expressed overt hostility toward ELL 
students and oftentimes expressed both how grateful they felt to meet students from 
diverse origins. In fact, they internalized the valorization of ELL students, underscoring 
their hard work ethics and persistence in learning English. On several occasions in the 
hallways, I witnessed African-American students saying hello to ELL students in passing 
(Fieldnote, 2/4/14). In the College Dreams class, friendships blossomed between ELL 
and American students as they enjoyed the rare opportunity to interact on a daily basis in 
group-work.  
While many ELL students attributed the “poor quality” of the school to the 
American students, ELL and American students alike also felt that with the proliferation 
of school choice in Philadelphia, attending a neighborhood school meant that they had 
failed, that they weren’t receiving the same kind of education as their peers that went to 
charter schools or, in David’s case, like the students in affluent suburban schools. 
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Internalizing notions of themselves as “failures” without choices, students like James 
lamented that even though he attended one of the “better” neighborhood schools, the 
budget crisis and his school’s consequent resource deprivation symbolized a lack of 
investment in schools attended by students like him. First-generation ELL students’ 
contrasted their educational experiences in their countries of origin, disbelieving that in 
America, public schools could be worse than their own. The fact that their parents had 
“come here” to better their lives vis-à-vis the immigrant bargain magnified their 
resentment.  
Together, ELLs and American students also critiqued the school’s reliance on 
partnerships, stressing the incongruity between partner constructions of the students’ 
needs and their actual needs. Students like Sondra felt that organizations like Service for 
Salvation proposed an all too simple solution, “community service”, to the structural 
issues of poverty embedded in her day-to-day life. Other students like David and Jorie 
highlighted the selectivity and instability of these partners in their services by targeting 
only students that met particular categories of difference, and/or losing grants and having 
to withdraw from the school. Overall they felt that partners could not serve as stand-ins 
for teachers and that the discrepancies between their construction of students’ and 
consequently the school’s needs and their inability to consistently and equitably provide 
services to all of the students, rendered problematic the strategy to mobilize them 
compensate for absent state-funded supports.   
 Across ethnographies of educational policy, student voices are relatively absent as 
researchers have tended to focus more on “official” policy making bodies and adults as 
actors exercising power. I showed in this chapter that students generated sophisticated 
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analyses of the unintended effects of the school closure policy as it related to their 
school’s strategies to remain open. I further demonstrate that student perspectives on 
school closure are not divorced from larger trends in the district like charter school 
expansion that degrade the value of the traditional neighborhood school through 
stratification of school types. BY including their voices, I hoped to illuminate the ways in 
which students make meaning of these reforms in their lives, crafting critiques that shed 
light on issues of equity and choice as they relate to the current direction of education 
reform in Philadelphia. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION: THE BRAND UNRAVELS 
 I concluded my full-time data collection in June of 2014 with plans to write this 
dissertation during 2014-2015. However, through social media, personal relationships 
with Johnson High’s staff and teachers, and my home being in close proximity to the 
school, I have continued to receive updates regarding the school’s climate and everyday 
anecdotes about its activities, events, and problems. Within this final chapter I want to 
use the developments following my fieldwork to trouble the notion that the branding of 
neighborhood high schools is a sustainable, just process for institutions struggling to 
establish their value in an education market that renders them substandard. Further, I 
want to use Johnson High as a cautionary tale to illustrate the problematic, long-term 
effects of treating the traditional public school like a commodity that requires branding in 
order to compete in the marketplace.  
Disbanded Success Academy  
 In the beginning of AY 2014-2015, Ms. Betty alerted me further budget cuts 
required the Mr. Keo to dismantle the Success Academy (Fieldnote, 9/23/14). The 
principal cited that he could not commit to two teachers to only 38 students as other 
classrooms in the building had close to 40 students with 1 teacher. Reactions to this 
development were mixed. At a soccer game that I officiated17 later that year for many of 
Johnson High’s first-generation immigrant youth, Kai, an Burmese-Karen refugee senior, 
                                                           
17 The neighborhood in which I live and Johnson High is located has a thriving soccer community. 
Leagues at local parks and rec centers host players from a range of countries, including many of Johnson 
High’s first generation Latino youth and refugee youth from South and Southeast Asia. I serve as a referee 
for these leagues and therefore keep close contact with these youth through bi-weekly contact at their 
games.  
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a student that had graduated from the ELL program and now took classes with native-
born students, said that the school was “getting bad”.  
Yeah, there are fights everyday in the hallway. The kids are scared and there 
aren’t enough teachers to do anything about it. All of the crazy kids are upstairs 
now. Kids be starting to leave this school soon.  (Fieldnote 3/13/15). 
 
While racially skewed, discriminatory, and illegal, the Success Academy served as a risk 
management mechanism within the Johnson High’s branding process. The closing of the 
Success Academy reintroduced students, overwhelmingly African-American, but several 
White and racially mixed students, that exhibited behaviors associated with “urban 
deviance”, to overcrowded classrooms. As many of my participants noted, the school’s 
labeling and tracking of these students as “failures” or “dangers” was highly racialized 
but did reflect a painful reality that many of them had prior records of violent outbursts 
and arrest (Interview, 1/16/14).18 Minimizing the risk of “serious incidents” remains 
today an essential task for schools like Johnson High that are always at risk of closure. As 
Kai explains in his statement, “kids be starting to leave this school soon”, serious 
incidents not only jeopardize the school’s hard climate data that the School District of 
Philadelphia collates to score and prioritize school’s for closure, but also fuels the 
damage that the media can inflict on the school’s reputation and enrollment. In spite of its 
racialized effects, school leadership like Mr. Keo faced a real hazard in integrating 
students with potentially undiagnosed socio-emotional issues with the necessary supports 
like reasonable teacher to student ratios and staff like counselors, nurses, and school 
psychologists.  
 
                                                           
18 I would like to note that I do not accept the terms or strategies that leadership employed to describe an 
track Success students, nor do I condone its illegality.  
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Partnership Recession 
 In Chapter 5 I described a length the network of private resources accomplished 
through the recruitment and admission of non-profit partners to the school. Of the sixteen 
in the school, I followed five more closely to understand how they came to affect the 
distribution of resources within the school and students and families’ understanding of 
the “quality” of the education that was possible at the neighborhood school. I further 
described the fraught relationships that teachers and leadership had with these 
organizations, boasting strong friendships with many of their coordinators and benefitting 
from the resources they contributed to the void left by budget cuts, yet resenting the need 
for them. A central tension also surfaced between these organizations’ selective missions 
and the non-selective mission of the neighborhood school, exacerbating students’ and 
staffs’ perceptions that first-generation Asian students were “getting more” than native-
born students.  
As my fieldwork concluded, several coordinators of non-profits voiced their 
organization’s plans to withdraw from the school as grants funding their work elapsed. 
College Dreams, an organization that provided essentially a full-time college counselor 
for the senior class and resources for college trips, financial aid workshops, and 
information sessions, ended its activities in May as the students graduated and the grant 
concluded (Interview, 5/16/15). While College Dreams made its temporality more 
explicit from the onset, other organizations achieved more surprise in their decision to 
leave. By June of 2014, Career Ready, a non-profit that had had the longest standing 
relationship with Johnson High, of over two decades, ceased its operations within the 
building after truncating their resources committed for several years. Citing that the 
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school’s potential for closure and also their central organization’s loss of philanthropic 
and corporate grants, the school opted to “consolidate” their investments in two other 
high schools that seemed more “promising” in their futures (Fieldnote, 6/8/15).  
Even with both College Dreams’ and Career Ready’s withdrawal from the school, 
teachers and students still felt encouraged by the contributions of the three remaining 
central non-profit partners, namely Service for Salvation that offered two full-time staff 
and an annual supply budget of $150,000 for service programming within the school, 
including a service trip to a developing country every spring for 8 outstanding students to 
build a school. Service for Salvation avowed an impressive following of over 200 
students, the largest of all of the non-profits, and the least selective in its criteria for 
participation. Interviews with their staff in AY 2013-2014 foreshadowed a continued 
commitment to the school, financial health, and promise as a non-profit that had logged 
thousands of service hours for Johnson’s students. However, by December of 2014, just 
18 months after Service for Salvation had forged this partnership, rumors circulated that 
they too would withdraw before the end of the school year. In March, I sat in on a Skype 
conversation with the national director as students pleaded with him to continue their 
program in Philadelphia. He explained,  
Last year we spent about $300,000 more than we were able to raise which is very 
difficult because we’ve been doing that in Philly since 2002. Over the years it has 
added up because since 2002 we have invested a little more than $4 million in 
running and operating our programs in Philadelphia. Since we weren’t able to 
raise the dollars in Philly, we raised it from other regions. We just can’t sustain it 
that way and if we keep doing it, it’s going to cause us to be in a challenging 
financial situation. Some people have asked why we are expanding our programs 
in Boston and closing them in Philly and that’s a very good question. People in 
the Boston community started reaching out last year and were able to get major 
funding they raised about half a million dollars for the programs even before we 
agreed to come up there. The philanthropic community really rallied there. They 
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were able to raise the money. You have changed the landscape in Philadelphia 
through your service. You have changed communities around the world. Nobody 
can take that away from you. We did not do 148,000 hours of service in 
Philadelphia: you did. Please keep going and serving your communities. You can 
do it without us. That’s who you are. (Phone Call Recording, 3/5/15)  
 
Not only did the loss of Service for Salvation result in bottom line resource losses, 
but their two coordinators also lost their positions. Given their reach in the school to so 
many students and staff, morale plummeted, reinforcing the notion that Johnson High 
was an unworthy institution. As one student, Miguel, put it, “Nobody, if they have the 
choice, sticks around here for long” (Fieldnote, 10/9/13). The two remaining non-profits, 
Refugee Aid and Hoops and Dreams, while providing essential resources for targeted 
populations (i.e. refugees), work with narrow reach. Refugee Aid has strict criteria for 
qualification for their services while Hoops and Dreams has a limited number of slots 
available. As an employee in Refugee Aid’s summer English immersion program, I 
witnessed firsthand the financial instability implicating their organization as block grants 
from the state suffered from partisan gridlock in Pennsylvania’s Congress, and 
philanthropic funding sources threatened to pull out unless their students demonstrated 
measurable growth in their standardized test scores.  
Therefore, in the short year since the end of my “official” data collection, Johnson 
High watched three of their five major non-profit partners leave for reasons endemic 
within the non-profit community: cyclical grant funding, consolidation of resources, and 
mission change. The literature on the non-profit industrial complex corroborates these 
findings, citing the unstable, oftentimes competitive nature of the non-profit world and its 
insufficiency in delivering services formerly provided by the state (Smith 2007; Finley, 
Esposito, and Hall 2012). While the School District of Philadelphia continues to 
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encourage struggling neighborhood schools to become more porous through the 
recruitment of partnerships, the strategy becomes a smokescreen for a more insidious 
problem: that without steady funding from the district and state, partners reify and 
exacerbate the instability in staffing and resources. Moreover, using partners as a way of 
“branding” the school ultimately results in the funneling of resources toward select 
populations deemed “worthy” of service and care in accordance with the missions of the 
non-profit organization. If one likens this strategy to the approach that charter schools 
take to developing partnerships with outside organizations to supplement their budgets, it 
sets up a false expectation as charter schools are guaranteed per capita funding from the 
state in a way that neighborhood schools are not. In turn, the fallout from developing 
internal networks of private capital adversely affect neighborhood schools that cannot 
rely on consistent funding, resources, and staffing through both the state and their 
partners.  
Further Segregation 
Related to sustained austerity at the district level, class sizes surged in AY 2014-
2015 and several teachers pointed to increased segregation between the ELL and native-
born populations in classes. To deal with potential friction from the disbanding of the 
Success Academy, one teacher, Ms. London, noted the administration and several ELL 
teachers’ efforts toward spatial management of conflict.  
This year, all "American"/non-ELL 9th graders are in the 2nd floor wing with the 
doors. So, they are isolated all day from the rest of the school. ELL 9th graders 
are not. The numbers are stark in the AP classes. Even in 2012-2013, there were 
only Asian students in Calculus. This year there are 4 students in Calculus - all 
Asian. Same with physics. They have had some push back this year and it has 
gotten nasty. An honors writing class was started this year and people from 
outside of the school had to argue for including students who aren't Asian. Kids 
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notice it whether or not the adults admit it. The demographics are also changing. 
Fewer Asian students in 9th and 10th grade. (Email Correspondence, 11/20/15).  
 
Ms. London points out that not only are there separate classes for ELL and native-born 
students (i.e. “American”, non-ELL), but that the school has taken steps to place them in 
an entirely different part of the building to discourage contact between the populations. In 
the same vein as before, only Asian students populate the most advanced courses in the 
school. 
 While consistent with observations during my fieldwork of those classes, the 
“pushback” that Ms. London cites in parents and teachers arguing for the inclusion of 
non-Asian students in an honors writing class is unprecedented. While students noticed 
the exclusion in Chapter 6 and many teachers in Chapters 3 and 4 were critical of de facto 
segregation as a strategy to maintain attractive climate numbers, business as usual carried 
on throughout my fieldwork. With budget cuts, resource scarcity and rising stress levels 
among the staff, resistance to these branding strategies from within rarely amounted to 
more than a frustrated comment in passing or a diatribe in an interview. The fact that 
“people outside of the school” such as community members and parents began to 
question the racialized direction of internal reform raise questions about how brands and 
their perceived “value” mutate when consumers begin to magnify their contradictions. 
The looming paradox of the construction of a selective, racialized identity in a non-
selective neighborhood school – rationalized as part of an institutional strategy to survive 
a competitive urban education market – ironically has brought into question the “value” 
of the neighborhood school when the premise of its very establishment is violated.    
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Current Moment  
 As I move into the completion of this dissertation, Johnson High’s fate as a 
neighborhood school in an increasingly menacing district climate is far from conclusive. 
The School District of Philadelphia announced in October 2015, during the final drafting, 
that it would be voting on recommendations in January to close and or convert 15 schools 
to charters (Mezzacappa 2015). Cited as chronically “low-performing”, “under-enrolled” 
and in “urgent” need of “change”, district officials have advertised these conversions and 
closures as a necessary step for offering low-income children access to “high quality” 
schools closer to their homes (Community Meeting, 11/17/15). After attending several 
meetings with parents and teachers in an 100 percent African-American elementary 
school slated for charter conversion, officials have made it clear that school communities, 
parents, and staff will only be involved in decision-making to the extent that they will 
have input over which charter provider will come take over the building. Ultimate 
authority over the fate of these schools rests with the School Reform Commission (SRC) 
this coming January.  
 The lack of democratic participation in a process designed to dramatically 
reconfigure Philadelphia’s landscape is both a mechanism and symptom of the market 
fundamentalist logics that I have argued have been both taken up and resisted at 
traditional public schools like Johnson High. The education market, created through 
policies in the last 20 years to privatize and deregulate urban public education, is not 
guided by principles of democracy and collective decision-making, but the codes of 
“good business.” School communities are expected to control their “performance” and be 
held accountable for their “failure”, yet the resources and participation necessary to 
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establish stable, consistent, educational environments for children to thrive hinge on the 
whim of policymakers at the state and district levels that both define the parameters of 
success and failure and the coffers available for its remediation. Facing this lack of 
control over the ability to plan and/or define their own goals and possibilities for their 
students within this framework, school communities like Johnson High’s respond like 
actors in an education market – they chart their own paths based on assessments of risk 
and value as they compete with charter and other traditional schools to keep their doors 
open.  
At Johnson High these assessments translated into reading students as posing 
degrees risk to the climate, performance, and reputation of the school instead of 
evaluations of pupils’ potential and promise. It meant relying on model minority 
stereotypes and building a school brand around first generation Asian youth that would 
circulate notions of “education quality”, “opportunity” and “safety” beyond the school’s 
bounds to attract larger enrollments and private resources through community partners. It 
meant segregating African-American students and other native-born students from their 
peers in order to “protect” their valued customers: Asian families. As critical policy 
scholarship argues, policies like school closure that extend the marketization of public 
education operate as live “texts”, negotiated, contested, and struggled over between 
groups both within and outside the formal machinery of official policy making (Ozga and 
Jones 2006; Shore, Wright, and Però 2011). They create new relationships and semantic 
spaces based on the politics, value and risk regimes that they invoke in their rollout. At 
Johnson High and in urban districts across the country where closure and charter 
conversions are imminent, school-level actors like administrators, teachers, parents, 
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students, and community members do no interpret these policies in a vacuum. Drawing 
on their own understandings of risk and value, their communities’ histories, 
contemporary social dynamics, and politics, they craft ethically fraught responses from 
backed corners.  
Policy Implications  
 As I have demonstrated, these ethically fraught responses challenge the 
foundations of the traditional public school, the institutional fruit of historical battles for 
mass public education. Within the mainstream of education policy research, ethnographic 
studies that challenge the status quo are oftentimes criticized for not offering specific 
policy recommendations. While this may be true for some studies, I contend that this one 
is rife with recommendations to alter the machinery and assumptions of current 
educational policymaking in U.S. cities. Policies that marry markets to reform stratify 
youth along lines of race and class, not just between charter, magnet, and neighborhood 
schools, but also, as Johnson High shows, within schools. They encourage zero-sum 
competition between institutions in environments of resource scarcity and need, inducing 
leadership and teachers to work toward marketing their schools and not necessarily 
improving them. Based on the oftentimes perverse motivations encouraged by closure-as-
reform, I make several more targeted recommendations.  
1) Suspend the closure of neighborhood schools until the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania has established a funding formula that allows neighborhood schools the 
same advantages afforded to charter schools.  
At the moment, neighborhood schools do not receive per capita funding for their 
students, allowing them to receive students exiting mid-year from charter schools without 
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supplemental funding. Legislative stalemates also have prevented the passing of an 
education budget and consequently have deprived neighborhood schools of teachers and 
supplies since 2011. Closing and converting schools to charters based on 
“underperformance” places the onus for “failure” on teacher and administrators 
negotiating the effects of austerity at ground-zero. Copious studies, both quantitative and 
qualitative alike, have pointed out how flawed the use of purely numeric systems of 
evaluation for “quality” schools can be for poor urban schools (Bryk 2010). The 
quantification of failure therefore does not necessarily measure performance but the poor 
conditions under educators and students operate as well as the income-levels of students’ 
homes. Issuing punitive measures like closure and conversion does not only destroy 
schooling communities but also misdiagnoses the roots of underperformance: poverty and 
underfunding.  
Further, research on the effects of school closures on children who transfer 
(achievement/socioemotional), neighborhood communities, property values, and the 
vacant buildings is still nascent. Existing research shows that the cost savings of 
consolidating and closing schools falls far short of what districts have predicted (Pew 
Charitable Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative 2011; Jack and Sludden 2013). 
Emergent research also suggests that low-income, largely black neighborhoods are 
disproportionately targeted by closures (Research for Action 2012; Bierbaum 2014). In 
light of limited empirical work on the reform, coupled with the overwhelmingly negative 
impact that this work suggests for students and communities, moving forward with plans 
for more mass closures and charter conversions is shortsighted at best, irresponsible and 
impulsive at worst.  
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2) Build democratic participation and local control into the process of potential charter 
conversion.  
My goal in this dissertation was not to indict charter operators, teachers, and the 
families that choose to enroll their charter schools. Many charters do right by their 
students and push the limits of innovative praxis. My qualm lays in the risk that charter 
schools as well as their unfettered expansion in Philadelphia poses to the fiscal and 
political health of democratic institutions like public schools. In AY 2014-2015, the 
School District of Philadelphia allowed two district-run elementary schools to vote 
whether they would like to become charter schools the following year. Overwhelmingly 
the parents, staff, and students decided against the recommendation and remained 
neighborhood schools (Medina 2014). In October 2015, the SDP removed this option for 
15 schools by vesting the SRC with the decision-making power. If communities decide 
that they would like a charter operator, they could broach the district and the district 
decides to work in conjunction with them to match a provider. Unilaterally leveling a 
school community, firing teachers, and holding schools accountable for their performance 
in this climate wrecks both irrevocable damage on neighborhood schools and is wholly 
unjust.  
3) Restore funding to neighborhood schools. And then some.  
I would like to issue a disclaimer that I have not argued for the sufficiency of current 
neighborhood school conditions or their historical performance in the service of poor 
black and brown children. There is no “golden age” for the neighborhood school in the 
last 50 years for poor youth of color, largely due to chronic underfunding and budget 
crises that have plagued districts like Philadelphia’s. I also realize that suggesting equal 
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or more funding (provided vis-à-vis the state) is a politically charged issue without much 
support across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. However, equity in funding is both a 
material and symbolic starting point for Philadelphia’s public schools. Without a formula 
that overly relies on property taxes and/or hinges on the political whims of conservative 
legislators in Harrisburg, Philadelphia’s neighborhood schools will continue to languish 
and decline in infrastructure, morale, and sustainability. Students and families also lose 
confidence that the traditional public school is stable enough to provide the “thorough 
and efficient” education promised by the state, and will continue to flee the district for 
charters or the suburbs.   
4) Identify and employ more holistic evaluation systems of schools and teachers.  
Pulling hard data on climate, test-scores, and enrollment and scoring neighborhood 
schools’ quality has obfuscated the increasingly difficult contexts in which educators and 
students work. A recent report prepared by Research for Action, an independent, non-
partisan Philadelphia-based research firm, stated that 90 percent of school profile scores 
throughout Pennsylvania rely on standardized test scores in spite of the original intention 
to incorporate a wide array of measures (Chute 2015). This reliance on test scores to 
develop “quality” ratings, favors more advantaged schools. It further punishes 
neighborhood schools coping with the effects of austerity and unable to plan for the 
future. These metrics both drive and warp perceptions of school quality, unfairly earning 
educators and students in these schools “failing” labels and shuttering their doors as 
consequence. Systems that more accurately capture the social and political dynamics that 
come to influence a school’s performance are sorely needed.   
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A Note on the Educators in this Study  
 Before moving into final comments, I would like to issue a note regarding my 
profound concern for the ways in which readers might construe the actions of the 
educators in this book. I have used only a small fraction of the mountain of data to frame 
the argument for this dissertation. Among that data are anecdotes and demonstrations of 
courage, integrity, and resilience as teachers and administrators worked amidst not only 
budget cuts but pay freezes and assaults on their pensions and healthcare. I watched them 
cry as they spent 6 weeks proctoring tests to frustrated students that they could not help. I 
saw them dip into their own pockets to make proms, school traditions, and back-to-school 
nights possible. They were passionate but tired, caring but discouraged, compassionate 
but fatigued. While the branding of Johnson High certainly manifested racial tensions and 
service inequities, at the heart of these educators’ efforts was a belief in the neighborhood 
school – that if they could just save it, albeit for a selective population, they could 
preserve a space to create a more inclusive educational environment in the future.  
 My biggest concern is that in sharing their testimonies, readers will label my 
participants as racists – as individual perpetuators of educational practices that 
marginalize black and brown children. This narrow reading would preclude a deeper and 
more important criticism of the disturbing racism in the reform movement at large, 
robbing low-income communities of color of the ability to participate in the fate of their 
schools; a movement predicated on narrow self-interests that allow families and children 
to flee a public system for charters instead of strengthening precariously divested 
neighborhood schools. Reform efforts that deprive communities of color of participation 
in determining the direction of their schools presume that these same communities and 
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their educators do not know how to properly educate their children. Further, these 
reforms break teacher unions and close schools in cities’ poorest neighborhoods. By 
treating neighborhood schools and their employees like dying businesses, they respond 
like dying businesses: with desperation.  
 As I conclude this note, I am reminded of an interview with Mr. Raymond, the AP 
biology teacher in Chapter 4 that lamented internal organization changes like the Success 
Academy and their long-term effects on the mission of the school. Later in his interview, 
he explained,  
I don’t see the District lasting 5 years, honestly. I warn students that are 
considering teaching to maybe look for a different [field] because right now it’s 
tough. They don’t honor any kind of advanced degrees anymore and there’s been 
a pay-freeze for about five years. This district isn’t unique in its problems but 
there’s a big push for the disposable teacher that comes out of some kind of 
certification program, like [Teach for America]. It’s just a stepping stone in the 
path to your next career. You can say that “I taught” and “I know what it’s like to 
be a teacher” and now “I’m going to be a bank executive or a politician”.  It 
deprofessionalizes us. It think I’m ok now just because I’m younger. I can’t 
imagine doing this with kids or even starting a family with the kind of stuff that I 
do now. As a single person, unattached with lots of energy, supporting myself on 
this salary, it barely works. I don’t have an extravagant lifestyle. But a lot of the 
other teachers have been in the game a lot longer than I have and [more 
responsibilities]. They can’t afford to stay in it. (Interview, 4/10/14)  
 
Mr. Raymond’s testimony highlights the difficult choices facing public educators as they 
wade through uncertain waters in their career trajectories. Popular media and political 
pundits oftentimes villainize teachers for “not putting the kids first” but I would like to 
challenge the notion that “what’s good for the kids” and “what’s good for the teachers” 
are mutually exclusive. Imperiling the livelihoods of public school administrators and 
their staff, blaming them for society’s ills, and requiring them to work in progressively 
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more difficult conditions with less pay, disintegrates morale, leaving educators no other 
option but to pursue different professional paths.  
 I therefore want to preempt essentialized interpretations of these staff and 
administrators as racist, unethical individuals that deserve shame. Johnson High’s 
educators are my friends and have taught me a great deal about persistence in the face of 
awesome adversity. I have a deep respect for them and would encourage my readers to 
see them as actors operating in a sociopolitical field of constraints that force them into 
both complicity and resistance to the market fundamentalist project to decentralize and 
privatize public education. In spite of their faults, at the heart of their work is a concern 
for the wellbeing and lives of the youth that they serve. I entreat my readers to 
foreground their compassion and understanding for the multitude of challenges that face 
educators in schools like Johnson High, but not to excuse the racist implications of their 
strategies.   
Future Research  
I ethnographically capture in this dissertation how the threat of closure shifts the 
organizational mission of neighborhood schools from the non-selective service of all 
youth to the selective service of those that enhance their imagined brand’s value. 
Emergent literature looking at the impact of school closures on districts and communities 
has not yet explored school closures as an agent of educational commodification, nor the 
effects that this policy has on the organization and governance of existing neighborhood 
schools. Thus, unlike the bulk of research on this policy that looks at the impact of 
closures on districts and communities, I uniquely explain how risk, uncertainty, and 
value-creation, induced by closure-as-policy, shift the practices and purposes of public 
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educators’ work from pedagogical and democratic, to entrepreneurial and managerial. 
Moreover, understanding how those practices embed racialized notions of risk and value 
illuminates how school branding processes, prompted by closure threats, exacerbate and 
extend inequities in educational opportunities. Tethering notions of “value” to their 
strategies to purge the school of Black children, school actors appropriate anti-black 
logics to structure their responses to market competition. This study is therefore first of 
its kind to understand how perceptions of potential closure become a catalyst for 
problematic cultural and ethical changes that neighborhood schools make in order to 
“merit” staying open. Moreover, this study uniquely captures what happens when 
policymakers relinquish responsibility for defining and structuring a school’s failure by 
placing the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of students and educators. 
This final chapter has also demonstrated that school brands, like those of 
commodities, are fragile. They remain susceptible to media and public discourse that 
frames them as factories of failure, dropout, and violence; as bastions of lazy, union-
protecting teachers and administrators; as outdated institutions that promote complacency 
and stagnation in praxis. Neighborhood schools are also at the mercy of top-down, 
accountability directives from the district and state that unabashedly move forward with 
assumption-laden, context-devoid education reform that further deprives them on the 
resources that they need to improve. Therefore, the branding processes neighborhood 
schools engage become merely stop-gaps, staving off closure temporarily but 
compromising their missions in the interim and exacerbating the treatment of native-born, 
Black children.  
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The School District of Philadelphia’s recent announcement to close 15 more 
schools and convert many to charters makes the reality of closure ever more prescient for 
neighborhood schools district-wide. In the coming years, I plan to initiate ethnographic 
research in additional schools in Philadelphia to gather comparative data for a book on 
variegated responses to school closure policy as a way to explore responses to the 
deepening marketization of public education in American cities. I hypothesize that 
schools with different demographics, needs, leadership, and histories will invoke and 
enact problematic and fraught ethics around their strategies to compete in the market and 
remain open, raising questions about the racial, ethical, and political dimensions and 
unintended implications of market-driven reforms like closures in low-income, urban 
contexts.  
This is the first ethnographic case study for this book project, laying the 
foundation for further inquiry in future years into the consolidation of public 
infrastructure through school closures and its implications for democratic governance and 
social welfare in post-industrial cities more generally. As high-poverty urban school 
districts across the U.S. like Philadelphia’s continue to grapple with discordant pressures 
to stabilize their finances while simultaneously enabling the expansion of charter schools, 
closures will also continue to implicate all urban schools. This study is central to 
understanding not only how school closure as policy, as a signifier or the deepening 
marketization of public education, transforms educational practice in schools under 
consideration, but more importantly, how the racialized and classed processes that the 
policy sets into motion potentially undermine the public entitlement to equality of 
educational opportunity promised to vulnerable youth. 
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